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HAS THE Chevron DOCTRINE RUN OuT OF GAS?
SENZA RIPIENI* USE OF Chevron DEFERENCE
OR THE RULE OF LENITY
Patricia G. Chapman, JD. **
"[A] statute is not a received text, like the Bible or a Shakespearean play. It is
a directive issued by the legislature. Statutes are the instrumentalities by which
our primary policymaking institutions carry out their mission. They determine
how our society is organized and... whether it prospers or declines."'
I. INTRODUCTION
The art of interpreting a musical work involves the composer who writes music
and the performer who interprets it, using many different methods and tools of
interpretation, 2 to "transform [notes] from the printed page into vital communi-
cation."3 The same process rings true for courts engaged in the art of statutory
construction.' The legislature creating the statute is akin to the composer, trans-
lating each legislator's ideas and policies into the composition of a statute. Like
the musician, or orchestra, who interprets the notes of the composer, a court
transforms the words' of the legislature into a determination of "what the law is" 6
for the audience's benefit. The "audience" can be any combination of attorneys,
other courts, the general public, administrative agencies which administer the
statutory scheme, and any regulated entities interested in and/or affected by the
statute or the regulation which is the subject of a court's interpretive efforts.
*Senza Ripieni (literally, without orchestra) is an Italian musical direction which requires all members of the
orchestra to "play silent," except for the soloist. HARVARD DICTIONARY OF Music 734 (2d ed. 1969).
** Ms. Chapman has practiced law since 1983, focusing on complex litigation cases. She is currently the prin-
cipal owner of the Law Offices of Patricia G. Chapman, Houston, Texas, where her practice involves toxic tort
litigation, business litigation, natural resources, and Superfund litigation cases. Ms. Chapman received her
L.L.M. degree in Environmental Law and Natural Resources from Lewis and Clark College, Portland, Oregon,
in 1997. She has been an adjunct law professor at the University of Houston and is a member of the American
Bar Association, the Texas Bar Association, the College of the State Bar of Texas, the Oregon Bar Association,
Who's Who in the Practice of Law, and numerous sections devoted to litigation and environmental law.
1. Edward L. Rubin, Modern Statutes, Loose Canons, and the Limits of Practical Reason: A Response to
Farber and Ross, 45 VARD. L. REV. 579 (1992).
2. For examples of interpretive tools in the art of singing, see MATHILDE MARCHESI, VOCAL METHOD PART
II viii (1945) ("People often speak of the Italian, French or German School or Style of singing.").
3. Expression, HARVARD DICTIONARY OF MUSIC 302 (2d ed. 1969).
4. This Author is not the first to see the parallel relationship between the art of interpretation in the fine
arts and the fine art of statutory interpretation. Jerome Frank, Words and Music: Some Remarks on Statutory
Interpretation, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 1259, 1260 nn.5-9 (1947). The courts, themselves, use musical analogies in
recognition of the phenomenon. See Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Maine, 75 E3d 784, 793 (1st Cir. 1996) ("[A]
rule of construction is apposite only when Congress has blown an uncertain trumpet... ?').
5. A composer uses notes as her tool to convey her intent about a musical subject. Like these notes, the
intentions and directives of the legislature can only be accomplished by the use of words; however, "[w]ords are
clumsy tools, and it is very easy to cut one's fingers with them .. " Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the
Readings of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 546 (1947) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted) (quoting Allen,
Essay on Jeremy Bentham, THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL IDEAS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY ERA 181, 199 (Henshaw
ed. 1931)).
6. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) ("It is emphatically the province and duty of the [judicia-
ry] to [slay what the law is.").
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The difficult choice for a court engaging in this type of performance is the
choice of interpretive tool (judicial standard of review) 7 for the task at hand. The
process is a dynamic one" which is complicated by the need for an analysis of the
statute to determine the legislature's intent and a review of the deeds of the
administrative agency to determine whether the agency's endeavors are true to
that legislative intent. I The difficulty of this type of task is not lessened by the
requirement for some level of judicial restraint (deference) in evaluating an
administrative agency's actions; this deference recognizes the agency's expertise
in the areas it administers.
To many attorneys (and to many law students), an administrative law topic is
one to be avoided or, at the very least, to be approached with the same care (and
attendant reservations) as one would approach a significant dental procedure.
But, as the environmental revolution that began during the 1970s'" continues into
its third decade, its resulting regulatory effects seep into various areas of day-to-
day life,"1 creating new interest in administrative law. Some products of the envi-
ronmental revolutio continuum that create concern within the regulated commu-
nity (and its advocates) are congressionally-expanded punishments, the availabil-
ity of increased jail time and criminal fines under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 2 and individual liability for environmental violations landing "up
and down the corporate ladder."' 3 As a result, the judicial review of these admin-
istrative agency actions takes on additional importance to persons who are
touched by the revolution and/or concerned by its effect.
The anxiety suffered over these matters is not merely fanciful, and no wise
counsel should ignore the consequences of the environmental revolution. It may
be short comfort to the regulated community that its anxiety is shared by the
judiciary. This arm of our tripartite governmental structure has been instructed
to use the interpretive tool of "deference" during the evaluation of an agency's
7. Although the issue of the standard of judicial review is a subject that has been well researched and
reviewed, it is still a concept that is not easily understood:
Judges and scholars of every philosophical stripe strive to make their peace with the subject [of the
standard of judicial review]. Strangely, though, this struggle to understand is self-defeating; more
thought seems to bring less insight, as if the subject were stuck in some intellectual quicksand. It is
the phenomenon of Ptolemy's epicycles, a system of excessive complexity and intellectual waste.
Confessing failure in this exercise, more than a few judges and lawyers have written off the scope of
review as beyond rational description. Scholars, too, tread warily, recognizing that their reputations
as reporters only can suffer as they set out, again with Ptolemy's guidance, to place the mythical
Kingdome of Prester John accurately on the world map.
2 WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: AIR AND WATER § 4.3, at 31 (1986) (footnotes omitted).
8. "[S]tatutory interpretation... changes and must be appraised in relation to time, facts, sanctions, and
ideals" JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 47 (2d ed. 1960).
9. "Ultimately, all questions of administrative law, judicial review of agency action, and the degree of con-
gressional oversight revolve around attempts to discover where the true congressional intent lies." Edward J.
Markey, Congress to Administrative Agencies: Creator, Overseer, and Partner, 1990 DuKE L.J. 967, 968.
10. "The spectacular growth of public concern for the environment has transformed American law during
the past quarter-century. In the space of a single generation, environmental law has grown from a sparse set of
common law precedents and local ordinances to encompass a vast body of national legislation .... ROBERT V
PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAw, SCIENCE AND POLICY 1 (1992).
11. "Numerous federal and state agencies now implement these [environmental] laws through breathtaking-
ly complex regulations that affect virtually every aspect of our lives." Id.
12. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551, 3571 (1994).
13. See infra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
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actions and to elevate the agency's decision over the court's if the agency inter-
pretation is consistent with the statute's legislative intent or if Congress has not
expressed any legislative intent contrary to the agency's interpretation. In the
eyes of some courts, deference and its effects are per se unreasonable. The judi-
cial angst is magnified by Congress' willingness to delegate its legislative pow-
ers to administrative agencies, including the delegation of authority over criminal
activities:
[The delegation of congressional] criminal lawmaking authority to a regulatory
agency.., is enough to make any judge pause and question what has happened.
Deferent and minimal judicial review of Congress' transfer of its criminal law-
making function to ... other [governmental] branches, calls into question the
vitality of the tripartite system established by our Constitution .... Yet that
seems to be the state of the law. Since this court must apply the law as it exists.
. there is nothing further that can be done at this level.14
The idea of "deference""5 covers varying levels of judicial restraint. At this
time, the primary standard for deference is the Chevron"6 standard. However, the
Chevron standard is a difficult standard to rely on because no consistent "defer-
ence" guidelines have been articulated by the Supreme Court for other courts
that must review agency interpretive activities. The Supreme Court uses this
interpretive weapon inconsistently" and arbitrarily replaces it with other inter-
pretive tools, such as the canons of statutory construction," in circumstances in
which deference could be utilized. The Chevron"5 opinion, which spawned the
current guideline for "deference," approved the use of "traditional" tools of statu-
tory construction to determine congressional intent.20 These traditional tools cer-
tainly include the use of canons of construction; however, Chevron did not autho-
rize the current "activist judicial role"2 which indiscriminately replaces the
Chevron deference device with other statutory construction mechanisms.
14. United States v. Mills, 817 F Supp. 1546, 1555 (N.D. Fla. 1993), aff'd, 36 E3d 1052 (11 th Cir. 1994).
15. The term "deference," as used in this Article, refers to the standard set out in Chevron US.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984), which limits judicial discretion in the evalua-
tion of an administrative agency's action interpreting a statute if Congress has not clearly specified a contrary
answer. Although the Chevron case dealt with "formal" interpretations/rule making, the Chevron standard of
deference has also been applied to "informal" interpretations/rule making. See infra notes 97-98 and accompa-
nying text.
16. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
17. Wolpaw v. Commissioner, 47 E3d 787, 790 (6th Cir. 1995) ("[T]he degree to which courts are bound by
agency interpretations of law ... [is] like quicksand. The standard seems to have been constantly shifting,
steadily sinking, and, from the perspective of the intermediate appellate courts, frustrating.") (quoting Ohio
State Univ. v. Secretary, 996 F.2d 122, 123 n.1 (6th Cir. 1993)).
18. The canons of statutory construction, like the doctrine of deference, are not themselves the law, but are
used by courts to interpret the law. Like the Chevron deference doctrine, the canons have been criticized for
their capricious use, see infra note 27, and criticized as a device utilized for the judiciary's own purpose. See,
e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Canons of Statutory Construction and Judicial Preferences,
45 VAND. L. REv. 647, 649-56 (1992) (arguing that canons are judicial inventions created to meet the needs of
their creators).
19. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 837.
20. "If a court, employing traditional tools of statutory construction, ascertains that Congress had an inten-
tion on the precise question at issue, that intention is the law and must be given effect." Id. at 843 n.9 (alter-
ation in original) (citations omitted).
21. Stephen F Ross, Where Have You Gone Karl Llewellyn: Should Congress Turn Its Lonely Eyes to You?,
45 VADo. L. REv. 561, 563-66 (1992) (encouraging courts to utilize canons of construction encourages judicial
activism, not judicial restraint).
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The rule of lenity is one of the interpretive canons of construction exchanged for
Chevron deference in recent environmental enforcement actions.22 Traditionally
used in two separate criminal prosecution contexts,23 the rule of lenity requires
narrow construction of an ambiguous penal statute ' for the benefit of the defen-
dant. However, the use of this traditional criminal doctrine has been expanded
beyond its historical parameters to civil actions.2" There have also been indica-
tions from the Supreme Court that lenity would be applicable in an "appropriate"
administrative enforcement action or administrative penalty case.26 Use of lenity
in this manner often produces results that are inconsistent with the reasoned deci-
sion making of the administrative agency and with the legislative intent underly-
ing a statute, particularly in the environmental law arena.
Courts encountering this issue have adopted a singular standard (a senza ripi-
eni choice)--either the rule of lenity or Chevron deference-when both could
arguably apply. This Article argues that a choice of one or the other is required
by neither constitutional notions of due process nor precedential use of either
22. The rule of lenity has been used in various environmental enforcement cases, with mixed results. Two
of the enforcement cases under the Clean Water Act in which the rule of lenity was successfully asserted to
overturn a conviction or penalty are United States v. Borowski, 977 F.2d 27 (1st Cir. 1992) and United States v.
Plaza Health Laboratories, Inc., 3 E3d 643 (2d Cir. 1993). For instances in which use of the rule of lenity was
disallowed to overturn a criminal conviction, see Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388 (9th Cir. 1995)
(enforcement action under the Clean Water Act); United States v. Weitzenhoff, 35 E3d 1275 (9th Cir. 1994)
(enforcement action under the Clean Water Act); and United States v. Freter, 31 F.3d 783 (9th Cir. 1994)
(enforcement action under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act).
23. The rule of lenity originated in a criminal law context:
[T]he rule of lenity has been applied by the Supreme Court in two distinct types of situations...
[first, where] a federal criminal statute prohibits certain conduct, and the question to be resolved is
whether the defendant's actions fall within the substantive ambit of the statute's prohibition... [and
second, where] there is a question in regard to the severity of punishment Congress has authorized
for particular criminal activity, particularly where the question is one involving the propriety... of
cumulative punishment for multiple aspects of a single criminal transaction.
Daniel A. Per-Lee, Annotation, Supreme Court's Views as to the "Rule of Lenity" in the Construction of
Criminal Statutes, 62 L. ED. 2d 827, 828-29 (1981) (citations omitted).
24. "[A] penal statute is one which imposes punishment for an offense committed against the state ....
The term is ... frequently extended to include any act which imposes a penalty or creates a forfeiture." 73 AM.
JuR. 2D STATUTES § 12 (1974) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). The rule of lenity is used to interpret
"penal statutes," including criminal statutes. See Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 426-27 (1985);
United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347-48 (1971). The rule is also used to interpret statutes with civil sanc-
tions which are "punitive in character." See Leslie Salt Co., 55 E3d at 1398 (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting in
part); accord First Nat'l Bank of Gordon v. Department of Treasury, 911 E2d 57, 65 (8th Cir. 1990).
The rule of lenity has also been applied successfully to overturn convictions under administrative regulations
with criminal sanctions. See United States v. Pincourt, 167 F2d 831, 833 (3d Cir. 1948) ("[Administrative]
provisions must be explicit and unambiguous . . . to sustain a criminal prosecution; they must adequately
inform... [so] the ordinary person can know in advance how to avoid an unlawful course of action.") (quoting
M. Kraus & Bros., Inc. v. United States, 327 U.S. 614, 621 (1946) (citations omitted)); accord First Nat'l Bank
of Gordon, 911 F.2d at 65. However, the character of a penalty is determined through a process of statutory
interpretation. United States v. Charles George Trucking Co., 642 F. Supp. 329, 333 (D. Mass. 1986), aff'd, 823
F.2d 685 (1st Cir. 1987) ("Whether [a] statutorily defined penalty is civil or criminal is a matter of statutory
construction.").
25. United States v. Thompson/Center Arms Co., 504 U.S. 505, 508, 517-18 (1992) (employing the rule of
lenity to successfully overturn the actions of an administrative agency interpreting a civil statute).
26. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or., 515 U. S. 687, 704 n. 18 (1995).
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doctrine." Instead, using the illustrative tools of musical terms and analogies,
this Author argues that combining the two doctrines meets the underlying poli-
cies of both. This doctrinal marriage has the added benefit of fulfilling the con-
gressional intent behind broadly drafted environmental statutes and providing the
fair notice to the regulated community of the prohibitions contained in these
broadly worded statutory provisions required by due process.
Part I.A. of this Article discusses the advent of the administrative agency and
the methods used by administrative agencies to interpret the legislative intent
embodied in statutes. As an illustration, Part I.B. discusses the Environmental
Protection Agency's functions under the environmental enforcement scheme and
the penalties which generate concern for the regulated community, with a focus
on the Clean Water Act's strict liability provisions.28 Part II. explores the idea of
judicial deference to agency interpretations by discussing Chevron deference, the
Supreme Court's subsequent development of its Chevron "themes and varia-
tions,' 29 and illustrating the use of Chevron deference in a recent environmental
case. Part III. presents the rule of lenity by discussing the rule's historical back-
ground, describing its expansion by the Supreme Court and its use in environ-
mental cases, and elucidating concerns which arise from that use, again, by using
cases under the Clean Water Act as illustrations. Part IV discusses problems
with the current judicial practice of a senza ripieni choice of the two doctrines by
highlighting the similarities between the two and arguing that a choice of one
over the other is neither required nor appropriate. Part V discusses the pros and
cons of requiring a choice of one doctrine over the other either by congressional
mandate or Supreme Court precedent. Finally, Part VI. demonstrates that a com-
27. Neither the Chevron deference doctrine nor the canons of construction have been used consistently by
the Supreme Court. For a criticism of the Court's use of the canons of construction, see generally Symposium,
A Reevaluation of the Canons of Statutory Interpretation, 45 VAND. L. REv. 529 (1992). For a criticism of the
Court's use of the Chevron deference doctrine, see generally Russell L. Weaver, Some Realism About Chevron,
58 Mo. L. REv. 129, 138 n.57 (1993) ("Chevron's test is 'ad hoc and malleable,' and is 'like the length of the
chancellor's foot in equity court; it varies from chancellor to chancellor."') (quoting Abner J. Mikva, How
Should the Courts Treat Administrative Agencies, 36 Am. U. L. REv. 1, 8-9 (1986)); see also Russell L. Weaver
& Thomas A. Schweitzer, Deference to Agency Interpretations of Regulations: A Post Chevron Assessment, 22
MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 411, 424-25 (1992) (arguing that Chevron's instructions for greater deference to agency
decisions did not greatly affect the scope of basic judicial review).
28. Illustrative use of the Clean Water Act is appropriate because the Clean Water Act, §§ 101-607, 33
U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994 & Supp. 11 1996), is a strict liability statute which prohibits any activities not taken
in accordance with its terms. 33 U.S.C. § 131 l(a) (1994 & Supp. II 1996) (emphasis added). See also United
States v. Weitzenhoff, 35 E 3d 1275, 1293 (9th Cir. 1994) ("Most statutes permit anything except what is pro-
hibited, but [the Clean Water Act] prohibits all regulated conduct involving waters and wetlands, except what is
permitted .... Much more ordinary, innocent, productive activity is regulated by this law than people not
versed in environmental law might imagine.") (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
29. A theme is a musical idea that is the point of departure for a composition. A variation is the musical
form resulting from the application of different interpretive techniques to the theme, so that a musical theme is
followed by a varying number of modified restatements (variations). HARvARD DiCmtoNARY OF Music 892 (2d
ed. 1969) (original altered).
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bination of both interpretive doctrines (the Chevron waltz)"0 meets two signifi-
cant policy needs under the current environmental landscape status quo: (1) the
need for Chevron deference to an agency's expert interpretation of broad statuto-
ry language, which the legislature requires the agency to administer; and (2) the
need to provide "fair notice" and "certainty" to persons who may suffer substan-
tial penalties for violations of punitive regulations and/or agency interpretations
of regulations designed to promote compliance. So, settle yourselves while the
conductor raises her baton, the music commences, and the Chevron waltz begins!
I. IN THE BEGINNING
A. The Administrative Agency
"Administrative law is not for sissies-so you should lean back, clutch the sides
of your chairs, and steel yourselves ... ."
1. The Advent of the Administrative Agency
Although administrative agencies have been a part of the United States govem-
mental structure since its inception," the rise of the modem agency began at the
turn of the twentieth century, as agencies were created to address anti-competi-
tive conduct of monopolies and powerful corporations. 4 Original questions
about the constitutionality of such agencies were resolved in favor of the agen-
30. This Author spent many sleepless nights trying to justify the "Chevron two-step" to give proper credit
to the national dance of her Texas homeland. Having no luck, however, the author created the Chevron waltz,
with sincere apologies to the originators of the dance, the people of Austria. Id. at 922.
Although no such nomenclature was assigned to it, the method proposed by this Article was conceived
through an analysis of the judicial approach taken in General Electric Co. v. EPA, 53 E3d 1324 (D.C. Cir.
1995). A similar method was used in City ofAlbuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d 415 (10th Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 118 S. Ct. 410 (1997) (using Chevron waltz analysis to uphold a formal agency interpretation). Since
the Author is using the Clean Water Act as her illustrative manuscript, the opinion in Appalachian Energy
Group v. EPA, 33 F.3d 319 (4th Cir. 1994) was used to demonstrate this technique in a Clean Water Act case for
an informal interpretation; the facts of the case were extrapolated to use the Author's analogy, although no
penalties were involved in that opinion.
31. Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511.
32. An administrative agency is "a governmental body charged with administering and implementing par-
ticular legislation." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 42 (5th ed. 1979). For a thorough treatment of the historical
development of the administrative agency, see generally 1 KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 1.4-1.7 (3d ed. 1995).
33. The first federal agency was established by the Act of July 31, 1789, to "estimate the duties
payable" on imports and to perform other related duties. The second agency ... was established by
the President, pursuant to a statute of September 29, 1789, providing for military pensions for
"invalids who were wounded and disabled during the late war," to be paid "under such regulations as
the President of the United States may direct." From that day to this, Congress has been grinding
out legislation creating new agencies and adding to their powers.
1 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 32, at § 1.4, at 7.
34. ERNEST GELLHORN & RONALD M. LEVIN, ADMNISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS IN A NUTSHELL I (3d ed.
1990).
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cies.3 With that question resolved, the number of agencies (and the areas that
they regulated) expanded.3
As their numbers grew, these organizations were created by Congress to
address diverse matters, ranging from needs created by the National Depression
and World War II to social problems. In the 1970s, the Environmental Protection
Agency (hereinafter "EPA") was created to address the congressional and public
concerns about the health and safety of the environment. The EPA'S responsibili-
ties are to administer and enforce the prohibitions of the environmental statutes.
A good example of a broad congressional directive to an administrative agency
can be found in the Clean Water Act (hereinafter "CWA"),37 where Congress
directs the EPA to define and implement its provisions to fulfill the statute's
broad congressional purpose: "to restore and maintain the chemical, physical and
biological integrity of the Nation's waters. 38
2. Development of Agency Interpretive Authority
The legislative provisions which delegate powers enabling the agency to carry
out the statute's purpose are an integral part of any agency-implemented legisla-
tive statute. 9 Although Congress' ability to delegate any portion of its legislative
powers to other governmental branches was itself an original topic of constitu-
35. Sanford N. Caust-Ellenbogen, Blank Checks: Restoring the Balance of Powers in the Post-Chevron
Era, 32 B.C. L. REv. 757, 788 n.166 (1991) ("[T]he constitutionality of executive branch agencies is unques-
tioned .... ).
36. 1 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 32, at § 1.3; Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance
of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 465 (1989) ("Over the course of this century, con-
gressional decisions to intervene in almost every significant aspect of the economic and social order have
brought an enormous increase in the magnitude and pervasiveness of extant federal authority.") (footnote omit-
ted); William Funk et al., Administrative Law Cases and Problems 1-5 (1994) (unpublished manuscript on file
with author.) ("[B]etween 1969 and 1979 alone, Congress enacted 120 regulatory programs and by 1980, there
were 56 major federal regulatory agencies.") (quoting ALFRED C. AMEN, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN A GLOBAL
ECONOMY 83 (1992)); see, e.g., WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW viii (2d ed. 1994).
37. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994 & Supp. 111996).
38. Id. § 1251. Congress also intended that "violations of the CWA result in penalties." See, e.g., United
States v. Weitzenhoff, 35 E3d 1275, 1284 (9th Cir. 1994) ("[T]he congressional explanations of the new penalty
provisions strongly suggest that ... sanctions are to be imposed on an individual who knowingly engages in
conduct that results in a ... violation....").
39. 1 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 32, at § 3.7.
40. Article I of the United States Constitution provides that "[a]ll legislative Powers ... shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. This directive was originally interpreted by the
Supreme Court as a prohibition on any congressional delegation of legislative authority. Field v. Clark, 143
U.S. 649, 692 (1892).
41. The prohibition against congressional delegation of legislative authority was expressly overruled by
United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1910). It is now solidly established that "Congress simply cannot do
its job absent an ability to delegate power under broad general directives." Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S.
361, 372 (1989). However, questions continue to be raised concerning the constitutional validity of the delega-
tion of some of the legislative choices by Congress. See United States v. Mills, 817 F. Supp. 1546, 1555 (N.D.
Fla. 1993) (questioning the constitutionality of congressional delegation of its powers to define criminal activi-
ties, but upholding the defendant's conviction under the CWA), aff'd, 36 F3d 1052 (1 th Cir. 1994).
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tional controversy, ' the question was eventually resolved to allow broad delega-
tion of congressional authority.41 Often included in a legislative delegation of
authority is the delegation of the authority to define crimes (criminal authority), 2
although this legislatively delegated permission is not unconditional.43
3. Agency Interpretations
a. Modem statutes are broadly worded legislative mandates
"Modem" congressional statutes,44 particularly those which are implemented
by administrative agencies, contain extremely broad phrases which describe the
purpose and establish the meaning of the "law," but these same phrases also act
as instructions to the other branches of government to which the statutes are
addressed. Those branches then carry out the statute's legislative purpose by
interpreting its language through various means. It is through those interpreta-
tions that the legislature's intent is accomplished. The CWA is a good example
42. Originally, Congress could not assign its responsibility to define criminal conduct since "[c]rimes were
thought to differ from other sanctionable actions because they carried with them a sense of moral approbation."
Mark D. Alexander, Note, Increased Judicial Scrutiny for the Administrative Crime, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 612,
614-16 (1992) (footnote omitted). Some courts continue to question this idea in the area of administrative
crimes. See, e.g., Mills, 817 E Supp. at 1555.
43. In orderfor any delegated legislative authority to be a permissible delegation, the legislative language
must be drafted clearly to provide the other governmental branches guidance in achieving the legislative pur-
pose of the statute. J.W Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928) ("If Congress [estab-
lishes] by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to [act] is directed to
conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative power."); accord Grimaud, 220 U.S.
at 517; Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 372. The requirement of an "intelligible principle" is particularly acute under a
broadly worded scheme, such as the CWA. However, that scheme has been analyzed and determined to be con-
stitutionally permissible. Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 E3d 1388, 1396 n.3 (9th Cir. 1995) (the process
delegated by Congress to the EPA under the CWA "is more than mere 'intelligible principles' required to
uphold a delegation of legislative power."). See, e.g., WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AusTtN W. SCOTr, JR., SuBSTANTIrrVE
CRiuNAL LAW 154-59 (2d ed. 1986).
However, some commentators continue to insist on the necessity of judicial review of administrative agency
actions to check increasing legislative authority delegated to other governmental branches. Thomas W. Merrill,
Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 994 (1992) (arguing that the purpose of an inde-
pendent judiciary is often described in terms of its capacity for checking arbitrariness and aggrandizement by
the other branches of government) (footnote omitted).
44. Although this Article uses the term "modern statutes" to denote contemporary, broadly worded statutes
whose terms are implemented almost exclusively by administrative agencies, the Author acknowledges that
these "modern statutes" are not new creations, but merely outgrowths of their predecessors: "The statutes are
the outcome of a thousand years of history .... They form a system, with echoes of different moments, none
of which is entitled to prevail over the other." Frankfurter, supra note 5, at 533 (footnote omitted) (quoting
Hoeper v. Commissioner, 284 U.S. 206, 219 (1931)).
45. See Rubin, supra note 1, at 580 (describing modem statutes as legislative instructions to implementa-
tion mechanisms, such as courts and administrative agencies, which operate within a larger scheme to carry out
legislative purpose). An analogous interpretive practice used by musicians exercising their skills in musical
interpretation (particularly in the interpretation of Baroque compositions) is the practice of "ornamentation,"
which "enlivens, expands, or varies" a written or traditional melody "through [the] technique of improvisation."
Ornamentation, HARVARD DIcnoNARv OF Music 629 (2d ed. 1969) (alterations in original).
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of this type of modern statute. Under the CWA, congressional purpose and
intent are sketched in liberal terms so that the EPA must interpret the language
through regulations in order to accomplish Congress' purpose."6
b. Agency interpretations of broadly worded statutes can be formal or informal
i. There are many interpretive options available to the agency to interpret broad
legislative intent
Like other administrative agencies that interpret broad legislative mandates,
the EPA "continually interprets the CWA,"47 using many disparate methods of
interpretative actions. The range of interpretive options is virtually unlimited as
long as the mechanisms chosen comply with the Administrative Procedure Act
(hereinafter "APA")," unless Congress specifically mandates that the interpreta-
tions take a particular form under the subject legislation.49 However, the inter-
pretive options used by administrative agencies to interpret statutes can be classi-
fied into three broad classes of "interpretations":5" (1) legislative rules which
have the same binding effect as a statute; 51 (2) binding principles announced in
46. The purpose of the CWA is "to restore and maintain the ... integrity of the Nation's waters." 33
U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1994 & Supp. II 1996). This purpose is to be implemented by the EPA through various inter-
pretive mechanisms, Id. § 1251(d); however, this authority is not unlimited because both Congress and the
courts serve as overseers of the EPA's activities. See Richard J. Lazarus, The Neglected Question of
Congressional Oversight of EPA: Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes (Who Shall Watch the Watchers Themselves),
54 LAW & CoNTEmp. PROBS. 205 (1991). Other limitations may be contained in the statute's language and/or
under the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act. See infra notes 47-57 and accompanying text.
47. Robert A. Anthony, Which Agency Interpretations Should Bind Citizens and the Courts, 7 YALE J. ON
REG. 1, 2 (1990).
48. Administrative Procedure Act § 1, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-706 (1994 & Supp. H 1996).
49. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-706. One commentator argues that the crucial question that must be answered after
judicial analysis of an agency action is whether the agency has the authority from Congress to act or do its job
in a particular manner, or through a particular format? Robert A. Anthony, supra note 47, at 36-40; see, e.g.,
Robert A. Anthony, Well, You Want the Permit Don't You? Agency Efforts to Make Nonlegislative Documents
Bind the Public, 44 ADMiN. L. REV. 31 (1992) (arguing that an agency's interpretations are binding only if
Congress has indicated that they should be). See also 1 DAvis & PIERCE, supra note 32, at § 3.1 ("Every agency
decision must be anchored in the language of one or more statutes the agency is charged to implement.").
50. Some commentators have observed a fourth type of agency interpretive action: a "practically binding"
informal rule which "do[es] not legally bind," but which is treated by an agency as a "practical binding norm...
upon the regulated or benefitted public." Anthony, supra note 49, at 32.
51. Rules of this type can be promulgated only through use of procedures set forth in the APA, 5 U.S.C. §
553; see also 1 DAvis & PIERCE, supra note 32, at § 6.1 ("[L]egislative rules-have the same binding effect as
statutes... [and] can be promulgated only through use of procedures set forth in APA § 553 .... ).
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adjudicative proceedings (adjudication); 2 and (3) non-legislative rules which do
not have the legal authority to bind either the public or the court.5 3
For the purposes of this Article, the first two categories of administrative inter-
pretations/actions (legislative rulemaking and adjudication) will be called formal
interpretations." "Formal" interpretations are those promulgated by an agency
that are binding on the public and are issued by an agency in such a way that a
court's review will be somewhat restricted. These formal interpretations (and
their informal brethren) will endure unless they are contrary to the language of
the statute or congressional intent,55 or the agency interpretations are unenforce-
able as a matter of law." Non-legislative interpretations (referred to in this paper
as "informal" interpretations), by their nature, do not have any constrictive effect
on the court's review, although some consideration may be given to the agency's
viewpoint on that issue. 7 These informal agency statements fall within the APA's
definition of "rules,"' although there is no required "notice and comment" process.
52. Adjudication is set out in the APA as the agency process for the "formulation of an order." 5 U.S.C. §
551(7). The characteristic that distinguishes legislation from adjudication is that legislation "affects the rights
of individuals in the abstract and must be applied in a further proceeding before the legal position of any partic-
ular individual will be definitively touched by it; while adjudication operates concretely upon individuals in
their individual capacity." 1 DAvis & PIERCE, supra note 32, at §§ 6.1 and 8.1; see, e.g., FUNK ET AL., supra note
36, at 1/27-1/31.
53. Anthony, supra note 49, at 32 ("The[] function [of an informal rule] is to inform staff and the public of
the agency's positions .... "). These informal rules are not required to undergo the APA formal "notice and
comment" process, 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A), but often contain very important information for regulated entities. A
recent example of such an interpretive rule is the memoranda and interim policy statements from EPA Assistant
Administrator, Robert Perciaseppe, which interpreted the first phase of the EPA's storm-water permitting pro-
gram. See Water Pollution, 27 Env't. Rep. (BNA) 840 (Aug. 9, 1996) (announcing that the numeric, water
quality based effluent limits do not apply to storm water permits issued under the CWA). This new policy state-
ment was sent to agency water management division directors and state water program directors. Any other
person who might be affected by this rule would be dependent upon sources, such as commercial environmental
reporting services or industry publications, to receive notice since the EPA is not required to provide "notice
and comment" of this type of rule.
54. Grouping the first two types of interpretive options together is appropriate because "[although t]he dif-
ference between judicial adjudication and agency rulemaking is well known... the important point is that both
processes involve [the] interpretation of a statute*" Rubin, supra note 1, at 582.
55. The agency interpretation will be upheld as reasonable if it is not "inconsistent with the statutory man-
date or [would not] frustrate the policy that Congress sought to implement." Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp. v.
Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 903 F 2d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (quoting Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of
Governors, 468 U.S. 137, 143 (1984)). The agency interpretation will also be upheld as long as it is "reason-
ably related to the purposes of its enabling legislation." Colorado State Banking Bd. v. Resolution Trust Corp.,
926 E2d 931, 945 (10th Cir. 1991) (quoting Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 369
(1973)).
56. The agency's interpretation of the statute will be upheld as long as it is not "arbitrary, capricious, or
manifestly contrary to the statute." Katsis v. INS., 997 F.2d 1067, 1070 (3d Cir. 1993) (quoting Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984)); see also 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)
(1994). "The scope of review under the 'arbitrary and capricious' standard is [a] narrow [one]." Arent v.
Shalala, 70 F.3d 610, 616 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983)). Moreover, although the agency's determination will be given significant leeway, Steel
Mfrs. Ass'n v. EPA, 27 F.3d 642, 646 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (holding that a court may not substitute its judgment for
the agency's, but may require only that the agency engaged in "reasoned decision making"), the agency must
articulate the reason for its interpretation because "'[i]n the absence of any explanation justifying [the agency's
position] ... [the court is] unable to sustain [it] as reasonabl[e] .... ' Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Int'l
Union v. NLRB, 46 E3d 82, 90 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (quoting Leeco, Inc. v. Hayes, 965 E2d 1081, 1085 (D.C. Cir.
1992). See Anthony, supra note 47, at 2-4 n.6, 36-39.
57. See infra note 60. Some examples of these non-binding agency interpretations are policy statements,
interpretive rules, guidance manuals, and memos to staff. Occasionally, these informal interpretation rules are
published in the Federal Register, although that is not required. Anthony, supra note 49, at 31.
58. See, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(4) (1994) (definition of a rule) and 553(b)(A) (1994) (interpretive rules and policy
statements).
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ii. The distinctions between formal and informal interpretations are disregarded
by the courts for the purpose of deference
Initially, the distinction between a "formal" agency interpretation and an
"informal" interpretation 9 played a role in determining the degree of judicial
deference that would be afforded an agency action by a court;6" however, the
lines between the distinctions have blurred and the present state of the law in this
area has been called murky.6 In some instances, the distinction will be consid-
ered by the court in determining whether to defer to the agency's actions (or dic-
tate the level of deference to apply). In other instances, the differences are disre-
garded and the amount of deference afforded may be determined by other fac-
tors, although there is some judicial uncertainty concerning when to regard these
differences and when to reject them. 2 This discussion of the workings of the statu-
tory administrative agency/legislative framework can be appropriately demonstrat-
ed by focusing on the environmental regulatory scheme under the CWA.
B. Agency Interpretation of a Regulatory Scheme-The CWA
1. General Framework of Liability
The congressional framework which composes the general environmental
enforcement scheme of the major environmental statutes contains four modes
63
59. Metropolitan Sch. Dist. v. Davila, 969 F.2d 485, 489-90 (7th Cir. 1992) (stating that the distinction
between formal and informal rules is "admittedly far from crystal clear"); see also I DAVIS & PIERCE, supra
note 32, at § 6.3 (arguing that the main differences between formal and informal interpretive rules are: (1) the
need for congressional intent that the rules be binding; and (2) the need for notice of any binding rules to the
regulated community).
60. The traditional standard used to determine whether a court will give some weight to interpretive rules
and other informal agency rulemaking decisions is set out in Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
Skidmore deference allows a court to give an agency action "important but not controlling significance," based
on the agency's
body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for
guidance. The weight of such a judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness
evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pro-
nouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.
Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 424 (1977) (quoting Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140). The current deference stan-
dard for informal rules is apparently changing since Chevron deference (originally announced in a case involv-
ing a formal interpretive rule) has been applied to both formal and informal rules. See infra notes 131-139 and
accompanying text. But, the Skidmore standard maintains its vitality as a substitute for Chevron deference in
cases involving interpretive (informal) rules. Jamie A Yavelburg, Note, The Revival of Skidmore v. Swift:
Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations after EEOC v. Aramco, 42 DuKE L.J. 166, 197-202 (1992).
61. It has also been described as "'hazy', 'fuzzy', and 'enshrouded in considerable smog'...." Yavelburg,
supra note 60, at 169 (footnotes omitted). In fact, "some have despaired of being able to draw the ... distinc-
tion definitively." Anthony, supra note 49, at 33.
62. See infra note 113; for the purposes of this Article, "deference" means the two-step standard set out in
Chevron.
63. In musical terms, a mode or modality denotes the selection of tones, arranged in a scale, that forms the
basic tonal substance of a composition. HARvARD DIcrIoNAFY OF Music 535 (2d ed. 1969).
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of punishment for environmental polluters: criminal, 4 civil, 5 administrative,"
and liability resulting from actions brought by citizens acting as "private attorney
generals." 7 Any decision by the EPA to bring an enforcement action under this
composition of general congressional directives (and its selection of any one
particular enforcement option)69 is in the sole discretion of the EPA.7" The liabil-
ity scheme established is pervasive,71 with liability for activities attaching both to
64. See generally Clean Air Act § 113, 42 U.S.C. § 7413 (1994); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)
(1994); Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act §§ 103(b), (c), 42 U.S.C. §§
9603(b), (c) (1994 & Supp. 11 1996); Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act §§ 325(b), (d),
42 U.S.C. §§ 11045(b), (d) (1994); Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act § 14(b), 7 U.S.C. §
1361(b) (1994 & Supp. 11 1996); Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act § 105(b), 33 U.S.C. §
1415(b) (1994); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act § 3008(d), 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d) (1994); Public
Health Service Act (Safe Drinking Water Act) § 1423(b), 42 U.S.C. § 300h-2(b) (1994); and Toxic Substances
Control Act § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 2615(b) (1994).
65. See generally Clean Air Act § 113 (b); Clean Water Act §§ 309(b), (d); Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act §§ 107, 113, 122; Emergency Planning and Community Right to
Know Act §§ 325(c)-(e), 326(a); Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act § 14(a); Marine
Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act §§ 105(a), (d); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act § 3008(a);
Safe Drinking Water Act §§ 1423 (a), (b); and Toxic Substances Control Act § 17.
66. See generally Clean Air Act § 113 (d); Clean Water Act § 309(g); Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act §§ 106, 109; Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know
Act § 325; Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act § 13; Marine Protection, Research, and
Sanctuaries Act § 105(a); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act §§ 3008(a), (c), (h); Safe Drinking Water
Act §§ 1423(a), (c); Toxic Substances Control Act § 16(a).
67. Environmental Protection Agency v. City of Green Forest, 921 E2d 1394, 1403 (8th Cir. 1990). Most
environmental statutes contain these provisions. See generally Clean Air Act § 304; Clean Water Act §505;
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act §§ 107, 113; Emergency Planning
and Community Right to Know Act § 326; Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act § 105(g);
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act § 7002; Safe Drinking Water Act § 1449; and Toxic Substances
Control Act § 20; the exception is the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-
136(y).
68. In terms of a musical piece, the word "composition" literally means "putting together." HARVARD
DICTIONARY OF MUSIC 189 (2d ed. 1969).
69. James M. Strock, Environmental Criminal Enforcement for the 1990s, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 916,
936-37 (1989) ("[EPA's] guidelines establish a two-way (civil-criminal and criminal-civil) process of case selec-
tion .... EPA's aim is to identify, prioritize, and target those cases requiring immediate attention and investiga-
tion, and consider criminal enforcement in the context of all available enforcement and response actions.")
Once a case is identified under these guidelines, it is referred to the Department of Justice for prosecution.
If a prosecutor proceeding under the environmental statutes can show that the prohibited activities violate
more than one statute, the government can prosecute under all applicable statutes since the penalties and sanc-
tions available for violations of the environmental statutes are not mutually exclusive. For example, an enforce-
ment action pursued under the CWA for violation of effluent limits under an NPDES permit, 33 U.S.C. § 1342,
does not prevent an additional enforcement action against the violator if sludge resulting from the discharge
contains hazardous waste subject to RCRA's provisions. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6991(i)(1994).
70. "[A]n agency's decision ... to prosecute or enforce, whether through civil or criminal process, is a
decision generally committed to ... [its] absolute discretion." Heckler v. Chancy, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1984);
see also Harmon Cove Condominium Ass'n, Inc. v. Marsh, 815 E2d 949, 953 (3d Cir. 1987) (holding that the
decision to enforce violations under a CWA permit are committed to the agency's discretion).
71. Liability under the environmental statutes extends to: (a) Corporations-see United States v. Protex
Indus., Inc., 874 F.2d 740 (10th Cir. 1989) (convicting corporation under RCRA); Apex Oil Co. v. United
States, 530 F.2d 1291 (8th Cir. 1976) (holding that corporation is criminally liable if the crime committed by its
employees is committed within the scope of employment with intent to benefit the corporation); see also
Developments in the Law: Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Behavior Through Criminal Sanctions, 92
HA.v. L. Rev. 1227, 1247 (1979); Tenth Survey of White Collar Crime, Environmental Crimes, 32 AM. CIM. L.
Rv. 245, 252 (1995); (b) Officers of the corporations and other corporate employees-see United States v.
Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d 1275 (9th Cir. 1994) (convicting managers of a sewage treatment plant for the violation of
the plant's NPDES permit); United States v. Goldfaden, 987 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1993) (convicting president of
corporation and adjusting sentence upward under Federal Sentencing Guidelines); and (c) Individuals, regard-
less of their individual level of corporate responsibility-see United States v. Freeman, 30 E3d 1040 (8th Cir.
1994) (convicting co-owner of corporation that manufactured auto parts); United States v. Johnson & Towers,
Inc., 741 F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1984) (convicting foreman and service manager individually of environmental
crimes); United States v. Laughlin, 768 E Supp. 957 (N.D.N.Y. 1991), aff'd., 10 F.3d 961 (2d. Cir. 1993) (con-
victing president of company of illegally storing and disposing of hazardous wastes without a permit).
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the corporate entity and to individual corporate employees, regardless of the
individual's level of corporate responsibility or involvement. For liability to
attach, the individual must merely have some responsibility for, or involvement in,
the activity. This net of liability includes any "responsible corporate officer."72
a. Criminal liability
73
The environmental statutory enforcement scheme provides for three types of
criminal liability:7' liability resulting from negligent actions, liability resulting
72. For the purpose of the CWA, a responsible corporate officer (hereinafter "RCO") is a "person" subject
to any and all of the penalties under the act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(6) (1994). The RCO doctrine has been almost
universally criticized for its expansive coverage. See generally Steven M. Morgan & Allison K. Obermann,
Perils of the Profession: Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine May Facilitate a Dramatic Increase in
Criminal Prosecutions of Environmental Offenders, 45 Sw. L.J. 1199 (1991) (proposing alternatives to the RCO
doctrine that reduce a violator's criminal liability); Brenda S. Hustis & John Y. Gotanda, The Responsible
Corporate Officer: Designated Felon or Legal Fiction, 25 Lov. U. CHI. L.J. 169 (1994) (arguing against the use
of the RCO doctrine); Larry Howell, Environmental Crimes: The Boom in "Busting" Corporations and Their
Responsible Officers, 16 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 417 (1992) (tracing the increased use of the RCO doctrine);
Jeremy D. Heep, Comment, Adapting the Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine in Light of United States v.
MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co., 78 MINN. L. REv. 699 (1994) (examining situations in which the RCO
doctrine should be limited).
73. "[Initially, the] EPA investigated only a limited number of criminal cases .... [However, because the]
unlawful disposal of hazardous waste [became] a significant national concern," the EPA strengthened its
enforcement program by increasing the number of criminal prosecutions. Strock, supra note 69, at 917-19.
Congress assisted in the effort by passing increasingly strict legislation. Id.
This increase has been criticized as obstructing the cause of improving the quality of the environment. See
Kepten D. Carmichael, Note, Strict Criminal Liability for Environmental Violations: A Need for Judicial
Restraint, 71 IND. L.J. 729, 748-52 & n.2 (1996) (arguing that there are numerous negative consequences result-
ing from environmental strict liability, including a discouraging effect on persons who wish to voluntarily clean
up the consequences of their environmental mishaps).
The current status of the criminal enforcement scheme is in a state of flux due to numerous influences,
including the threat of EPA budget reductions which result from Congress' continuing effort to balance the fed-
eral budget. See Judson W. Starr & John E Cooney, Criminal Enforcement in a Decentralized Environment,
NRLI NEWS (Northwestern School of Law of Lewis and Clark College), Summer 1996, at 4-5. With the re-
election of President Clinton (and a Republican-controlled Congress), this area will remain unstable.
74. A detailed discussion of criminal liability under all of the environmental statutes is beyond the scope of
this Article and has been addressed admirably in numerous other articles. See, e.g., Eva M. Fromm,
Commanding Respect: Criminal Sanctions for Environmental Crimes, 21 ST. MARY'S L.J. 821 (1990); Judson
W Starr & Thomas J. Kelly, Environmental Crimes and the Sentencing Guidelines: The Time Has Come... and
It Is Hard Time, 20 ENvTL. L. REP. 10096, 10096-97 (1990); G. Nelson Smith, III, No Longer Just a Cost of
Doing Business: Criminal Liability of Corporate Officials for Violations of the Clean Water Act and the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 53 LA. L. REv. 119 (1992); Neil S. Cartusciello, Developments in
Environmental Criminal Law: Has the Pendulum Begun It's Return?, 1994, available in WL C964 ALI-ABA
67; Benjamin S. Sharp, Environmental Enforcement Excesses, Overcriminalization and Too Severe Punishment,
21 ENVTL. L. REP. 10658 (Nov. 1991); Tenth Survey of White Collar Crime, supra note 71, at 257.
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from "knowing" actions,7" and liability resulting from "knowing" endangerment
to other persons. There are other "general criminal statutes" that are used by fed-
eral prosecutors in criminal enforcement actions,"6 and any assessed sentences
and penalties can be enhanced under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.77 The
CWA's criminal enforcement provisions track this general enforcement scheme
outline.78
b. Civil penalties
Although all environmental statutes contain civil penalties, the CWA civil
penalties can be utilized as a proper illustrative tool for this author's Chevron
75. The issue of the mens rea required for a successful prosecution under a criminal environmental statute
is currently a subject of vigorous debate. In Staples v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1793, 1804 (1994), the
Supreme Court required a prosecutor to offer proof of the defendant's actions which violated the statute and
proof of defendant's knowledge of the law which made those actions illegal in order to obtain a criminal convic-
tion. See generally Susan Mandiberg, Mental State in Federal Regulatory Crimes: The Environmental Example
(1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (arguing that regulatory crimes are crimes which are not
strict liability crimes, but include a traditional, morally grounded mens rea requirement); Karen M. Hansen,
"Knowing" Environmental Crimes, 16 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 987 (1990) (illustrating that rote application of
the "knowingly" tenets of criminal law results in criminal prosecution for conduct that should be subject only to
civil enforcement); Ralph V Seep, Annotation, Necessity of Proof of Scienter under Statute Fixing Criminal
Penalties for Hazardous Waste Violations, 106 A.L.R. FED 836 (1992) (collecting federal cases which discuss
the necessity of proof of scienter for criminal prosecutions under RCRA).
The one area in which the trend has not been followed is the CWA prosecutions, in which federal prosecutors
have successfully argued that a crime under the Act is a strict liability offense for which the government's bur-
den of proof is reduced. United States v. Weitzenhoff, 35 E3d 1283-86 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v.
Hopkins, 53 E3d 533, 539-40 (2d Cir. 1995). But see United States v. Ahmad, 101 F.3d 386 (5th Cir. 1996)
(rejecting government's argument that violations of the CWA fall into the judicially created exception for "pub-
lic welfare" offenses).
76. 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1994) (aiding or abetting); 18 U.S.C. § 4 (1994) (misprision of a felony); 18 U.S.C. §
1001 (1994 & Supp. 11 1996) (false statements); 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994) (mail fraud); 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1994)
(conspiracy); 18 U.S.C. § 1505 (1994) (obstruction of agency proceedings).
77. 18 U.S.C. § 3551 (1994 & Supp. 11 1996) ("A defendant found guilty of an offense described in any
Federal statute . . . shall be sentenced in accordance with this chapter.") (emphasis added). The Sentencing
Guidelines apply to both individuals and organizations and subject violators of any environmental law to fines
of up to $250,000.00 for an individual convicted of a felony and up to $500,000.00 in fines for a corporation
convicted of a felony. The statute also permits a fine of twice the gross gain or loss for any person deriving a
pecuniary gain from the offense or an offense resulting in a pecuniary loss to a person other than the defendant.
18 U.S.C. § 3571 (1994).
Although no environmental enforcement action was at issue, in one case, the Supreme Court upheld the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines as constitutional. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 379-408 (1989). For
a more complete description of the Guidelines and how they operate, see Twenty-Fourth Annual Review of
Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals 1993-1994, Sentencing Project
Guidelines, 83 GEo. L.J. 1229 (1995). For a criticism of the use of these guidelines, see David Yellen, Illusion,
Illogic and Injustice: Real Offense Sentencing and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 78 MrNN. L. REV. 403
(1993).
Because of the perceived notions of unfairness, removal of the effect of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
from environmental enforcement activities has been proposed. Sharp, supra note 74, at 10660-64 (suggesting
that there are alternatives to the use of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines that will more successfully remediate
the harm caused by environmental violations). The need for alternative remedies to sentence enhancement
under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines is particularly acute under the CWA because monetary penalties are
mandatory. See infra note 79 and accompanying text.
78. Under the CWA, criminal fines are substantial, even at the lowest level of criminal conviction. The
fines range from $2,500.00 to a limit of $25,000.00 per day per violation or imprisonment of not more than one
year, or both. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1) (1994). If the CWA violation was "knowing" or if the violator has been
previously convicted of a CWA violation, the penalties increase. Id. § 1319(c)(2). A conviction of a negligent
violation committed after a prior conviction increases the available punishment to a fine of not more than
$50,000.00 per day per violation and imprisonment of not more than 2 years, or both. Id. § 1319(c)(1). These
penalties can be increased through an application of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, see supra note 77, with
liability extending to any person perched on the rungs of the corporate ladder. See supra notes 71-72; Carol E.
Dinkins & Faith Bulger, Clean WaterAct Enforcement, 1990, available in WL C534 ALI-ABA 311.
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waltz theory because the CWA is a "strict liability statute.""9 The CWA civil
penalties can be as stringent as the fines provided under the criminal provi-
sions." Once a CWA violation is found, some civil penalty will be levied," even
when the violation results from an administrative action, such as an administra-
tive order.82 However, the court deciding the penalty is required by statute to
consider mitigating factors during any penalty assessment, 3 and settlement is
encouraged by the EPA's own policies. 4 The civil enforcement possibilities
79. "[T]he discharge of any pollutant by any person shall be unlawful." 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1362(12) (1994
& Supp. 111996); see supra note 28.
80. The maximum penalty assessable under the CWA is $25,000.00 per day per violation. Each violation
counts separately for penalty assessment purposes. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Texaco Ref. &
Mktg., Inc., 800 F Supp. 1, 21 (D. Del. 1992) ("[S]eparate exceedances of weight and concentration limits can
constitute separate violations."), aff'd in part, rev 'd in part, 2 E3d 493 (3d Cir. 1993); accord Atlantic States
Legal Found., Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 897 E2d 1128, 1138 (1 1th Cir. 1990). The number of violations is con-
sidered part of the "gravity" factor in penalty calculations for settlement purposes. See United States
Environmental Protection Agency, Interim Clean Water Act Settlement Penalty Policy, 60 Fed. Reg. 22,063
(1995).
81. So far, three circuits have agreed on this point. Atlantic States Legal Found., 897 F2d at 1142 ("[Olnce
a violation has been established, some form of penalty is required.") (citations omitted); Stoddard v. West
Carolina Regional Sewer Auth., 784 E2d 1200, 1208 (4th Cir. 1986) ("This language leaves little doubt that...
a penalty in some form is mandated.") (citations omitted); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 E3d 1388, 1397
(9th Cir. 1995) ("We agree.., that civil penalties are mandatory under section 309(d).").
82. Even if the violation has been of a CWA administrative compliance order (a procedurally challenged
activity, see infra note 86), penalties are mandatory. United States v. Brace, 41 E3d 117, 129-30 (1994)
(remanding case to district court to determine penalties for violation of EPA administrative order).
83. [T]he Court shall consider the seriousness of the violation or violations, the economic benefit (if
any) resulting from the violation, any history of such violations, any good-faith efforts to comply
with the applicable requirements, the economic impact of the penalty on the violator and such other
matters as justice may require.
33 U.S.C. § 1319(d).
84. The EPA's position is that "the ultimate goal of an enforcement action is to resolve the violation as
expeditiously as possible." William A. Moore, The Pendleton Swings from Compliance to Punishment: EPA
Compliance Orders and Duplicative Citizen Suits, 14 REV. LITIG. 247, 272 (1995) (quoting OFFICE OF
ENFORCEMENT, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, ENFORCEMENT FOUR-YEAR STRATEGIC PLAN: ENHANCED
ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT FOR THE 1990's 4 (1991)). To meet that goal, some adjustment downward for
the penalty amount is available if a violator settles his case with the EPA under its settlement procedures.
United States Environmental Protection Agency, Interim Clean Water Act Settlement Penalty Policy, 60 Fed.
Reg. 22,063 (1995). An additional incentive to some violators to settle any assessed penalties comes from the
fact that civil penalties assessed under the CWA are not deductible business expenses. Colt Indus. v. United
States, 17 ENVTL. L. REP. 20962 (Cl. Ct. 1986).
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available under the CWA include filing a civil action 85 or proceeding under the
less procedurally stringent administrative provisions. 6
2. The Environmental Enforcement Scheme Is Intended to be Uniform
The CWA (and the other environmental statutes) attempts to establish a uni-
form scheme 7 for environmental protection. The broad congressional purpose
behind the CWAs8 is implemented and interpreted by the EPA, which constructs
and implements this uniform enforcement scheme. The foundations of the CWA
enforcement scheme are the laws passed by Congress, which establish the out-
lines of the scheme, and the EPA's interpretation of the statute by formal and
informal interpretations.89 The resulting mixture of legislative intent and agency
interpretation (as well as the perception of the judiciary's ability to interpret such
85. Under the CWA, the EPA may commence a civil action for appropriate relief, including a request for
fines and/or injunctive relief to restrain violations, see 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319(b), (c)(4) (1994), but the issuance of
an injunction against violations of the CWA is not mandatory. Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305,
315-18 (1982) (holding that injunctions are available to halt violations of the CWA; however the statute does
not provide for a mandatory injunction). The defendant in such an action has the right to a jury trial on the
question of liability, but the penalty will be assessed by the court. Tull v. U.S., 481 U.S. 412, 426-27 (1987).
86. The administrative compliance order and the administrative penalty are the most frequently used of the
EPA's available enforcement options. RODGERS, supra note 36, at 651. The administrative compliance order
requires fewer procedural requirements than the filing of a civil action and can be issued by the EPA or by the
appropriate state agency for any CWA violation. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(3). If the violator fails to comply with
the EPA's administrative compliance order, the EPA can file a civil action to enforce the order, asking the court
to award monetary penalties and/or a permanent or temporary injunction to enforce the administrative order.
Id. § 1319(b). For the purposes of assessing penalties in a civil suit, a violation of any order issued by the EPA
is a separate CWA violation for which additional penalties can be assessed. Id. § 1319(d).
An administrative penalty proceeding is the other "procedurally challenged" enforcement option. Like the
administrative order, the administrative penalty is "enforcer friendly" due to its lack of procedural require-
ments. The amount of the penalty (and the character of the available hearing) is determined by whether a Class
I sanction (penalties limited to a maximum of $10,000.00 per violation, with a maximum penalty of
$25,000.00, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(2)(A)) or a Class HI sanction (maximum penalty of $125,000.00, 33 U.S.C. §
1319(g)(2)(B)) is being sought. If a Class II penalty is sought, the EPA can seek higher fines, but the violator
is entitled to some procedural protections, such as notice and an opportunity for a formal hearing, 33 U.S.C. §
1319 (g)(2)(B); required mitigation factors, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(3); opportunity for public comment prior to
the assessment of a penalty, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(4); and an opportunity for judicial review, although the scope
of the review is limited, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(5), (8), and (9).
87. Prior to Congressional intervention, the original environmental enforcement network was a mixture of
"common law precedents and local ordinances," which operated neither efficiently nor uniformly. PERCIVAL ET
AL., supra note 10, at 1. To address problems created by "individual judges, acting in a disjointed litigation
regime... and to develop a body of law that adequately addresse[d] the seeming conflicting needs for specific
technical expertise, uniformity and flexibility in application," a comprehensive and consistent scheme of envi-
ronmental enforcement was developed. Moore, supra note 84, at 273-75 (footnotes omitted). This harmonious
scheme was a valuable tool for the regulators, but was also important to the regulated community: "[I]n order
'to promote compliance[,] the enforcement.., policy must be perceived to be continuous'.... [Clonsistency is
important because [it] leads to a kind of social contract that industry enters with government." Id. at 274 (quot-
ing JOSEPH D. DIMENTo, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND AMERICAN BusINEss: DILEMMAS OF COMPLIANCE 100 (1986)
(footnote omitted)).
88. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1994).
89. Some of the formal regulations that interpret the CWA include the following: General Regulations, 40
C.ER. §§ 100-140 (1995); Effluent limits and guidelines (general pretreatment regulations), 40 C.F.R. §§ 400-
471 (1996); CWA & § 404 regulations, 40 C.ER. §§ 230-233 (1995); Army Corp of Engineers § 404 regula-
tions and ocean dumping prohibitions, 33 C.ER. §§ 323-330 (1995); and EPA's Ocean Dumping Regulations,
40 C.ER. §§ 220-229 (1995).
Just a few of the informal guidance documents related to the CWA that are available through commercial
reporting services, like the Environmental Law Reporter, include the following: Guidance on Notice to Public
and Commenters in Clean Water Act Class H Administrative Penalty Proceedings, EPA, 8/28/87, ELR No. AD-
1010; Final Water Quality Guidance for the Great Lakes System, EPA, 3/23/95, ELR No. AD-1208; Guidance
on Division of CWA Administrative Penalties with State or Local Governments, EPA, 9/27/92, ELR No. AD-
1013. These formal and informal regulations/rules constitute the EPA's interpretations of the stated
Congressional purpose underlying the CWA: "[T]o restore and maintain the chemical, physical and biological
integrity of the Nation's waters." 33 U.S.C. § 1251; PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 10, at 877.
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a scheme uniformly) was an essential element which influenced the development
of judicial deference to an agency's expertise as an interpretive tool:
Once again, we are confronted with an area dominated by complex scientific
inquiry and judgment .... We simply are not in a position to second-guess this
technical decision by administrative experts[;] . . . [here,] the best course of
action is to leave this debate to the world of science to ultimately be resolved by
those with specialized training in this field .... [the] EPA's [decision] ... will
not be disturbed.9"
II. CHEVRON DEFERENCE
"To rest upon a formula is a slumber that, prolonged, means death."91
A. Introduction to Deference
The dilemma of whether a court should defer to the interpretive actions of an
administrative agency has existed since the beginning of this century. 2 There are
myriad different situations in which a court will be requested to defer to an
agency's actions, and the degree of "deference" utilized can vary. 3 However,
before determining the level of interpretive deference afforded an agency action,
the court must first address a threshold question: whether, while pursuing its
constitutional responsibility to "determine the law,"'94 it will consider an agency's
view on an interpretive problem in any way." The contemporary standard of
"deference" is defined in Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council.6 The Chevron case involved a formal rule, promulgated by the EPA,
interpreting provisions of the Clean Air Act. 7 Although the issue arose in the
context of an EPA "formal interpretation," Chevron deference has also been used
90. Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 16 E3d 1395, 1404 (4th Cir. 1993).
91. Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 596 (1961) (quoting Oliver Wendall Holmes).
92. Maureen B. Callahan, Must Federal Courts Defer to Agency Interpretations of Statutes?: A New
Doctrinal Basis for Chevron USA v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 1991 Wis. L. REV. 1275, 1278
("Since the emergence of a large-scale federal administrative apparatus early in this century, the federal courts
have grappled repeatedly with the issue of how to treat agency interpretations of statutes.") (footnote omitted).
See also Yavelburg, supra note 61, at 167 ("As the interpretive role of agencies [grew], the courts ... grappled
with the question of what level of deference to give agency opinions.") (footnote omitted).
93. See infra note 113 and accompanying text.
94. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) ("It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to [s]ay what the law is."). However, with the advent of the administrative agency and the notion of
deference, this "duty of the judicial department" has changed and now it is the administrative agencies who are
"saying what the law is" by filling in the gaps of broadly worded statutes. This alteration in the scheme raises
serious constitutional questions. See Caust-Ellenbogen, supra note 35, at 790 ("The notion that a court should
defer to an agency interpretation of law appears on its face to violate article III. Such deference .. .either
[vests] judicial power in an administrative agency that lacks the attributes of an article III tribunal or [restricts]
the scope of the federal court's jurisdiction over cases arising under federal law....").
95. "If [a] court concludes that some consideration is appropriate, the question remains whether that con-
sideration is required or merely the preferred course .... Once a court determines that consideration of an
agency's view is either required or appropriate, it must decide upon the extent of that consideration.
Callahan, supra note 92, at 1276 n.3.
96. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
97. Clean AirAct §§ 101-618, 42 U.S.C. §§ 74 01-7671q (1994 & Supp. I 1996).
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by some courts as a standard to justify judicial deference to informal or non-leg-
islative rules, although use of Chevron in this manner has been highly criti-
cized.98
B. Chevron Deference-The Current Standard
1. Chevron Introduced a New Era for Administrative Law
The Chevron decision marked a new era in the field of administrative law. It
was the Alpha (beginning) of the Chevron deference doctrine and the supposed
Omega (end) of the inconsistent patchwork of judicial standards used to evaluate
the interpretive actions of an administrative agency. Prior to the Chevron deci-
sion, there was no standardized judicial approach used to evaluate an administra-
tive agency's actions.9
The pre-Chevron practice of "deference on a sliding scale"1 ' was supposedly
changed by Chevron 's "simple" two-step analysis:
First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the pre-
cise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the
matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguous-
ly expressed intent of Congress. If... the statute is silent or ambiguous with
respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute. 101
2. The Chevron Approach Was Not Universally Accepted
a. Although the Chevron standard simplified the review of agency actions, it was
perceived as problematic for the authority it removed from the judiciary and gave
to the agencies
98. See infra notes 131-140 and accompanying text. The traditional deference standard for an informal rule
is set out in Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944), see supra note 60.
99. See Caust-Ellenbogen, supra note 35, at 764, 770 ("The pre-Chevron cases are notable for their appar-
ent inconsistency regarding judicial review of agency interpretations of law .... Courts had developed no clear
guidelines to indicate which situations required deference ... [or] whether the agency was entitled to binding,
or merely persuasive, deference.") (footnotes omitted). See also Callahan, supra note 92, at 1276 ("Prior to
Chevron, federal courts implicitly had taken a case-by-case approach, considering agency views and accepting
agency interpretations of statutes only in those instances where such deference was deemed to be appropriate.")
(citation omitted).
100. Merrill, supra note 43, at 972 ("[Before Chevron], deference existed along a sliding scale, ranging from
'great' to 'some' to 'little."') (original altered) (citation omitted).
101. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43 (citations omitted). See Caust-Ellenbogen, supra note 35, at 776
("Chevron ... appeared to resolve the inconsistency in [the] approach suggested by... [previous cases through
the use of] a unitary twopart test applicable to all questions involving judicial review of agency determinations
of law.").
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Reactions to the "new" 10 2 precept were varied." 3  On the positive side, the
Chevron analysis was simple and straightforward, compared to the varying pre-
Chevron judicial efforts. On the other hand, Chevron "s analysis was perceived as
problematic for at least two different reasons. First, the Chevron deference stan-
dard allowed an agency's interpretation to prevail over interpretations1 4 and poli-
cy choices preferred by the reviewing court.05 Effectively, Chevron removed
much of the ability of the judiciary to "determine the law" 06 in those situations
in which the agency's actions were authorized by legislation passed by Congress,
or where the judiciary was unable to ascertain that the agency's actions were con-
trary to congressional intent." 7
Second, that portion of the opinion which indicated that statutory silences or
ambiguities (the "gap")0 8 were an implied delegation of policy making power to
102. See Caust-Ellenbogen, supra note 35, at 776 ("Justice Stevens' . .. rationale that the Constitution
requires courts to defer to the policy choices of the political branches... [broke] new ground in administrative
law."); but see Scalia, supra note 31, at 512 (arguing that Chevron was not "new" law, but merely a statement of
the Court's willingness to accept reasonable executive interpretations of law); cf Merrill, supra note 43, at 975-
76 ("Chevron was an unlikely candidate to produce a landmark decision on deference to executive interpreta-
tions of statutes .... Indeed, there is reason to believe that the participating Justices did not regard Chevron as
a departure from prior law.").
103. Some hailed the analysis as a "pillar in administrative law." Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration
After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2075 (1991) ("[Chevron] has become a... counterMarbury, for the
administrative state."). Other commentators criticized it as a "siren's song." Farina, supra note 36, at 456
("Chevron is a siren's song, seductive but treacherous... [whose] danger... lies in its apparent obliviousness
to the fundamental alterations it makes in our constitutional conception of the administrative state'").
104. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.l; see also Crounse Corp. v. I.C.C., 781 F.2d 1176, 1183 (6th Cir. 1986)
("[l]t is not necessary for a court to find that the agency's construction was the only ... one or even the reading
the court would have reached if the question initially had arisen in a judicial proceeding.") (quoting Federal
Election Comm'n v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm'n, 454 U.S. 27, 39 (1981)). However, the agency
action must be in accordance with the legislative language, Congressional intent, and the APA, see supra note
49 and accompanying text, notes 55-56. Agency action must also "make sense to reviewing courts." Puerto
Rico Sun Oil Co. v. EPA, 8 E3d 73, 77 (1st Cir. 1993).
105. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 864-66; Sunstein, supra note 103, at 2088 and n.81. Some commentators disagree
on whether the Chevron decision removed the court's ability to make policy decisions. Cf Rebecca H. White,
The Stare Decisis "Exception " of the Chevron Deference Rule, 44 FLA. L. REv. 723, 724 n.4 (1992) ("Chevron
thus equated the interpretation of ambiguous statutes to the making of policy choices.") with Scalia, supra note
31, at 515 ("Policy evaluation is... part of the traditional judicial tool-kit that is used in applying the first step
of Chevron-the step that determines, before deferring to agency judgment, whether the law is indeed ambigu-
ous.") (arguing that Chevron does not prevent the judiciary from considering policy choices).
106. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803); see Farina, supra note 36, at 452 ("To determine 'what the
law is' in the context of an actual controversy that turns on a question of statutory meaning is the quintessential
judicial function.").
107. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44. See also Merrill, supra note 43, at 978 (calling Stevens' reasoning the
"democratic theory" which recognizes Congress as "the ultimate source of lawmaking authority in a democra-
cy."). If the congressional intent is clear, both the court and the agency must give effect to Congress' wishes.
108. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. See also Anthony, supra note 47, at 4 ("[Chevron's] language suggests that,
if the reviewing court cannot find specific congressional intent on the precise point at issue, but rather finds the
statute to be silent or ambiguous on that point, it should presume that Congress delegated to the agency the
interpretative authority to fill the gap, and must therefore accept any reasonable agency interpretation.");
Merrill, supra note 43, at 978 ("Chevron declared that the agency is the preferred gap filler.").
This broad area, intended to be filled by agency decisions and interpretations, has also been called a "target
area, a subset of all the available options .... [A]n administrative agency [is instructed by Congress] to imple-
ment the statute by resolving all the remaining issues necessary to produce a definitive governmental decision."
PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 10, at 185.
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the agency 9 created a great deal of concern"' about the degree of enhanced
authority transferred to the agencies as a result of the Chevron decision:
Congress invariably resolves some policy issues but leaves to some other institu-
tion of government the task of resolving many other[s] .... As [Chevron] rec-
ognized .... Congress declines to resolve policy issues for many different rea-
sons .... [H]owever, [what is more controversial about Chevron s recognition
of an implied delegation of policy making power is] that Congress resolves very
few issues when it enacts a statute empowering an agency to regulate."'
b. The landscape of administrative agencies is not cohesive enough for one uni-
form rule of review
Other concerns expressed about the Court's Chevron deference standard arose
out of the non-cohesive nature of the administrative landscape; this varied world
does not lend itself to one Catholicon" 2 rule. As a result, the Chevron deference
doctrine has not been accepted unreservedly because "there are too many differ-
ent types of circumstances, including different statutes, different kinds of appli-
cations, different substantive regulatory or administrative problems, and different
legal postures in which cases arrive, to allow 'proper' judicial attitudes about
questions of law to be reduced to any single simple verbal formula.""
3
109. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 864-66; 1 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 32, § 3.3, at 112 ("Congress cannot, and
does not, resolve all policy disputes when it enacts a statute .... For a variety of reasons-inadequate exper-
tise, inadequate time, inadequate foresight, or problems inherent in collective decision making-Congress
leaves many policy issues open. When Congress drafts a statute that does not resolve a[ll] policy dispute[s,]...
[at some later time], some institution must resolve that dispute."). The reality of this legislative dilemma has
been recognized as one of the reasons administrative agencies were created. See, e.g., Diefenthal v. Civil
Aeronautics Bd., 681 F.2d 1039, 1044 (5th Cir. 1982) ("It was precisely because Congress could not be aware
of the particular problems or needs that would develop in an area that it delegated authority to the agencies,
within the broad confines of the statutory scheme, to deal with these problems as they arose.").
110. Sierra Club v. Larson, 2 F.3d 462, 468 (1st Cir. 1993) ("The Chevron doctrine has been the subject of
much debate ...."). The doctrine has been debated not only among the courts, but also among legal commen-
tators, with little general consensus reached concerning its effect. Cf Callahan, supra note 92, at 1281 ("The
Chevron [decision] is remarkable ...in its apparent substitution of the Court's longstanding case-by-case
approach ... with a blanket rule of required deference ... in the event of statutory silence or ambiguity.") with
Merrill, supra note 43, at 993 ("Chevron 's adoption of a general theoretical framework ... was an important
advance ...[but] the Court [chose] the wrong framework.") and Caust-Ellenbogen, supra note 35, at 761
("Chevron ... is unconstitutional, represents poor political theory, produces bad policy outcomes, and rests on
shaky doctrinal foundations.").
111. Richard J. Pierce, Chevron and its Aftermath: Judicial Review of Agency Interpretations of Statutory
Provisions, 41 VAND. L. REv. 301, 305 (1988) (citation omitted).
112. Catholicon (literally, "universal") was "coined by Glareanus in his Dodecachordon (1547), for compo-
sitions so designed that they may be sung in [a variety of] church modes." HARVARD DICTIONARY OF MUSIC 138
(2d ed. 1969).
113. Merrill, supra note 43, at 1027 (quoting Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and
Policy, 38 ADMtN. L. REv. 363, 373 (1986)). Professor Merrill believes that Chevron's failure to perform con-
sistently "can be attributed to the Court's reluctance to embrace the draconian implications of the doctrine for
the balance of power among the branches, and to practical problems generated by its all-or-nothing approach ......
Id. at 970. Confusion has been added to this already complicated question by the judiciary's flexible use of the
term "deference" in the decisions which discuss this issue, sometimes creating confusion about the particular
meaning being discussed in the caselaw and commentaries. See, e.g., Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R.R. v.
Pena, 44 F.3d 437, 444-45 (7th Cir. 1994) (characterizing "deference" as any one of three separate instances of
agency decision making) (Easterbrook, J., concurring), aff'd, 516 U.S. 152 (1996).
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C. Variations on the Theme of Chevron Deference
As a result of dissatisfaction with Chevron's prototype, a nimble judiciary and
various legal commentators suggested and subsequently composed numerous
variations on the theme of Chevron.14 The Supreme Court's subsequent modifi-
cations effectively changed the original "simple statement" ' of the Chevron
theme, or simply ignored it by replacing the Chevron deference standard with
other doctrines, thus placing limits on its reliability.1 6 Some of these judicially-
composed variations arose out of judicial concern over an agency overreaching
its delegated congressional authority, or overextension of agency activities
through a broad reading of the statute. These exceptions to Chevron deference
seek to place some limits on the exercise of an agency's authority as it interprets
its statutory mandates. 7 An apparent side effect of this trend is the current
Supreme Court use of textualism and/or the plain meaning rule1 8 to find the
voice of legislative intent, regardless of how sour the note plays or how remotely
hidden the legislative voice sounds.
A second set of variations on the Chevron deference theme are attempts by the
Supreme Court to retain opportunities to judicially limit agency interpretations
and/or make decisions which, in the Court's view, are decisions more properly
suited to the rigors of judicial interpretation than Chevron deference. This effort
is accomplished by replacing Chevron deference with other judicial doctrines.
This includes instances in which the issue involved is a "pure question of statuto-
114. See supra note 29. Two Chevron variations proposed by legal commentators are as follows: (1) The
Executive Precedent Model, Merrill, supra note 43, at 1003-12 (proposing that "executive interpretations" be
viewed as a form of precedent and integrated into the process of statutory construction in much the same way
that judicial precedent is integrated); and (2) The Interbranch Cooperative Model, Caust-Ellenbogen, supra note
35, at 823-33 (advocating a return to the pre-Chevron tradition of deference decisions being made on a case-by-
case basis).
115. Originally, the inquiry at step one of the Chevron analysis concerned congressional intent on "the pre-
cise question at issue." Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842. However, the current inquiry at step one of the analysis is
whether Congress has spoken clearly. Metropolitan Stevedore Co. v. Rambo, 515 U.S. 291, 295 (1995) (plain
meaning rule) (emphasis added). The "plain meaning" is determined by using statutorily extrinsic aids, such as
dictionaries or contextual clues and definitions, contained in the statute being interpreted. Thomas W Merrill,
Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 351, 355-57 (1994) (tracing a decline in
the Court's use of Chevron deference).
116. Chevron deference invoked inconsistently or just ignored is viewed as a departure from strict Supreme
Court devotion to the doctrine. See generally Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An
Empirical Study of FederalAdministrative Law, 1990 DuKE L.J. 984 (tracing changes in administrative law over
the last twenty years, with a focus on changes wrought by Chevron). Merrill, supra note 115, at 354-63; David
J. Bederman, Revivalist Canons and Treaty Interpretation, 41 UCLA L. Rav. 953, 1023 n.463 (1994) ("despite
a brief flirtation with deference to agency constructions . . . ,the Supreme Court has not shown much enthusi-
asm for deferring to the Executive in statutory cases.") (citations omitted); see also Caust-Ellenbogen, supra
note 35, at 786 ("Chevron has failed to generate a consistent, easily applicable approach to the problem of judi-
cial review of agency determinations of questions of law.").
117. Two examples of Supreme Court "variations" which judicially limit an agency's authority for statutory
interpretation are demonstrated in Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 177-78 (1990) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring) (stating that limited deference will be given to agency actions when the agency is acting as a prosecutor)
and Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 649-50 (1990). Accord Kelley v. EPA, 15 E3d 1100, 1107-08
(1994) (holding that actions taken by an agency outside its legislatively delegated authority are not entitled to
deference).
118. See Metropolitan Stevedore Co., 515 U.S. at 294-98 (changing established definition of "change in con-
ditions" by declaring the statute's clear meaning); Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 122 (1994) (rejecting an
agency rule codifying a sixty year interpretation of a statute by using "plain meaning" rule). The Supreme
Court's insistence that Congress speak clearly in its legislative language in order to allow a court to ascertain
legislative intent has been criticized as being unrealistic about the legislative process. Pierce, supra note 111, at
304-05; see also Farina, supra note 36, at 468 n.67 ("Chevron's clear statement approach.., has little tolerance
for the vagaries of drafting; ... in the name of vindicating the primacy of the legislature, it adopts a standard of
statutory clarity and specificity that will be difficult for Congress to meet.").
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
ry construction,"' 19 the issue implicated is one of constitutional importance, 2' the
agency interpretation conflicts with Supreme Court precedent,12 and finally,
there are agency actions the Court believes are illogical. 22
The third set of Chevron variations addresses issues of "notice." In these
cases, the court scrutinizes the amount of notice of statutory interpretations
which prohibit certain activities provided to the regulated community and, if
needed, places limits on the regulation's effect. Some examples of these varia-
tions are instances in which the agency takes a litigating position not articulated
in any regulation, ruling, or administrative practice,'23 as well as regulations
which have merely been proposed. 24 The cumulative result of these variations
(and others not discussed) on the Chevron deference theme is an unsteady
"quicksand" of law 2' accompanied by much criticism. 26 In fact, because so
many limits and variations have occurred since the original Chevron decision,
some doubt the continued viability of the original Chevron deference doctrine.127
The final movement'28 in this symphony of Chevron variations involves
Chevron deference given to informal rules. 29 The original Chevron deference
opinion involved an instance in which the EPA promulgated a "formal" rule
interpreting the Clean Air Act. 3 However, during the agency's process of con-
tinually interpreting statutes, 3 ' interpretations take on many different forms, both
119. Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446-48 (1987).
120. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575
(1988).
121. Maislin Indus., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 497 U.S. 116, 134-35 (1990).
122. Agency interpretations must be supported by plausible reasons and must, at least, make sense to the
reviewing court. Madison Gas & Elec. Co. v. EPA, 25 F.3d 526 (7th. Cir. 1994); accord Puerto Rico Sun Oil
Co. v. EPA, 8 F.3d 73, 77 (lst Cir. 1993).
123. Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 212-13 (1988).
124. In re Appletree Mkts., Inc., 19 F.3d. 969, 973 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that deference to proposed regu-
lations is inappropriate because it "would upset the constitutional balance of power among the branches in the
same manner... [as] deference to laws considered[,] but not enacted by Congress").
125. Wolpaw v. Commissioner, 47 E3d 787, 790 (6th Cir. 1995); Yavelburg, supra note 61, at 169.
126. Merrill, supra note 43, at 993 (suggesting that the Court's "persistent refusal to abide by the narrow
strictures of Chevron suggests that there must be something wrong with either Chevron s implicit theory of def-
erence, or its practical implications, or both."). The changes to the original "simple statement" of the Chevron
deference doctrine have had a significant effect on the fundamental principles of Chevron.
First, these changes have converted the Chevron doctrine from a doctrine of deference to an anti-deference doc-
trine. Merrill, supra note 43, at 990-92. This activist judicial involvement is contrary to the judicial role contem-
plated by the Chevron case. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 ("If... Congress has not directly addressed the precise
question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute .... Rather... the ques-
tion for the court is whether the agency's answer is ... permissible...."). Second, so many additions and substi-
tutions for the original two-step inquiry appear to be throw-backs to the polyglot doctrinal approach used by the
judiciary in the pre-Chevron era. Merrill, supra note 43, at 972-75. See also supra note 27 (listing articles
which criticize the inconsistent use of Chevron deference).
127. See Caust-Ellenbogen, supra note 35, at 815-16 ("Despite the broad pronouncements of Chevron,
courts have refused to apply the strong reading of Chevron in certain situations .... [T]he same concerns that
justify the exceptions to Chevron cast doubt on the propriety of Chevron in general.").
128. Movements are the various complete and comparatively independent divisions of musical compositions,
such as the sonata, the symphony, etc. HARvARD DICTIONARY OF Music 547 (2d ed. 1969).
129. Because informal rules do not have the power to "bind" a court to the agency's action, see supra note 57
and accompanying text, the application of Chevron deference to uphold an informal rule has been criticized.
See infra notes 138-139 and accompanying text.
130. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840-41.
131. Anthony, supra note 47, at 2.
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formal and informal. '32 This panapoly of interpretive options is necessary to pro-
mote agency flexibility in "complex or changing circumstances."133 But, a major
problem with the exercise of this adaptable decision making/interpretation is that
these informal rules, some of which impose heavy burdens on the regulated com-
munity, are sometimes enacted without input from, or notice to, those most
affected. The effect of this limited notice is compounded when Chevron defer-
ence is used by the judiciary to defer to informal interpretations. However,
Chevron deference has been given to informal agency interpretations set forth in
manuals, 1 3  guidelines,13 letters directed to state agencies that administer
medicare funds, 136 and agency policy statements. 37 Use of Chevron deference in
this manner has been criticized by commentators3 8 and by the judiciary alike:
There is indeed a great danger in giving Chevron deference (and often, legisla-
tive effect) to rules promulgated without the benefit of [formal] rulemaking...
• After all, once a reviewing court defers to the agency and upholds a rule... it
becomes law without the bother of the agency taking true legislative action.
Worse, it results in private parties.., being bound by "a proposition they had no
opportunity to shape and will have no meaningful opportunity to challenge
when it is applied to them" .... I find such a result both politically undemocra-
tic and jurisprudentially odious.3 9
Although commentators observe that use of the Chevron deference doctrine is
waning, 4" the doctrine is still the most commonly used interpretive tool when the
judiciary interprets agency actions or when a court interprets broadly worded
statutes which authorize agency actions. An example of Chevron deference, as it
has recently been used in an environmental regulatory case, may be found in
Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon14 (here-
inafter "Sweet Home").
132. That is, unless the form of the interpretation is contrary to the APA, see supra note 49, or the legislative
intent of Congress, supra note 55-56 and accompanying text.
133. Shalala v. Guernsey Memorial Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 95 (1995) (citations omitted).
134. Friends of the Shawangunks, Inc. v. Clark, 754 E2d 446, 450 (2d Cir. 1985).
135. Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 59-62 (1995).
136. Elizabeth Blackwell Health Ctr. for Women v. Knoll, 61 E3d 170. 181-82 (3d Cir. 1995).
137. American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 778 E2d 850, 861 (D.C. Cir.
1985).
138. Professor Robert Anthony is a frequent critic on the subject. See Robert A. Anthony, "Interpretive"
Rules, "Legislative" Rules and "Spurious" Rules: Lifting the Smog, 8 ADMIN. L.J. 1, 12-14 (1994); Robert A.
Anthony, supra note 49, at 32-33; Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances,
Manuals and the Like-Should Federal Agencies Use Them to Bind the Public? 41 DUKE L.J. 1311, 1372-75
(1992) (arguing that agencies should engage in formal rulemaking procedures for policies intended to be bind-
ing on the public).
139. Elizabeth Blackwell Health Ctr for Women, 61 E3d at 189-90 (Nygaard, J., dissenting) (citations omit-
ted); see also Community Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 E2d 943, 953 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Starr, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
140. Merrill, supra note 115, at 354 ("Although the Court tends to identify the deference doctrine more
closely with Chevron than ever before, deference to agency interpretations appears to be playing a smaller role
overall than had been the norm up through the end of the 1980's.").
141. 515 U.S. 687 (1995).
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D. Sweet Home
The Endangered Species Act (hereinafter "ESA") prohibits any "taking" of
wildlife protected by the Act's prohibitions; "taking" is defined under the Act as
"harassing, harming, pursuing, wounding or killing" the protected species.'42
The statutory provisions of the ESA do not contain any additional enlightenment
regarding the "harms" that are prohibited, and, in 1975, the Secretary of the
Interior interpreted the statute by promulgating regulations which elaborated on
the "harm" definition. Among other prohibitions, the Secretary's "harm" regula-
tions prohibited "significant habitat modification or degradation where [such
activity] actually kills or injures wildlife."1" Although there are many protec-
tions contained in the ESA for listed species, it was the "harm" regulations
which were challenged by persons financially dependent upon, or interested in,
the forest products industry." These persons argued that Congress did not
intend the ESA's prohibition against "taking" endangered species to include the
regulations' inclusion of habitat modification. This argument failed in the Dis-
trict Court, which employed Chevron deference to uphold the Secretary's regula-
tion, 1 45 but, at the appellate level, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
employed a canon of statutory interpretation, noscitur a sociis,14 to strike down
the "harm" regulations, finding them overly broad. 47
The Supreme Court disagreed with the interpretive approach used by the Court
of Appeals to evaluate the Secretary's "harm" regulations and upheld them as a
reasonable interpretation of the ESA on three separate grounds. The first ground
was an ordinary understanding of the word "harm," which, as used in the
Secretary's interpretation, was found to be consistent with the context and the
legislative intent of the ESA.'48 The third ground for supporting the regulations
was the procedure provided by Congress under the ESA, which allowed permits
to be issued for takings that would otherwise be prohibited. Because some "tak-
ings" prohibited under the ESA could be accomplished, although only if a permit
was properly issued, the Court concluded that indirect takings, such as the habitat
modification encompassed by the Secretary of the Interior's "harm" regulations,
were implicitly prohibited under the terms of the Act."'
142. Endangered Species Act (ESA) § 9(a)(1)(B), 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B) (1994); Sweet Home, 515 U.S.
at 690-91.
143. Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 690.
144. Id. at 692; see also infra note 158.
145. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or. v. Lujan, 806 F. Supp. 279, 285 (D.D.C. 1992),
aff'd, 1 F3d 1 (D.C. Cit. 1994), rev'd, 515 U.S. 687 (1995).
146. "Under the doctrine of 'noscitur a sociis,' the meaning of questionable words or phrases in a statute
may be ascertained by reference to the meaning of words or phrases associated with it." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 956 (5th ed. 1979).
147. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or. v. Babbitt, 17 F.3d 1463, 1465-66 (D.C. Cir.
1994).
148. The Court looked in WEBSTER'S DICTioNARY to find the "ordinary understanding" of the word "harm"
and determined that, in the context of the ESA, harm "encompasses habitat modification that results in actual
injury or death to members of an endangered or threatened species." Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 697.
149. Id. at 700-04.
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The Court's second ground for upholding the "harm" regulation was founded
in a Chevron deference analysis. The Court found that the ESA supported the
Secretary's regulation by extending protection to the habitat of any species that is
protected under the ESA."'t Relying on an earlier Supreme Court decision,' the
Court found that the ESA was the "most comprehensive legislation for the
preservation of endangered species ever enacted" and that one of the Act's cen-
tral purposes was to "provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon which
endangered species and threatened species depend may be conserved." ' 2 Al-
though the "harm" regulation at issue in the Sweet Home case was not at issue in
the earlier case, the Supreme Court's opinion in the prior case did discuss the
regulation at issue in Sweet Home and its inclusion of habitat modification as a
prohibited activity; in fact, the "harm" regulation at issue in Sweet Home was
pivotal in the Court's earlier decision. "' Relying on its reasoning in the earlier
decision, the Sweet Home Court found the following: (1) that Congress intended
to provide comprehensive protection for endangered species listed under the Act;
(2) that no congressional intent could be found under the Act that would cancel
the Secretary's interpretation of "harm," which included habitat modification;
and (3) that the Secretary's interpretation was reasonable and within the scope of
responsibility delegated by Congress through the ESA. 15 "The latitude the
Endangered Species Act gives the Secretary [of the Interior] in enforcing the
statute, together with the degree of regulatory expertise necessary to its enforce-
ment, establishes that we owe some degree of deference to the Secretary's rea-
sonable interpretation."' 56 Once the analysis was complete, the Court proceeded
to uphold the Secretary's regulation.
The Court criticized the District of Columbia Court of Appeals' substitution of
noscitur a sociis in place of Chevron deference to interpret the congressional
intent underlying the ESA, echoing Judge Mikva's concern about the wisdom of
substituting Chevron deference with a canon of construction. 57 The Court also
rejected the respondents' argument that lenity should be applied to overturn the
Secretary's "harm" regulation because some violations of the regulation would
result in criminal penalties. 8
Although the Sweet Home decision relied on Chevron deference to uphold the
Secretary's regulation,5 ' the District of Columbia Court of Appeals' use of a
150. Id. at 698-700.
151. Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) (the snail darter case).
152. Endangered Species Act § 2(b), 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (1994 & Supp. 11 1996); Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at
698 (quoting Tennessee ValleyAuth., 437 U.S. at 180, 193) (citations omitted).
153. Tennessee Valley Auth., 437 U.S. at 184.
154. Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 699 n.12. In Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. at 154, the Court
acknowledged that the legislative mandate underlying the ESA required any measures necessary to save endan-
gered species. "It is clear from the [ESA's] legislative history that Congress intended to halt and reverse the
trend toward species extinction-whatever the cost." Id. The "cost" in the Tennessee Valley case was a nearly
completed multi-million dollar dam project.
155. Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 698-701.
156. Id. at 703 (citations omitted).
157. Id. at 701-02; see infra note 198.
158. Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 704 n.18. For the respondents' lenity argument, see Brief for Respondents,
1995, available in WL 130541, at *28-29.
159. Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 704.
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canon of statutory interpretation (noscitur a sociis) to interpret the statute, and
the respondents' attempts to assert the doctrine of lenity to overturn the regula-
tion, demonstrates that the evolutionary process of the Chevron deference doc-
trine will continue. As courts face the choice of Chevron deference or the use of
"other" interpretive doctrines to evaluate agency actions and interpret statutes,
more Chevron variations will likely appear. These Chevron mutations appear to
be a tacit judicial acknowledgement of Chevron ' shortcomings as it operates in
the extremely complex arena of environmental law, although some form of defer-
ence in this regulatory scheme is crucial.'
The Chevron variations cause particular concern during the evaluation of
agency activities taken in enforcement actions under the CWA, which "prohibits
all regulated conduct involving waters and wetlands except what is permitted." '161
Under that austere scheme, casual, day-to-day activities may be prohibited by
statutory provisions and interpretative regulations promulgated by the EPA.
Persons who engage in such activities may be unaware of the consequences of
their actions and, before penalties can be assessed for those activities, are entitled
to "fair notice" of those consequences. Wholesale Chevron deference to agency
statutory interpretations in those circumstances fails to comply with the require-
ments of due process and, as such, is not an appropriate judicial response.
Concern about Chevron deference in these circumstances (and its effect) has
inspired the judiciary, like the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in Sweet
Home, to use other interpretive doctrines in reviewing agency decisions. One of
the rising stars of the alternative interpretive doctrines is the canon of construc-
tion (interpretation) called the rule of lenity.
III. THE RULE OF LENITY
"[C]anons of statutory construction are generally useless
and occasionally harmful .... ,12
A. The Art of Statutory Construction
The process of statutory interpretation,163 like musical interpretation, is a
dynamic process.164 As a part of this process, the court has available for its use
160. "We acknowledge the complex nature of environmental statutes and regulations and the specialized
knowledge necessary to construe them, and . . . defer to the EPA's interpretations of its own regulations."
Beazer East, Inc. v. EPA, 963 E2d 603, 607 (3d Cir. 1992) (citations omitted).
Because the environmental regulatory system is complex, courts occasionally acknowledge that deference to
the agency's expertise is necessary in scientific matters. See Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 16
E3d 1395, 1401, 1404 (4th Cir. 1993) (acknowledging that when a court is confronted with an area dominated
by complex scientific inquiry and judgment, it will not second-guess a technical decision by administrative
experts).
161. United States v. Weitzenhoff, 35 F 3d 1275, 1293 (9th Cir. 1994) (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
162. Rubin, supra note 1, at 583.
163. There are many views on statutory interpretation. For a general treatment of the court's role in the
interpretation of statutes, see HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P.
Frickey eds.), THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (1994). For a
listing of other sources on the topic, see John C. Nagle, Review Essay, Newt Gingrich, Dynamic Statutory
Interpreter, 1995 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2209, 2209-10 nn.2 & 3. For a historical view of the subject, see Richard A.
Posner, Legislation and Its Interpretation: A Primer, 68 NEB. L. REv. 431, 431-34 (1989).
164. HALL, supra note 8, at 46-47; see also Edward H. Levi, An Introduction of Legal Reasoning, 15 U. CH.
L. REv. 501, 507-519 (1948) (illustrating the changing "vogues" of statutory interpretation by tracing the rise
and fall of the "inherently dangerous" doctrine).
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many different interpretive tools. Although the canons of interpretation are used
frequently by the courts to interpret statutes and review agency interpretations,
these canons are frequently criticized for their inconsistent use:
[Canons of interpretation] are general statements about the interpretation of
statutory language with no consideration of the different types of statutes or the
different roles that courts play in relation to these statutes. They are loose
canons, showing up at unpredictable times and rolling about in unpredictable
directions. Worse than their unpredictability is their oppressive noise and the
ever-present danger of explosion. They distract judges from the real task at
hand-the determination of the statute's role, and their own role, in the compli-
cated task of modem governance. 6 '
The rule of lenity is but one of these devices.
B. Lenity 's Historical Background
Derived from the principle of legality,16 the rule of lenity developed in the sev-
enteenth and eighteenth centuries as the result of severe English Parliament leg-
islative mandates which levied capital punishment for crimes ranging from mur-
der to "being in the company of gypsies":167
[I]n this context of unmitigated severity ... the [English] courts began to con-
strue capital statutes more strictly in favor of defendants. This trend toward
reading statutes narrowly developed into a conscious doctrine of strict construc-
tion in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries .... The doctrine of
lenity ... functioned to resist legislative pronouncements that were viewed as
overly harsh, even when the language of the statute was "clear.' '16
165. Rubin, supra note 1, at 583; see also Posner, supra note 163, at 442 (criticizing canons as constituting
"an unsound and unworkable system of rules."); Sunstein, supra note 103, at 2105-06; Karl N. Llewellyn,
Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules for Canons about How Statutes are to be
Construed, 3 VAND. L. REv. 395 (1950); Ross, supra note 21, at 561 (Llewellyn demonstrated that "for virtually
every canon of construction... there was another canon that could be employed to reach the opposite result.")
(citation omitted); 1 DAvis & PIERCE, supra note 32, at § 3.6 (Supp. 1995) ("In a high proportion of cases, two
or more canons arguably apply and each would yield a different construction of the statute.").
166. Legality requires that "conduct may not be treated as criminal unless it has been so defined by an
authority having the institutional competence to do so before [such conduct] has taken place." Steven B. Duke,
Comment, Legality in the Second Circuit, 49 BROOK. L. REv. 911 (1983) (quoting H. L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF
THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 79-80 (1968)). It has been hailed by legal historians as the greatest achievement of the
Western political experience; "[it's] historic meaning ... is a definite limitation on the power of the state."
HALL, supra note 8, at 27; but see John C. Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness and the Construction of Penal
Statutes, 71 VA. L. REv. 189, 201 (1985) ("[P]erhaps legality is not as important as we think.").
167. Sarah Newland, Note, The Mercy of Scalia: Statutory Construction and the Rule of Lenity, 29 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 197, 200-01 (1995). Although some of these capital crimes would be considered petty, mis-
demeanor offenses in our current age, in that time, they were offenses which cost the violators their lives.
Some of the lesser capital offenses [were] marking the edges of any current coin of the kingdom, demolishing a
church or chapel, the wandering about of soldiers or mariners without a pass, pocket-picking to the amount of
twelve pence and over, and being in the company of gypsies. Jeffries, supra note 166, at 198 n.23. There were
approximately 200 capital crimes on the books and few "provided any alternative penalty." Id.
168. Newland, supra note 167, at 200. "[This attitude] reflected not only concern for the criminal defendant,
but also the tension between the legislative and judicial branches of the English government." Id. (citations
omitted).
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As the rule of lenity assumed its "extraordinary role" in Europe,'69 fledgling
American courts adopted the doctrine:
The rule that penal laws are to be construed strictly, is perhaps not much less old
than construction itself. It is founded on the tenderness of the law for the rights
of individuals; and on the plain principle that the power of punishment is vested
in the legislative, not in the judicial department. It is the legislature, not the
Court, which is to define a crime, and ordain its punishment.17
As the doctrine of lenity evolved on this side of the Atlantic, the American
variant 7 required the legislature to clearly define crimes (thus fulfilling "legisla-
tive certainty") so that "fair notice"" 2 of prohibited activities would be available
for any potential defendant who might engage in those activities:
[The rule of lenity] is founded on two policies that have long been part of our
tradition. First, "a fair warning should be given to the world in language that
the common world will understand, of what the law intends.to do if a certain
line is passed ..... Second, because of the seriousness of criminal penalties
and because criminal punishment usually represents the moral condemnation of
the community, legislatures and not courts should define criminal activity. This
policy embodies "the instinctive distaste against men languishing in prison
unless the lawmaker has clearly said they should." '173
C. The Leitmotiv74 of Lenity
The rule of lenity requires a reviewing court to prefer a narrow (as opposed to
a generous) reading of an ambiguous penal or punitive' statute, allowing penal-
169. [T]he strict construction of penal statutes played an extraordinary role in the eighteenth century
when a humanitarian ideology ... rose against severe, indiscriminate penalization. Statutes which
were quite clear in their meaning were completely distorted. "Strict construction" then was any
interpretation, however fantastic, which saved minor offenders from the capital penalty.
WAYNE R. LAFAvE, MODERN CRImINAL LAW, CASES, COMMErrs AND QuEs'noNs 38 (1978) (quoting HALL, supra
note 8, at 46-47).
170. United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. 76, 95 (1820). The Court often refers to lenity as a "venerable"
doctrine and, on occasion, offers no citation to justify its invocation. Bruce A. Markell, Bankruptcy, Lenity, and
the Statutory Interpretation of Cognate Civil and Criminal Statutes, 69 IND. L.J. 335, 338 & nn. 12-13 (1994).
171. The lenity doctrine was adopted from England, but, as it evolved in the United States, American courts
used it "to avoid applying overly harsh penalties." Newland, supra note 167, at 200 n.18 (citations omitted).
172. The "fair notice" must be phrased as a warning clear enough for the common world to understand:
Although it is not likely that a criminal will carefully consider the text of the law before he murders
or steals, it is reasonable that a fair warning should be given to the world in language that the com-
mon world will understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed. To make the
warning fair, so far as possible the line should be clear.
McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931).
173. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347-48 (1971). See also Duke, supra note 166, at 912 (arguing
that the requirement of "fair notice" is "intimately related to [many of] the purposes and justifications of crimi-
nal punishment"); Markell, supra note 169, at 338 ("[Llenity ... serves both due process and separation of
powers concerns. Due process [requires] ... a penal statute ... [to] be clear .... [S]eparation of powers con-
cerns make clarity the legislature's task.") (citations omitted).
174. A leitmotiv is a musical "representation of characters, typical situations, and recurrent ideas by musical
[themes or] motifs." HARvARD DICTIONARY OF MUSic 465-66 (2d ed. 1969). The technique was first utilized
consistently in the operas of Richard Wagner. Id. Lenity has become a leitmotiv in administrative law for the
notion of fairness and due process.
175. Beltway Management Co. v. Lexington-Landmark Ins. Co., 746 E Supp. 1145, 1158-59 (D.D.C. 1990)
("Statutes are not ... considered penal merely because they contain some criminal penalties. [But rather t]hey
are penal only if the purpose of the provision applied is punitive."); see also supra note 24.
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ties only if the language of the statute is clear or if legislative intent to punish the
prohibited actions can be unmistakably ascertained. In order to make that deter-
mination, the court employs a two-step inquiry.7" It looks first at the words of
the statute, and lenity applies only if there is some doubt after reading the words.
If there is no doubt or ambiguity present, then there is no room for judicial con-
struction.1" However, if the statutory language is ambiguous, the statute will be
read narrowly for the benefit of the defendant.
The initial determination of ambiguity is not only the first step of the process,
but is also the primary inquiry because lenity cannot be used if congressional
intent is clear or if use of the rule of lenity contradicts congressional legislative
purpose. 78 The question of whether a statute contains ambiguous language is a
difficult one to answer because of the nature of language. One court's idea of
clear, intelligible, statutory language is another court's idea of ambiguity.
"Stated at this level of abstraction, of course, the rule [of lenity] 'provides little
more than atmospherics, since it leaves open the crucial question-almost invari-
ably present-of how much ambiguousness constitutes ... ambiguity."179
Because of the difficulty in determining whether language is ambiguous and,
therefore, whether lenity should apply, the doctrine of lenity, like Chevron defer-
ence, has not been used in a consistent manner.
D. Variations on Lenity 's Theme
Linguistic ambiguity has inspired many of the instances in which lenity's gen-
eral rule is not applied. For example, the rule of lenity will not be triggered
"merely because a statute appears textually ambiguous on its face";18 nor can the
176. A similar two-step analysis is used in a Chevron deference analysis; in both instances, if the legislative
intent is clear, that is the end of the judicial inquiry because the court can easily decide whether the agency
action fits within the words of the statute. "Judicial activism," see Ross, supra note 21, at 562, is most apparent
at step one because it is at step one that the choice is made as to "who gets to decide what the law is." Farina,
supra note 36, at 464.
177. "Where there is no ambiguity in the words, there is no room for construction." United States v.
Wiltberger, 18 U.S. 76, 95-96 (1820); see also Metropolitan Stevedore Co. v. Rambo, 515 U.S. 291, 295 (1995).
178. Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 427 (1985) ("[T]he rule of lenity is not to be applied where to
do so would conflict with the implied or expressed intent of Congress... ").
179. Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 108 (1990) (quoting United States v. Hansen, 772 F2d 940, 948
(D.C. Cir. 1985) (Scalia, J.). Ambiguity's presence (or lack thereof) in legislative language is the most "fertile
area" for disagreement among members of the Court. See Markell, supra note 170, at 346-48. Although the
Court has determined that lenity cannot be used to "override common sense and evident statutory purpose," see
United States v. Brown, 333 U.S. 18, 25 (1947), lenity's application to ambiguous language has been utilized by
the Court, at times, in a seeming effort to do so. An illustration of the confusion wrought by judicial disagree-
ments on the proper choice and use of interpretative methods can be found in Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S.
561 (1995), where methods of statutory construction used to determine the definition of "prospectus" under the
Securities Exchange Act resulted in disagreements among the Court on the roles of statutory definitions, dictio-
nary definitions, usages, legislative history, canons of construction, stare decisis, and the effect of congression-
al reenactment after consistent judicial interpretation. In the end, the determination of whether language is
ambiguous is not a scientific choice, but an aesthetic one. See Markell, supra note 170, at 346 (determining
linguistic clarity is similar to "determining the proper perspective for creating a painting or photograph of a
particular subject; where the creator stands in relation to the subject-and how much background she chooses
to include-can affect the impression conveyed.").
180. United States v. R.L.C., 503 U.S. 291, 311 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring).
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statutory language be manipulated by a court to create ambiguous language."' 1
Lenity is to be applied "at the end of the [judicial] process," '182 after the court
uses "all available methods" to ascertain whether the meaning of the statute is
ambiguous. 83 Finally, lenity is not available for use if congressional intent can
be ascertained (or if it is determined that no ambiguity is present),184 despite the
possibility of other interpretations offered by counsel or the court."18
Because the doctrine of lenity has not been used consistently by the courts, one
commentator remarked that the doctrine has not been used to "meet the dual
policies of fair warning and legislative certainty" but, instead, has been misused
"as a tie breaker for tough issues. '  The inconsistent use of lenity elicited criti-
cism from within the legal community as early as 1962,187 and such a criticism
continues today. "Judicial enforcement of lenity is notoriously sporadic and
unpredictable. As often as not, the 'instinctive distaste' for extinguishing indi-
vidual liberty without clear legislative warrant gives way to other tastes that can
be satisfied only by broad readings of federal criminal statutes.""
E. Dissonance:"18 Extension of the Doctrine of Lenity
The doctrine of lenity originated in the context of the prosecution of minor
criminal activity resulting in capital penalties; its purpose was to save human
181. Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 596 (1961).
182. Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 463 (1991); see also Gozlon-Peretz v. United States, 498 U.S.
395, 410 (1991) ("[Lenity] comes into operation at the end of the process of construing what Congress has
expressed, not at the beginning as an overriding consideration of being lenient to wrongdoers.").
183. "The rule of lenity ... is not applicable unless there is a 'grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the lan-
guage and structure of the Act,'... such that even after a court has 'seized every thing from which aid can be
derived', it is still 'left with an ambiguous statute."' Chapman, 500 U.S. at 463 (citations omitted); Moskal, 498
U.S. at 108 (quoting United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. 358, 386 (1805) (Marshall, C.J.)).
184. Moskal, 498 U.S. at 108 ("[Lenity is] reserved.., for those situations in which a reasonable doubt per-
sists about a statute's intended scope even after resort to 'the language and structure, legislative history, and
motivating policies' of the statute .... ). See also McElroy v. United States, 455 U.S. 642, 658 (1982) ("[Strict
construction] does not mean that every criminal statute must be given the narrowest possible meaning in com-
plete disregard of the purpose of the legislature.").
185. "The mere possibility of articulating a narrower [, or broader,] construction... does not by itself make
the rule of lenity applicable. Instead, that venerable rule is reserved for cases where, '[a]fter sei[zing] every
thing from which aid can be derived,' the Court is 'left with an ambiguous statute."' Smith v. United States, 508
U.S. 223, 239 (1993); accord Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83 (1955) ("It is not to be denied that argumen-
tative skill, as was shown at the Bar, could persuasively and not unreasonably reach either of the conflicting
constructions."). See also Markell, supra note 170, at 343 ("Partially as a consequence of the ease with which a
clever mind can create disparate readings of a particular text, most cases are consistent with the proposition that
it is an insufficient ground for ambiguity that a litigant or some other judge has produced two plausible read-
ings.").
186. Markell, supra note 170, at 342 nn.45-55, 346 (citing cases in which "the Court dismisses claims of
ambiguity with little more than the assertion that the claim is frivolous or not well taken. In other cases, how-
ever, the Court seems to struggle with claims of ambiguity.") (citation omitted).
187. The drafters of the Model Penal Code rejected the doctrine of "strict construction." See MODEL PENAL
CODE § 1.02 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). The rejection of the doctrine by the drafters of the Model Penal
Code was followed by the National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws in 1976:
[§ 103] would repeal for the Federal system the artificial rule of 'strict construction'.... [Use of
the rule] results occasionally in acquittal of offenders who were clearly within the letter and spirit of
the law. A more serious result is that Federal criminal law has been made intolerably cumbersome,
as the legislative draftsman has sought to anticipate every possible narrow construction. We can
make the Federal criminal law simpler and clearer if we do not have to talk an artificial language.
THE JUDICIAL PROCESS: READINGS, MATERIALS & CASES 226-227 (Ruggero J. Aldisert, ed. 1976) (quoting
National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, Working Papers 5-6 (1970) (footnotes omitted)).
188. Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994 Sup. CT. RE. 345, 346.
189. "Consonance and dissonance are the very foundation of harmonic music, in which the former repre-
sents the element of normalcy and repose, the latter... disturbance and tension." HARVARD DICTIONARY OF
MusIc 201 (2d ed. 1969).
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lives. Until relatively recently, modem use of the doctrine involved instances in
which criminal or punitive sanctions resulted from an infraction of an ambiguous
or unclear statute or regulation. However, in United States v. Thompson/Center
Arms Co., 19 the theme of lenity was transformed191 to a dissonant, broader use in
certain civil contexts. The transformation of the doctrine outside of its original
criminal parameters makes the decision a significant one for any persons
involved in agency enforcement actions seeking to enforce the requirements of
formal or informal statutory interpretations. This transformation of the doctrine
is particularly significant to the world of environmental enforcement activities
because the broad legislative language contained in these environmental statutes
provides counsel an ample opportunity to raise lenity as a shield, possibly avoid-
ing penalties for violations of those provisions.
1. United States v. Thompson/Center Arms Co.
Thompson/Center was a civil case. At the heart of the dispute was a provision
contained in the National Firearms Act which imposed a fee upon any person
"making a firearm."' 92 The Supreme Court's decision turned on the interpreta-
tion of the word "makes," found in both the operative civil and criminal statutes:
The key to resolving the ambiguity lies in recognizing that although it is a tax
statute that we construe now in a civil setting, the [National Firearms Act] has
criminal applications .... Making a firearm without approval may be subject
to criminal sanction, as is possession of an unregistered firearm and failure to
pay the tax on one .... It is proper, therefore, to apply the rule of lenity and
resolve the ambiguity in Thompson/Center's favor.193
The Supreme Court's decision in Thompson/Center transformed the rule of
lenity from a leitmotiv doctrine, which ensures the existence of fundamental fair-
ness prior to the enforcement of a penal or punitive statute, to a rule that can be
used either in a penal context or in a civil case in which the agency interpreta-
tions may have some kind of criminal application or effect. This transformation
is a giant leap for a doctrine whose genesis was to keep offenders from paying
the price of their lives as punishment for minor offenses. Use of this doctrine in
190. 504 U.S. 505 (1992).
191. "Transformation of themes: The modification of a musical subject with a view to 'changing its person-
ality."' HARVARD DICTIONARY OF Music 859 (2d ed. 1969).
192. Thompson/Center, 504 U.S. at 507. Thompson/Center Arms Co. packaged a pistol kit that could trans-
form the pistol into a long-barreled rifle. The production of pistols and long-barreled rifles were nontaxable
events under the National Firearms Act. Id. at 507. However, a partial conversion/use of the kit's shoulder
stock (but not its new gun barrel) produced a short barreled rifle whose production was subject to a fee.
Thompson/Center Arms Co. produced one kit, paid the fee, and then sued for the fee's recovery. Id. at 507-08.
193. Id. at 517-18 (citations omitted). In his dissent, Justice Stevens would have limited the application of
the rule of lenity to criminal circumstances where fair notice was an issue. "If this were a criminal case in
which the defendant did not have adequate notice of the Government's interpretation of an ambiguous statute,
then it would be entirely appropriate to apply the rule of lenity." Id. at 525 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added).
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a purely civil context ignores the historical development of this canon and, as a
result, also ignores the differing policies met by civil and criminal law enforce-
ment provisions. 9 '
2. Lenity Transformed' Sounds a Sour Note for Environmental Enforcement
Activity
The extension of the rule of lenity in this manner allows lenity to be applied to
any ambiguous statute which, if violated, might have some criminal application
or effect in other contexts (including the imposition of a civil penalty). '96 Thus
extended, the doctrine has significant implications for environmental enforce-
ment, and, for many reasons, use of lenity in this dissonant manner is inappropri-
ate, striking a discordant note to lenity's theme and to the area of environmental
law.
a. Extension of lenity in this manner encourages more regulation
One consequence of the extension of lenity in this manner is to encourage the
promulgation of numerous regulations by the agencies. In order to avoid judicial
use of lenity, agencies may attempt to "cover the waterfront" with regulatory
admonitions. However, even a compulsive, literate, and extremely wary adminis-
trator could not promulgate the number of formal and informal interpretations
needed to cover each and every regulated situation in order to forestall the appli-
cation of lenity. Additional regulations add more complexity to an already com-
plex system. Another consideration is that more regulations do not prevent the
judiciary from finding ambiguity in the regulation's language and using lenity to
read the regulation narrowly under the right factual situation.
b. Extending lenity to all environmental enforcement actions disrupts the unifor-
mity of the environmental enforcement system
The environmental enforcement system was designed to operate uniformly.'97
Introduction of the rule of lenity or, for that matter, inconsistent judicial use or
addition of any other canons of interpretation, such as noscitur a sociis,99 brings
194. Although there is strong appeal for applying the rule of lenity in the area of environmental criminal
enforcement actions, see Alexander, supra note 42, at 616, wholesale application of the doctrine to a civil con-
text disregards the differences between criminal and civil law. Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The
Middleground Between Criminal and Civil Law, 101 YALE L.J. 1795 (1992) (arguing that the differences
between the two areas of law, including the societal and moral condemnation inherent in the traditional criminal
punishment equation, the procedural and penal differences between the two areas which allow for consequences
other than prison, and the mitigation factors available in a civil penalty case, make the application of lenity to
most civil penalties inappropriate).
195. Transformation of themes, see supra note 191.
196. If the Thompson/Center Arms Company's legal challenge had not succeeded, a $200 fee would have
been assessed against future gun kits sold. United States v. Thompson/Center Arms Co, 504 U.S. 505 (1992).
197. Moore, supra note 84, at 273-74.
198. The substitution of noscitur a sociis for Chevron deference was criticized in Sweet Home Chapter of
Communities for a Great Oregon v. Babbitt, 17 E3d 1463, 1473-75 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (Mikva, C.J., dissenting)
("The majority's first, and biggest, mistake is to jettison the Chevron [deference] standard .... [E]ven if it is
ever appropriate to measure an agency's construction of a statute against a... principle of statutory construc-
tion, this is not the place .... ) (emphasis added), rev 'd, 513 U.S. 1072 (1995).
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uncertainty into the system and encourages uneven enforcement-a result which
is inconsistent with congressional intent and which neither the regulators nor the
regulated community desires.199
Second, use of lenity as an interpretive tool for any regulation with "criminal
applications" disrupts the exercise of the agency's delegated authority (and con-
tradicts Chevron deference) by replacing the EPA's expertise and policy decisions
with the policy making determinations of the judiciary."' As a result, the deter-
mination of policy decisions related to environmental enforcement is dependent
upon the standards each particular court chooses to adopt for "criminal applica-
tions." The resulting case-by-case disruption of a coherent scheme was one of
the forces behind an intended uniform environmental enforcement landscape.
Decisions concerning the implementation of the environmental statutes involve
technical and complex matters; use of lenity allows the court to "second guess"
the actions of the agency most knowledgeable in the area and to substitute its
own policies, a direct contradiction to the Chevron deference doctrine which
requires that "ties [of this nature] go to the dealer."2 1
c. Use of lenity in this manner may contradict congressional intent-the Clean
Water Act
As noted above, most of the foundational purposes underlying the environmen-
tal statutes are expressed in very broad terms by Congress. The CWA is no
exception. Its purpose is "to restore and maintain the . . . integrity of the
Nation's waters."2 2 This congressionally created statutory "gap" is bridged by
numerous formal and informal interpretations" 3 propounded by the EPA under
its congressionally delegated authority. Although the nature of the CWA's avail-
able sanctions make them appropriate candidates for use of the rule of lenity,"4 a
blanket use of lenity in the context of CWA enforcement activities reaches results
199. Moore, supra note 84.
200. If the policy dispute is one the resolution of which is within the scope of the authority Congress has
delegated to an agency, ("the gap"), see supra notes 108-109 and accompanying text, then it is the agency's
responsibility to resolve the policy issues through agency interpretive actions, not the responsibility of the
courts to resolve such issues through the use of the canons of interpretation. According to the Chevron case,
broad statutory language indicates an intention by the legislature for the agency to interpret the language and
make decisions to implement it as the preferred "gap filler." Chevron, 467 U.S. at 837, 843, 863-65. This leg-
islative "gap filling" intent is negated by the judicial use of lenity, which strictly adheres to a narrow statutory
interpretation, thus abrogating an agency's delegated responsibilities. United States v. R.L.C., 503 U.S. 291,
306 n.6 (1992) ("[L]enity does not always require the 'narrowest' construction, and our cases have recognized
that a broader construction may be permissible on the basis of non-textual factors that make clear the legislative
intent where it is within the fair meaning of the statutory language."); see also infra notes 205-206.
201. Sweet Home, 17 E3d at 1473 (Mikva, C.J., dissenting) ("The whole point of Chevron deference is that
when Congress has not given a clear command, we presume that it has accorded discretion to the agency to
clarify any ambiguities in the statute it administers. In requiring [an] agency to justify its regulation by refer-
ence to such a clear command, the majority confounds its role. Ties are supposed to go to the dealer under
Chevron.").
202. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1994).
203. See supra note 89.
204. Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 E3d 1388, 1398 (9th Cir. 1995) ("The rule of lenity has not been
limited to criminal statutes, particularly when the civil sanctions in question are punitive in character .... The
penalties contemplated by [the CWA] clearly have punitive purposes.") (citations omitted) (O'Scannlain, J. dis-
senting).
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clearly inconsistent with Congress' intent to protect the waters of the United
States and to assess penalties against those who disregard that intent. It is clear
that, in any matter of statutory interpretation, a court begins by first looking to the
language of the statute itself;2 5 but, in the process of its evaluation, a court must
also read the language of the statute in the context of the "object and policy" of
the law.2"' Failure to do so, especially in the context of the environmental laws,
results in aberrant decisions which do nothing to further the underlying purpose of
most environmental statutes. In two CWA cases which illustrate this point, 7 lenity
was invoked to overturn the conviction of flagrant water polluters." 8
i. United States v. Borowski
In United States v. Borowski,"9 John Borowski was convicted of "knowingly"21
endangering his employees by violating the CWA's "pretreater" rules.2" The
First Circuit Court of Appeals overturned Borowski's conviction by invoking the
rule of lenity. In making its decision, the court first discussed the congressional
purpose of the CWA, the "pretreater" statutory provisions, and the regulations
which enunciated the standards not met at Mr. Borowski's plant.2 However, the
205. Dole v. United Steelworkers of Am., 494 U.S. 26, 35 (1990) ("Our 'starting point is the language of the
statute,'... but, 'in expounding a statute, we are not guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but
look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy."') (citations omitted). See Denise W
DeFranco, Administrative Law- Chevron and Canons of Construction, 58 GEO. WASH. L. RE. 829, 839 (1990)
("Canons of construction are but one factor among several that courts should use to determine the reasonable-
ness of an agency's interpretation of a statute. Other factors include the purpose of the statute, conflicting poli-
cy considerations that are to be balanced, and legislative intent.") (citations omitted).
206. Dole, 494 U.S. at 35. See also Aulston v. United States, 915 E2d 584, 589 (10th Cir. 1990) ("In interpret-
ing the relevant language, however, we look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy.").
207. United States v. Borowski, 977 E2d 27 (1st Cir. 1992); United States v. Plaza Health Lab., Inc., 3 F.3d
643 (2d Cir. 1993).
208. This Article presents the argument that a judicial review approach, in which a court first analyzes whether
to exercise Chevron deference to an administrative regulation and then determines whether the lenity concern of
"fair warning" has been met, is more likely to accomplish Congress' purposes under the environmental statutes
than a senza ripieni choice of one doctrine over the other. The Author believes that, under this approach, the con-
victions of both Mr. Villegas and Mr. Borowski would have been upheld. See infra notes 222-223.
209. 977 E2d 27 (tst Cir. 1992).
210. Knowing endangerment is defined as follows:
Any person who knowingly violates ... § 1317 ... and who knows at that time that he ... places
another person in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury, shall, upon conviction, be sub-
ject to a fine of not more than $250,000 or imprisonment of not more than 15 years, or both. A per-
son which is an organization shall, upon conviction of violating this subparagraph be subject to a
fine of not more than $1,000,000.
33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(3)(A) (1994) (emphasis added).
211. Although special rules exempt persons and companies who directly discharge pollutants into public
sewer systems (like Borowski) from obtaining an NPDES permit, there are other requirements (pretreatment
standards) which must be met for these discharges. See 33 U.S.C. § 1317(b). Mr. Borowski was aware that the
discharges from his facility did not meet any of these standards. Borowski, 977 E2d at 29.
212. 'The objective of [the Clean Water] Act is to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and bio-
logical integrity of the Nation's waters.' The EPA is directed to promulgate pretreatment standards.
.to 'prevent the discharge of any pollutant' that will pass through publicly-owned treatment works,
interfere with the works, be incompatible with the works,... or otherwise violate effluent standards
for the works.
Id. at 30 (citations omitted).
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court found that the statutory language was ambiguous213 as to the identity of
persons protected under the "pretreater" rules. In other words, it was unclear that
the statute's provisions were intended to protect the employees injured by Mr.
Borowski's activities. Once this ambiguity was found, the court reluctantly
applied the rule of lenity to overturn Borowski's conviction, despite the fact it
characterized his conduct as "utterly reprehensible" and possibly violative "of
other criminal laws. 214
ii. United States v. Plaza Health Laboratories, Inc.
The second illustration of a case which used a canon of construction to evalu-
ate agency activities under the CWA and failed to further the CWA's purposes in
the process is United States v. Plaza Health Laboratories, Inc.2"' This case
involved an individual (Mr. Villegas) who disposed of dangerous medical
wastes21 into the Hudson River. In overturning Mr. Villegas' criminal convic-
tion, the Second Circuit found that "point source,"2 7 as defined in the CWA, did
213. The Court found that the identity of the "persons" targeted for protection under the CWA's pretreater
statutes did not include Borowski's employees: "One can read the entire statute and regulations in vain for any
protection mechanism for industrial employees who work with wastes at the point of discharge." Id. at 31.
"Any concern for employees reflected in the regulations deals with 'downstream' employees... " Id. at n.7
(alteration in original) (citations omitted).
214. Id. at 32. For criticism of the Borowski decision, see Peter D. Isakoff, First Circuit Limits Application
of Clean Water Act, 6 No. 12 INSIDE LITIG. 8 (Dec. 1992). The use of lenity to overturn Mr. Borowski's convic-
tion is particularly troublesome in view of the fact that most commentators conclude that the CWA's
pretreater/indirect discharger provisions regulations (the source of Mr. Borowski's criminal conviction) have
failed to meet the purposes of the CWA. See Oliver A. Houck, Ending the War: A Strategy to Save America s
Coastal Zone, 47 MD. L. RE. 358 (1988) ("Virtually every review of the pretreatment program has rated it a
failure .... As was once said of the American involvement in Vietnam, it is time to declare this program a vic-
tory and get out.") Id. at 386-88 (citations omitted).
215. 3 E3d 643 (2d Cir. 1993).
216. The evidence showed that, on at least two occasions, the defendant, Mr. Villegas, disposed of hazardous
medical wastes (glass vials full of blood, some contaminated with the hepatitis-B virus) into the Hudson River.
Id. at 643-44. The wastes were discovered by a group of eighth grade students on a field trip. Id.
217. "'Point source' means any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, including but not limited to
any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, rolling stock, concentrated animal
feeding operation, or vessel or other floating craft, from which pollutants are or may be discharged." 33 U.S.C.
§ 1362(14) (1994 & Supp. 111996). Prior to the Plaza Health decision, courts had construed the definition of a
point source very broadly; however, the difference between the prior cases and Plaza Health was that the Plaza
Health point source was a person (Mr. Villegas). Plaza Health, 3 F.3d at 648-49. The dissent in Plaza Health
would have called Mr. Villegas a point source by broadly construing the term "point source" to fulfill the
Congressional purpose of the CWA because the dissent believed lenity did not apply to the facts at hand. Id. at
654-56 (Oaks, J., dissenting).
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not clearly apply to an individual such as Mr. Villegas.218 The Court invoked the
rule of lenity to overturn the conviction,21 even though Villegas' actions clearly
violated the CWA.220
These two cases illustrate some of the anomalies that occur when lenity is
employed to evaluate agency actions taken in the course of an environmental
enforcement action. First, in many instances, the guilty persons are aware that
their actions are wrong, at least in a moral sense; once that element has been
proved, that knowledge and/or information should be sufficient to support a con-
viction or a penalty under the CWA221 because of the nature of its strict liability
scheme.
In both Borowski and Plaza Health, the courts recognized that the defendants,
Mr. Borowski222 and Mr. Villegas,223 were aware that the activities which formed
the basis of their convictions violated the CWA's provisions and that some kind of
consequence might ensue as a result of their activity. The use of lenity in these
two cases was unsuitable because the need for legislative certainty had already
been met and because both defendants demonstrated (at least to the appellate
court jurists) that they had "fair notice" that their actions were prohibited by law.
Both courts utilized the rule of lenity to "create ambiguity" in the interpretation of
these statutes which Congress had allowed the EPA to administer.
Moreover, in both Borowski and Plaza Health, the court could have read the
provisions of the CWA broadly, as a "public welfare statute," in order to effectu-
218. The appellate court reviewed the lower court's "analytical struggle" to find a "discernible, confined and
discrete conveyance [point source in Villegas actions]," but concluded that:
[there is] no suggestion either in the act itself or in the history of its passage that Congress intended
the CWA to impose criminal liability on an individual for the myriad, random acts of human waste
disposal .... [T]he term 'point source' as applied to a human being is at best ambiguous.
Id. at 647-49.
219. "[W]e conclude that the criminal provisions of the CWA did not clearly proscribe Villegas's conduct
and did not accord him fair warning of the sanctions the law placed on that conduct. Under the rule of lenity,
therefore, the prosecutions against him must be dismissed." Id. at 649.
220. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1994 & Supp. 11 1996) (prohibiting the discharge of any pollutant into the
navigable waters of the United States without a permit). For criticism of the Plaza Health decision, see
Deborah E. Niehuus, Note, Diluting the Clean Water Act: Will Muddy Waters Flow from United States v. Plaza
Health Laboratories, Inc., 11 COOLEY L. REv. 911 (1994); Robin L. Greenwald, What's the "Point" of the Clean
Water Act Following United States v. Plaza Health Laboratories, Inc.?: The Second Circuit Acts as a Legislator
Rather Than As a Court, 60 BROOK. L. REv. 689 (1994); Mark J. Dorval, Note, Discharge of Pollutants into the
Nation 's Waters: What Does the CWA Prohibit?-United States v. Plaza Health Laboratories, Inc., 3 E3d 643
(2d Cir. 1993), 13 TEMP. ENVTL. L. TECH. J. 121 (1994).
221. United States v. Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d 1275, 1283-86 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Hopkins, 53 E3d
533, 538-41 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that the government is required to show only that the defendant was con-
scious of his own actions at the time a violation of the CWA took place to sustain a conviction for "knowingly"
violating the statute). But see supra note 75; see also Carmichael, supra note 73, at 731, 748-52 (arguing that
there are "intolerable implications" which result from the imposition of strict liability for environmental regula-
tory violations, resulting in a lessening of incentive to reduce the level of pollution in the environment).
222. United States v. Borowski, 977 E2d 27, 29 (1st Cir. 1992) ("[B]orowski knew that [the] practices creat-
ed serious health risks to the employees .... Borowski... [was] also aware that the disposal practices violated
the EPA's pretreatment regulations.").
223. United States v. Plaza Health, 3 F3d 645, 653 (2d Cir. 1993) (Oakes, J., dissenting) ("Villegas was well
aware that there were methods of controlling the discharge (and that the materials were too dangerous for casual
disposal): his laboratory had hired a professional medical waste handler. He simply chose not to use an appro-
priate waste disposal mechanism.").
224. United States v. MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co., 933 F.2d 35, 49-50 (1st Cir. 1991); Weitzenhoff,
35 E 3d at 1286 ("The criminal provisions of the CWA are clearly designed to protect the public at large from
the potentially dire consequences of water pollution .. and as such fall within the category of public welfare
legislation.") (citations omitted).
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ate its regulatory purpose.224 Had it done so, the convictions of both Mr. Borow-
ski22 and Mr. Villegas228 could have been upheld. In fact, the Borowski and
Plaza Health courts' utilization of lenity to read the provisions of the CWA nar-
rowly and ambiguously to strike the convictions of Borowski and Villegas was an
improper use of the doctrine because lenity cannot be used to create an ambigui-
ty227 and cannot be used to "conflict with the intent of Congress. ' 228 These two
cases illustrate the problems caused by an "activist" court that chooses to replace
Chevron deference with the rule of lenity.
225. Had the Borowski court chosen to interpret the statute broadly, it could have upheld Mr. Borowski's
conviction on three separate grounds. First, if the court had declared the CWA a public welfare statute, it could
have construed it broadly to effectuate its purposes. United States v. International Minerals & Chem. Corp.,
402 U.S. 558, 565 (1971). The court could also have interpreted the statute by "look[ing] to the provisions of
the whole law, and to its object and policy." Dole v. United Steelworkers of Am., 494 U.S. 26, 35 (1990) (cita-
tions omitted). Had it done so, Mr. Borowski's conviction could have been upheld as violating the CWA's prohi-
bition on discharge of pollutants, 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (a) (1994 & Supp. II 1996), and as violating Congress' intent
to punish violators under the CWA. Weitzenhoff, 35 E3d at 1286. Since Borowski did not comply with 33
U.S.C. § 131 l(a) or with its one exception, 33 U.S.C. § 1342, this argument might have sustained his conviction.
Second, the court could have upheld the conviction by finding a violation by Borowski under 33 U.S.C. §
1317. The punishment provisions of § 1319(c)(2)(A) provide that "any person who knowingly violates ... §
1317... shall be punished." The court focused only on the provisions of§ 1317(b) as the source of Borowski's
violation; however, Borowski's actions also violated 33 U.S.C. § 1317 (d): "[1It shall be unlawful for any owner
or operator of any source to operate.., in violation of any such effluent standard or prohibition or pretreatment
standard'" The court found that Mr. Borowski was an "owner/operator" as that term was defined under the act,
Borowski, 977 F.2d at 29, and that he had illegally operated by dumping toxic substances in amounts which vio-
lated the pretreatment standards for his facility. Since 33 U.S.C. § 1319 allows punishment for a "knowing vio-
lation" of§ 1317 (not just § 1317(b)), Borowski's violation of§ 1317(d) could have been used as a basis to sus-
tain his conviction.
Finally, the legislative history which supports the criminal provisions under which Mr. Borowski was prose-
cuted indicated that these statutes were "clearly designed to protect the public at large from the potentially dire
consequences of water pollution." Weitzenhoff, 35 F. 3d at 1286 (citing S. RE'. No. 99-50, at 29 (1985)).
Although Mr. Borowski's employees may not have been protected, other users of the POTN facilities affected
by Borowski's illegal discharges were clearly members of "the public at large" which the CWA's provisions are
intended to protect. Using lenity to overturn Mr. Borowski's conviction without consideration of that history is
clearly inconsistent with the legislature's intent.
226. In United States v. Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224, 225 (1966) (interpreting the Rivers and Harbors Act
of 1899), the Court allowed "common sense, precedent, and legislative history" to uphold a polluter's convic-
tion. The same strategy could have been used to uphold the conviction of Mr. Villegas. First, the Plaza Health
court's "fine tuning" of the statutory language to exclude blatant polluters, like Mr. Villegas, lacks common
sense. As the dissent in Plaza Health pointed out, the language of the statute focuses on "controllable sources"
of pollution, which could include an individual. Plaza Health, 3 F.3d at 653 (Oakes, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added). To hold otherwise would create a meaning of the statute that is nonsensical and encourages violations
of the CWA by encouraging "[corporate] employees to stand between the company trucks and the sea, ...
transforming point source pollution (dumping from trucks) into [acceptable] pollution (dumping by hand)." Id.
at 654.
Second, there was precedent to support the conclusion that the CWA's prohibitions were broad enough to
include "individuals," such as Mr. Villegas; however, the majority relied on precedents which supported its
position and ignored the precedents cited by the dissent which would have supported Villegas' conviction. Id.
at 647-49, 651 (Oakes, J., dissenting).
Finally, the legislative history behind the punishment provisions of the CWA indicated that these statutes
were "clearly designed to protect the public at large from the potentially dire consequences of water pollution."
Weitzenhoff, 35 E 3d at 1286 (citing S. REP. No. 99-50, at 29 (1985)). The residents of New Jersey, the users of
the polluted beach, and the children who discovered the hazardous waste should have received the protection
the CWA was supposed to provide. The use of lenity negated that clear congressional purpose.
227. Callanan v. United State s, 364 U.S. 587, 596 (1961).
228. Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 427 (1985); Metropolitan Stevedore Co. v. Rambo, 515 U.S.
291 (1995) ("[W]hen a statute speaks with clarity to an issue, judicial inquiry into the statute's meaning.., is
finished.") (citation omitted).
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3. Lenity Transformed Cannot Support a Facial Challenge of an Agency's Regu-
lation-Lenity Ridotto22 s
In Sweet Home,230 the Court's opinion upholding the subject regulation relied prin-
cipally on the doctrine of Chevron deference.231 However, the Court did address the
respondent's arguments that lenity should apply to overturn the "harm" regula-
tion because violations could result in either civil or criminal consequences. 32
After first discussing lenity's two main purposes, "fair warning" and "legislative
responsibility to define crimes," ' the Court rejected the use of lenity in the
Sweet Home case;234 however, the Court retained the option of lenity's use for
regulatory based convictions and/or fines:
We have applied the rule of lenity in a case raising a narrow question concern-
ing the application of a statute that contains criminal sanctions to a specific fac-
tual dispute .... We have never suggested that the rule of lenity should provide
the standard for reviewing facial challenges to administrative regulations whenever
the governing statute authorizes criminal enforcement .... [I]f there exist[s] regu-
lations whose interpretation of statutory criminal penalties provide such inade-
quate notice of potential liability as to offend the rule of lenity,... [this] regula-
tion, which has existed for two decades and gives a fair warning of its conse-
quences, cannot be one of them.23
The opinion in Sweet Home does provide some guidance to lenity's use for
evaluating agency regulations by allowing a regulation to clear lenity's hurdles if
the interpretation is one of long standing23 and if it is clearly written, giving ade-
quate "notice of potential liability."'237 However, the Sweet Home opinion does
not place any limits on the Supreme Court's previous willingness to extend the
rule of lenity to other civil contexts, as in Thompson/Center.238 In fact, in Sweet
Home, the Court implied that, under the right set of facts, additional tenets of
criminal law-such as a requirement of scienterl 39-may be extended to the con-
229. "Ridotto" means reduced or arranged (for piano or instruments). HARVARD DICTIONARY OF Music 734
(2d ed. 1969). The term is used typically when larger orchestral scores are arranged for smaller groups of
instruments or ensembles.
230. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687 (1995).
231. Id. at 704. See supra notes 150-155 and accompanying text.
232. See Brief for Respondent, available in 1995 WL 130541 at *28-*29.
233. "The rule of lenity is premised on two ideas: first, 'a fair warning should be given to the world in lan-
guage that the common world will understand of what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed'; second,
"legislatures and not courts should define criminal activity." Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 704 n. 18 (quoting United
States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347-48 (1971)).
234. Violation of the "harm" regulation at issue in Sweet Home has both criminal and civil penalties. Id. at
696-97 n.9.
235. Id. at 704 n.18.
236. In Sweet Home, the "harm" regulation had existed for two decades. Id.
237. Id.
238. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
239. "Scienter-(knowingly)-The term is frequently used to signify the defendant's guilty knowledge."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1207 (5th ed. 1979).
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text of a civil enforcement action under broadly worded statutes.24 Addition of
scienter as an element of an agency-defined civil offense resulting in civil penal-
ties would be an additional exception to the use of Chevron deference, thus creat-
ing more exceptions to Chevron deference and more confusion in this area.
The Supreme Court's use and development of the rule of lenity and Chevron
deference provide no clear answer to the question of which of the two doctrines
should apply if both doctrines are applicable to a question of statutory interpreta-
tion. This Author has pointed out that the Court has used lenity in place of
Chevron deference (Thompson/Center) and has used Chevron deference in a case
which seems to indicate that judicial use of the rule of lenity would also have
been appropriate (Sweet Home).241 But, since there is no current direction from
the Supreme Court, the question remains, and it is appropriate to inquire whether
the current senza ripieni choice made by the Court is the appropriate response.
IV Is THE CURRENT SENZA RIPIENI PRACTICE SUITABLE?
This Article has discussed and rejected the notion that there is any current,
clear precedential pattern in the cases involving the rule of lenity or Chevron
which could be invoked with any degree of confidence to answer the question
posed.242 One possible theory behind this judicial reluctance may lie in the simi-
larities between the two doctrines.
A. Similarities Between Chevron Deference and the Rule of Lenity
The two doctrines share many characteristics. The analysis under both inter-
pretive doctrines starts with the same first step: determining the legislative intent
behind the statutory language. It is in the second step of the analysis that the two
doctrines diverge. In Chevron deference, it is the agency whose interpretive reg-
ulations fill the "gap" caused by Congress' use of broad statutory language. If,
during the process of judicial review, the court finds the agency's "gap filling"
interpretations reasonable and not inconsistent with congressional intent, the
court approves (or defers to) the agency's actions. However, in the rule of lenity
cases, the "gap" (legislative uncertainty/ambiguity) is first acknowledged by the
court; then, if the "gap" is broad enough to support a claim of ambiguity, it is
filled by the court, sometimes regardless of any legislative intent behind the
statute.
240. Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 696-97 n.9 (stating that scienter requirements had been imputed to criminal
statutes imposing penal sanctions without an express scienter requirement and indicating that imputing scienter
requirements to enforcement activities resulting in civil penalties might occur under the right set of facts). If
scienter were to be added in the civil penalty context, it would be a further amelioration of the areas of civil and
criminal enforcement actions. See supra note 194; see also Mary M. Cheh, Constitutional Limits on Using
Civil Remedies to Achieve Criminal Law Objectives: Understanding and Transcending the Criminal-Civil Law
Distinction, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1325, 1327 (1991) ("[T]he current phenomenon of civil remedies blending with
criminal sanctions never has been more actively or consciously pursued.").
241. If the challenge to the regulation at issue in Sweet Home had been made on an "as applied" basis, the
Court indicated that the use of the rule of lenity might have been appropriate. Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 704
n.18.
242. The Author does not argue that a court must senza ripieni use the standard of Chevron or the rule of
lenity, exclusive of the other, in circumstances in which either would apply; but, it is the Author's observation
that the courts have made such a choice.
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Judicial bariolage4 3 and inconsistent use of these doctrines to analyze agency
interpretations in the environmental realm is disruptive to the intended uniformi-
ty of the environmental enforcement scheme. To invoke Chevron deference in
one instance to uphold an agency's interpretation and invoke the rule of lenity in
another to overturn it when the "gap" has been filled by reasonable formal or
informal agency interpretations creates chaos in a system in which consistency is
desired. This contravenes the intent of Congress to establish a unified system of
environmental enforcement and negates the clear congressional intent of the
environmental statutes to let an agency with expertise "fill in the interstices" of
the system--or, in musical terminology, to allow the agency to supply the melod-
ic chordal interpretation over the congressional thoroughbass.2" However, to
have a policy where all agency decisions involving penalties are deferred to by
the judiciary in a rubber stamp manner brings to mind the reasons why the rule
of lenity was created in the first place-to provide those who might tread on the
law with some notice of their peril before they act.
Additionally, neither of the doctrines possesses characteristics that would
enable one to overrule the other, either through constitutional significance or
sheer numbers. Being ever mindful of Justice Holmes' admonition about the dire
consequences of"rest[ing] upon a formula,"2 ' this section of the Article demon-
strates that a senza ripieni use of either the rule of lenity or Chevron deference as
a solo standard of interpretive review for agency actions, when both might apply,
is inappropriate and should be avoided.
B. Senza Ripieni Use of the Rule of Lenity Meets No Policies the Importance of
Which Outweighs the Need for Chevron Deference
1. The Rule of Lenity is Not a Constitutional Doctrine
The rule of lenity has been described as "rooted in fundamental principles of
due process"246 and heartily approved because employing it to construe an
ambiguous criminal statute creates a result that "embodies [our legal system's]
instinctive distaste against men languishing in prison unless the lawmaker has
clearly said they should." '247 The rule of lenity has also been called a "quasi-con-
stitutional" canon of construction2" which should take precedence over Chevron
243. "A special effect in violin playing, obtained by quickly shiffing back and forth between two or more
strings. ." HARVARD DICTIONARY OF Music 81 (2d ed. 1969).
244. A method of indicating an accompanying part by bass notes only, together with figures designating the
chief intervals and chords to be played above the bass notes. A thorough bass (bass line) is interpreted by
improvised melodic interpretation provided by the musician; however, the improvisational technique has strict
guidelines which the musician must follow. Id. at 849-50.
245. Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 596 (1961).
246. "[Lenity] . .. is rooted in fundamental principles of due process which mandate that no individual be
forced to speculate ... whether his conduct is prohibited." Dunn v. United States, 442 U.S. 100, 112 (1979).
See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as
Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REv. 593, 600-01 (1992) ("[The rule of lenity r]est[s] upon such due
process values as providing fair notice and constraining prosecutorial discretion... ").
247. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971) (quoting Mr Justice Frankfurter and the Reading of
Statutes, reprinted in HENRY J. FRiENDLy, BENCHMARKS 196, 209 (1967)).
248. See Kahan, supra note 188, at 347; see also Newland, supra note 167, at 202 (arguing that the doctrine
of lenity has "constitutional underpinnings").
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deference.249 But, viewing the rule of lenity in the context of its historical devel-
opment and observing its inconsistent use by the Supreme Court both lead to the
conclusion that there are no constitutional reasons why the rule of lenity should
prevail over Chevron deference.
First and foremost, although the rule developed as an exercise in protection of
fundamental human rights,"' it was not adopted in the United States as a "consti-
tutional rights" doctrine; it was adopted, instead, as a "normative" canon of con-
struction, utilized by the judiciary to meet certain policy goals."' Consistent
with that view is the observation that, like the other interpretive canons,5 2 the
rule of lenity has been used inconsistently by the courts.5 3
Second, the Supreme Court has consistently referred to the rule of lenity in
terms that sound more like "axioms of experience""2 4 useful in interpreting statu-
tory language,255 but not a constitutional command to be wielded by the judiciary
to overturn congressional intent expressed and embodied through legislation:
"The case must be a strong one indeed, which would justify a court in departing
from the plain meaning of words, especially in a penal act, in search of an inten-
tion which the words themselves did not suggest."2 ' One concern about any
judicially mandated use of the rule of lenity is that it will encourage courts to
return to the multiple pre-Chevron factors that were universally condemned.5 7 In
conclusion, the values met through the use of the rule of lenity are not of suffi-
cient precedential or constitutional importance to outweigh the need for Chevron
deference to an agency's reasonable interpretation of its governing statute.
249. See White, supra note 105, at 725 n.10 (presenting arguments for and against the proposition that con-
stitutionally inspired norms, such as the rule of lenity, should be given precedence over the Chevron deference
doctrine).
250. See supra notes 166-168 and accompanying text.
251. Bass, 404 U.S. at 348 ("[The rule of lenity] is founded on two policies .... ); see Ross, supra note 21,
at 563 (describing the canons of construction (including the rule of lenity) as "principles" used to determine
legislative intent or to accomplish some judicial policy objective).
252. United States v. Palmer, 864 F2d 524, 527 (7th Cir. 1988) ("The rule of lenity, like other canons of con-
struction, extends no further than the functions it serves."); United States v. Littlefield, 821 E2d 1365, 1367
(9th Cir. 1987) ("[Tlhe rule of lenity is merely a canon of statutory construction .... ).
253. The rule of lenity has been criticized for its inconsistent use and for being a "makeweight for results
that seem right on other grounds ...." Jeffries, supra note 166, at 198. See also Kahan, supra note 188, at 346
("Judicial enforcement of lenity is notoriously sporadic and unpredictable."); see supra note 27.
254. United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 221 (1952) ("[S]tatutory construction
[principles] help us little. They are not rules of law but merely axioms of experience.").
255. The Supreme Court has adopted numerous sobriquets for the rule of lenity, such as a "venerable rule,"
United States v. R.L.C., 503 U.S. 291, 305 (1992); a "time-honored interpretive guideline," Crandon v. United
States, 494 U.S. 152, 158 (1990); a "principle founded on two policies" Bass, 404 U.S. at 348 (1971); a "guide
to statutory construction" Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 596 (1961); and a "maxim of statutory con-
struction," Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37,49 n.13 (1979).
256. United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. 76, 96 (1820); see also Littlefield, 821 E2d at 1367-68 ("[L]enity..
may not be invoked to override a clear congressional directive to the contrary."). One example of "a strong
case" of the use of lenity to overturn express legislative mandates would be a case involving punishment result-
ing from the exercise of fundamental Constitutional rights, such as the freedom of speech, the freedom of reli-
gion, etc.
257. Merrill, supra note 43, at 972-73 ("[Pre-Chevron interpretive] factors tended to be invoked unevenly ....
[T]hey probably functioned in a manner not too different from the way the canons of interpretation operate in
statutory interpretation cases."); see supra Part 11.B. 1.
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2. Use of Lenity Under the Clean Water Act Violates Valid "Gap-filling" Agency
Actions
In the modem administrative state, most expressions of congressional intent
found in the statutes are necessarily broad. That broad congressional intent is
then interpreted by agencies with expertise in the particular area s8 exercising
their valid "gap-filling" capacity to interpret congressional intent and turn it into
law through the agency's regulatory activities-its formal and informal interpre-
tations." 9 A good example of broad congressional intent expressed and subse-
quently interpreted is found in the 1987 CWA Amendments.
The 1987 amendments were the congressional response to a serious problem of
deliberate violations of the CWA. These amendments strengthened sanctions
under both the criminal.. and civil2"' enforcement statutes and added the remedy
of administrative penalties.262 In addition, Congress expressed its intent to ele-
vate penalties for violations of the Act in order to deter would-be polluters.263
The "gap" between the legislative intent behind the statutory terms and the activ-
ities that Congress intended to prohibit in order to clean up the nation's waters is
more clearly set out in the numerous EPA regulations (formal and informal inter-
pretations) issued under the umbrella of EPA authority delegated to the agency
by Congress.26 4
These definitions of criminal and civil liability constitute the EPAs exercise of
its delegated interpretive authority. This "gap-filling" activity is not only consti-
tutional;266 it also recognizes the unique expertise that the EPA has in this area.266
Once Congress expresses its legislative intent,267 or at least indicates that an
258. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 651-52 (1990) ("[A]gency expertise is one of
the principal justifications behind Chevron deference.").
259. See supra notes 50-58 and accompanying text.
260. "Knowing violations of the Act have caused serious environmental harm and millions of dollars of
damage to private and public property. In some cases, they have raised the clear potential for loss of life and
serious personal injury. A stronger criminal sanction is needed.., to deter these violations." 2 WILLIAM H.
RODGERS, JR., supra note 7, at § 4.2A(D) (Supp. 1995) (quoting S. REP. No. 99-50, at 29 (1985)).
261. The legislative history underscores a familiar theme by insisting that "violators should not be able
to obtain an economic advantage [over] their competitors due to their noncompliance with environ-
mental laws. The determination of economic benefit or other factors will not require an elaborate or
burdensome evidentiary showing. Reasonable approximations of economic benefit will suffice."
Id. (quoting S. RER. No. 99-50, at 25 (1985)).
262. See supra note 86. The administrative penalty provisions have three important purposes: (1) the reme-
dies are intended to address past, rather than continued, violations; (2) the cap on the penalty amounts under the
administrative provisions and the availability of these provisions for violations of a lower daily limit are intend-
ed to assure that violations of greater magnitude are handled judicially; and (3) the administrative penalties are
intended to sunset after five years; at that time, the program will be reviewed. 2 WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR.,
supra note 8, at § 4.2A(D) n. 46 (Supp. 1995).
263. See supra notes 260-62; United States v. Weitzenhoff, 35 E3d 1275, 1283 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing H.R.
CoNF. REP. No. 99-1004, at 138 (1986) and H.R. REP. No. 99-189, at 29-30 (1985)).
264. See supra note 89.
265. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
266. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 651-52 (1990); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984).
267. Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83 (1955) ("When Congress has the will it has no difficulty in
expressing it ... ").
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agency is to "fill in the gaps"2 8 with reasonable interpretations, the rule of lenity
should not be invoked to disturb that intent,269 or as a substitute for statutory pur-
pose,27 or as the object and policy behind the law.271
Congress has clearly indicated both its intent to punish violators of the CWA
and its intent that the EPA promulgate regulations which define the offenses
under that enforcement scheme. Invoking the rule of lenity in an enforcement
action which involves valid "gap filling" agency interpretations allows a violator
of the CWA to engage in and to continue unlawful polluting activities without
fear of punishment. Like Borowski 2" and Plaza Health,73 the necromantic judi-
cial use of lenity contravenes the clear intent of Congress to "punish water pol-
luters." '274 Use of lenity to circumvent this valid legislative purpose is inappropri-
ate for this "venerable doctrine."
C. Senza Ripieni Use of Chevron Deference Meets No Policies
the Importance of Which Requires Dominance Over the Rule of Lenity
1. Chevron is Not a Constitutional Doctrine
The Chevron deference doctrine, although constitutionally permitted, is not
constitutionally required." 5 Accordingly, there are no constitutional arguments
which advocate the use of the Chevron deference doctrine that, standing alone,
could overcome the use of an arguably quasi-constitutional doctrine like the rule
of lenity.
268. "The power of an administrative agency to administer a congressionally created... program nec-
essarily requires the formulation of policy and the making of rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or
explicitly, by Congress".... If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an
express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regu-
lation . . . [which] are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly
contrary to the statute.
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 (citations omitted); see supra notes 108-11 and accompanying text.
269. See supra notes 200-02 and accompanying text.
270. Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 427 (1985) ("The rule of lenity is not to be applied where to do
so would conflict with the implied or expressed intent of Congress .... "); see also Metropolitan Stevedore Co.
v. Rambo, 515 U.S. 291, 295 ("[W]hen a statute speaks with clarity... judicial inquiry... is finished.").
271. "[I]n expounding a statute, we are not guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to
the provision of the whole law, and to its object and policy." Dole v. United Steelworkers of Am., 494 U.S. 26,
35 (1990) (quoting Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107, 115 (1989)). In addition to viewing the statute as a
whole during the interpretive process, other factors may be involved in the court's interpretive process-such as
common sense. "Strict construction ... cannot provide a substitute for common sense, precedent, and legisla-
tive history." United States v. Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224, 225 (1966). In Standard Oil, Justice Douglas
used common sense, precedent, and legislative history to interpret the term "refuse matter" to include commer-
cially valuable gasoline accidentally discharged into a river. Id. at 228-30.
272. 977 E2d 27 (1st Cir. 1992).
273. 3 F.3d 643 (2d Cir. 1993).
274. United States v. Hopkins, 53 E3d 533, 539 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing S. REP. No. 99-50, at 30 (1985)).
275. See White, supra note 105, at 733-34. ("[T]he Court does not regard the Chevron review standard as
constitutionally compelled ... [but] perceives [it] as subconstitutional, rather than constitutional, in nature.")
(citations omitted); but see Callahan, supra note 92, at 1277 (arguing that the assumption that Chevron defer-
ence is required by the Constitution or constitutionally sanctioned actions of Congress is incorrect; Chevron 's
deference "is a judicially self-imposed, prudential limitation."); and Merrill, supra note 43, at 996 n.121
(Chevron 's key assumptions are "fundamentally incongruous with the constitutional course by which the Court
came to reconcile agencies and separation of powers.") (quoting Farina, supra note 36, at 487-88).
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Chevron has been soundly criticized by those who hold up the Chevron defer-
ence doctrine as an unconstitutional erosion of the role of the judiciary in admin-
istrative penalty cases.278 As noted above, this constituent part of Chevron cre-
ates particular concern to some courts assessing penalties under the environmen-
tal statutes.277 This is particularly true under the CWA, which "forbids all activi-
ties not otherwise allowed;" '278 therefore, an across-the-board use of Chevron def-
erence as the standard of review for administrative actions involving penalties
will more likely than not result in a failure to preserve the rights of those whose
liberty or property interests are affected by sanctions. This effect is particularly
worrisome since the Supreme Court seems to expand and contract the Chevron
deference doctrine279 through exceptions and inconsistent use,28 almost at will.
2. Chevron Deference Fulfills a Necessary Purpose in the Administrative Regu-
latory Scheme
Chevron deference is important to the administrative regulatory scheme
because only through deference are agencies, which have "great expertise and
[which have been] charged with responsibility for administering the [statute]," '281
able to reconcile conflicting policies, fill in the statutory "gaps,"282 and fulfill the
role intended by Congress by making policy decisions necessary for the system
to efficiently operate. Chevron deference is also necessary because these same
experts are, as a result of legislative intent and under the Chevron deference doc-
trine, the preferred "gap fillers." '283 Finally, the Chevron doctrine does provide
some structure and (perhaps) a certain amount of comfort to the judiciary, whose
expertise in a highly regulated environmental area, such as the CWA, may not be
sufficient to render the right decision in a case which involves complex technical
data and a certain amount of scientific uncertainty.284
276. See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Costs and Benefits ofAggressive Judicial Review ofAgency Action, 1989
DUKE L.J. 522 ("Far from being an enemy of the democratic process, judicial review is its indispensable ally,
since it ensures administrative fidelity to public desires expressed in legislative commands."); Callahan, supra
note 92, at 1282 ("If Chevron mandates judicial deference to agency judgment in every case in which a statute
fails to address the precise point at issue or is ambiguous with respect thereto, it substantially weakens the fed-
eral courts' constitutional check on the political branches' exercise of governmental power ... [and] significant-
ly displaces the federal courts' supervisory role in relation to the administrative agencies.").
277. See United States v. Mills, 817 F. Supp. 1546, 1555 (N.D. Fla. 1993), aff d, 36 F.3d 1052 (11th Cir.
1994) (discussed at supra note 41). See also Alexander, supra note 42, at 624 (arguing that it is improper for
administrative agencies to define crimes because of lack of agency accountability for errors and because of sep-
aration of powers concerns).
278. See supra note 28.
279. See Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 111-14 (1992) (Chevron cited to an EPA interpretation of
water quality regulations which violated the CWA's purpose of cleaner water by allowing pollutants from an
upstream state to further degrade the waters of a downstream state).
280. See supra notes 114-39 and accompanying text.
281. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984).
282. Id. at 843; see supra notes 108-11 and accompanying text.
283. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843; see also Merrill, supra note 43, at 978-79 (arguing that agencies are the
preferred gap fillers under Chevron).
284. Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 16 F.3d 1395, 1401 (4th Cir. 1993) ("[T]he CWA is a
lengthy and complex statute ... [which] often require[s] the evaluation of sophisticated data .... [I]n review-
ing EPA's actions,... this court does not sit as a scientific body, meticulously reviewing all data under a labora-
tory microscope.") (citations omitted).
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If neither Chevron nor the rule of lenity has sufficient constitutional or prece-
dential strength to advocate a senza ripieni use, then, because both doctrines are
necessary to protect important interests in the administrative regulatory arena,
the issue becomes whether there is any alternative to the current, informal, and
mostly unreliable, judicial senza ripieni use of either doctrine in instances in
which both would arguably apply. One answer can be found by assessing the
possibility of action taken by other governmental branches to resolve the issue.
V A SENZA RIPIENI CHOICE CAN BE REQUIRED OR ENCOURAGED
BY CONGRESSIONAL OR JUDICIAL ACTIVITY
A. Congressional Action Could Decide the Issue 5
Congress could solve this dilemma in one of three ways: (1) by mandating the
standard of review for this type of case; (2) by passing legislation with congres-
sional intent delineated in clearer language;286 or (3) by changing in-house con-
gressional procedures to improve the quality of legislative history used by the
courts to define congressional intent. However, there are problems with each of
these options.
1. Congress Could Mandate the Standard of Review
If desired, Congress could dictate the judicial standard of review to be utilized
during the evaluation of agency interpretations of a statute. This mandate could
become a part of any congressional attempt to re-authorize statutes which are
interpreted by administrative agencies.287 A legislative mandate which prescribes
285. This type of remedy could be part of any proposed legislation or any re-authorized version or amend-
ment of existing agency-administered statutes. But, because mandates of this sort are difficult to pass and
maintain, see text accompanying infra notes 287 and 293, legislators are often reluctant to include this type of
provision in any type of re-authorization legislation. For example, in the last Congressional attempt at CWA re-
authorization, there were no provisions for any type of mandated judicial review standard. Although the pro-
posed bill, H.R. 961 104 Cong. (1995), passed the House on May 16, 1995, by a 240-185 vote, Recent
Developments in the Congress, 25 Envtl. L. Rep. 10367 (July, 1995), the final version, which relaxed federal
water pollution control regulations, restricted the ability of federal agencies to declare wetlands off-limits to
development, and allowed states to rely on voluntary measures to deal with unmet water pollution problems, did
not pass the Senate, had it done so, President Clinton promised to veto the bill. See Katherine Stimnel, CWA
Rewrite Could be Eclipsed, 26 Envt. Rep. (BNA) 1895-97 (Feb. 2, 1996).
286. One example of a statute in which this approach has succeeded is the Endangered Species Act of 1973
(ESA) § 7(a)(l), 16 U.S.C. 1536 (a)(1) (1994). In Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978), the
Court found a clear statutory command for mandatory injunctions under the ESA. Id. at 194-95. Scholars do not
agree on the usefulness of "clearer statutory language." Compare Ross, supra note 21, at 571-72 (arguing that
Congress can protect itself from judicial abuse of interpretive canons "if... [it] speaks clearly enough) with
Merrill, supra note 43, at 1031 (The prospect of Congress "enact[ing] longer and more detailed statutes in order to
provide specific directions to a reviewing court lead[s] to bad policy and more influence by private interest groups,
... add[ing] to the complexity-and incomprehensibility-of the legal system.") (footnotes omitted).
287. As described earlier, see supra note 285, this issue was not addressed in the 1995 CWA re-authorization
effort or any subsequent Congressional CWA re-authorization attempts. It is fairly obvious that a mandated
standard of judicial review is an issue unlikely to be addressed anytime soon, either because of a lack of con-
sensus for the idea or for other political reasons. See William S. Jordan, III, Deference Revisited: Politics as a
Determinant of Deference Doctrine and the End of the Apparent Chevron Consensus, 68 NEB. L. REv. 454
(1989) (tracing the history of the Chevron decision and concluding that the current state of flux surrounding the
doctrine is due to an ideological division between liberals and conservatives). See also Merrill, supra note 43,
at 1031 (criticizing alternatives to Chevron deference, such as Congress seeking greater control over the admin-
istrative agencies or the President's authority, as "an erosion of coherence [and promotion of] greater interest
group influence.").
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the degree of deference to be used by courts when evaluating agency interpreta-
tions of statutory provisions2 or which instructs the judiciary to disregard a par-
ticular canon of construction is not a new concept, but past similar efforts have
not met with much success."' 9 Even if Congress was able to legislatively restrict
the scope of judicial review for an administrative agency's actions, its efforts
would face constitutional challenges."'
Another problem with a legislatively mandated, unitary approach is the lack of
uniformity of the administrative agency scheme. There are too many different
types of agencies and agency structures for one blanket judicial review standard,
even if Congress were to mandate a unitary rule. In order to attempt to meet the
needs of each of the agencies whose function it is to define broad statutory lan-
guage, the language delineating the standard would itself have to be extremely
broad, thus raising the same arguments enumerated in this Article against broadly
worded statutory language.291 Because such a solution would not significantly
assist the judiciary in engaging in the art of statutory construction, it is not a
solution that will likely appear.
288. In 1980, Senator Dale Bumpers of Arkansas attempted to amend the Administrative Procedure Act to
prohibit or limit judicial deference to the actions of an administrative agency. Although the Bumpers amend-
ment and its House counterpart never became law, the measure gained enough support to pass the Senate. See
James T. O'Reilly, Deference Makes a Difference: A Study of Impacts of the Bumpers Judicial Review
Amendment, 49 U. CIN. L. REV. 739 (1980); see also Ross, supra note 21, at 567-68 n.38.
289. See Jefferson B. Fordham & J. Russell Leach, Interpretation of Statutes in Derogation of the Common
Law, 3 VAND. L. REV. 438, 450-451 & nn.74-75 (1950) (cataloging numerous statutes which prohibit judicial
strict construction for statutes in derogation of the common law and the resulting judicial disregard of those
statutes). The Model Penal Code attempts to dissuade the judiciary from using lenity:
The provisions of the Code shall be construed according to the fair import of their terms but when
the language is susceptible of differing constructions it shall be interpreted to further the general
purposes stated in this Section and the special purposes of the particular provision involved. The
discretionary powers conferred by the Code shall be exercised in accordance with the criteria stated
in the Code and, insofar as such criteria are not decisive,... a court's indiscriminate use of the rule
of lenity may not further the general purposes of criminal law.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02(3) (1985). For other examples of statutes which limit or preclude judicial review,
see Note, Congressional Preclusion of Judicial Review of Federal Benefit Disbursement: Reasserting Separa-
tion of Powers, 97 HARv. L. REV. 778 (1984) and Ross, supra note 21, at 556-67. However, such an approach
has not been very successful and has been criticized as an overreaction which "create[s] a troubling precedent
for congressional intervention in matters traditionally left to evolutionary judicial development." Merrill,
supra note 43, at 1031.
290. Two possible constitutional challenges to a legislative effort of this sort are: (1) a challenge to any limits
placed on the scope of judicial review and (2) a challenge based on a violation of the separation of powers doc-
trine. See Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976). The standard of judicial review is a topic dear to
the heart of courts reluctant to cede their authority for judicial review, particularly when deprivations of liberty
or property are involved. See Caust-Ellenbogen, supra note 35, at 798 ("In past cases, when Congress appeared
to [limit the judicial] remedy for deprivations of liberty or property, courts have construed the statutes to find
that Congress had not precluded judicial review."). Some commentators have characterized the problem of
judicial review of agency actions as the "fighting issue of statutory interpretation," Bederman, supra note 116,
at 1023 n.463, and continue to emphasize the importance of the judiciary as the primary interpreter of the
statutes that an agency interprets. See Sunstein, supra note 276, at 522 ("[Jjudicial review of administrative
action is necessary ... to ensure that regulatory agencies comply with congressional commands.").
291. See supra notes 112-113 and accompanying text.
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2. Congress Could Write Legislation More Clearly
Congress could attempt to word its agency-implemented, legislative mandates
more clearly and concisely to aid the courts (and the agencies) that must interpret
the mandates. However, this simply stated solution is handicapped from its
inception due to the imperfection of the only tool available to accomplish this
task-the tool of language. Any congressional attempt to more explicitly express
intent through the medium of statutory language is (at best) an imprecise and
inefficient method of clarification, which opens up many possibilities for judicial
"Monday morning quarterbacking" during the judicial review of such language.
Anything that is written may present a problem of meaning... derive[d] from
the very nature of words. They are symbols of meaning. But unlike mathemati-
cal symbols, the phrasing of a document, especially a complicated [statute], sel-
dom attains more than approximate precision. If individual words are inexact
symbols... their configuration can hardly achieve invariant meaning or assured
definiteness. Apart from the ambiguity inherent in its symbols, a statute suffers
from dubieties. It is not an equation or a formula representing a clearly marked
process, nor is it an expression of individual thought to which is imparted the
definiteness a single authorship can give. A statute is an instrument of govern-
ment partaking of its practical purposes but also of its infirmities and limita-
tions, of its awkward and groping efforts.292
It is unlikely that Congress would be able to enact statutes written in such a man-
ner that all ambiguity would be eliminated, nor would any representative spon-
soring such legislation gain much politically if such a bill was enacted.293 On the
other hand, even if such legislation was written, it would still be subject to a
potential claim of ambiguity by the reviewing court.294
A second problem with legislative mandates written in an attempt to avoid the
stigma (and consequences) of ambiguity involves the interpretation of older
statutes. While congressional "plain speak" might be able to clarify any pending
statutes, new statutes, or re-authorized statutes, this solution would not assist the
court in the construction of older statutes enacted prior to the Supreme Court's
focus on textualism. Some of these statutes contain numerous legislative gram-
292. Frankfurter, supra note 5, at 528.
293. Ross, supra note 21, at 569-70 ("There is little to be gained politically by abstract amendments to the
United States Code."). Ross believes the greater danger underlying a mandated use of one interpretive doctrine
over the other is that this action might lose its attractiveness once the balance of political power shifts to the
other side. He also points out that ridding the system of one normative canon essentially frees the judiciary to
"frustrate both congressional and administrative constructions by interpreting the statute in light of other nor-
mative canons based on the judiciary's policy preferences." Id. at 570.
294. The possibility of a court misusing its office and engaging in an endless statutory analysis to justify its
personal "meaning" of broad statutory language is evident. However, some courts are sensitive to this criticism
and claim to advocate the view that the court's job is to "take regulations as [they] find them, and as they are
plausibly read by those subject to them. It is not [the court's] proper function to 'torture one poor word ten
thousand ways'...."'.Weaver v. United States Information Agency, 87 E3d 1429, 1449 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (Wald,
J., dissenting) (quoting JoHN DRYDEN, MAc FLECKNOE, Line 210, reprinted in BARTETr'S FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS
369 (14th ed. 1973)).
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matical and/or drafting errors.29 As a result, the standard of review for these
statutes would differ from the standard of review for any enacted or re-authorized
"plain speak" statutes and be subject to the same criticisms of inconsistent inter-
pretation currently levied against the judicial utilization of Chevron deference
and the rule of lenity.
Third, such an approach completely ignores the reality of the current condition
of the administrative state:
The legislature is our dominant policymaking body, but it does not implement
the policies it formulates; that task belongs to the executive and the judiciary.
While we usually conceptualize this as the separation of powers doctrine, it is,
in fact, a specialization of the functions that the sheer size of modem govern-
ment demands. As a result of this specialization, statutes are essentially the leg-
islature's instructions to implementation mechanisms . . . [which] allocate
resources, deploy state power, issue information, and organize... internal oper-
ations .... "'
As a result, this methodology would be ineffective to resolve the current sys-
temic problems.
295. The vast majority of statutes the Court interprets today were drafted and enacted in the pre-textu-
alist era [pre-1988]. When Congress enacted those statutes, the Court was using a combination of
intentionalism and deference [to review agency interpretations of statutes]. Congress had no reason
to believe that it needed to hire large numbers of linguists and grammarians to ensure that each
statutory text explicitly and unambiguously accomplished each of its intended purposes. It assumed
that a court would give credence to evidence of clear legislative intent in a statute's legislative histo-
ry in the event ... [there was a] linguistic or grammatical flaw in the language of a statute or an
internal inconsistency .... Congress believed that it could afford to pay even less attention to lin-
guistic precision when it enacted an agency administered statute, since it assumed that a court would
defer to a politically accountable agency's interpretation of the statute in the event that a court
detected an apparent [ambiguity] or internal inconsistency. As a result, virtually all agency adminis-
tered statutes in existence today contain numerous drafting errors and internal inconsistencies.
I DAvis & PIERCE, supra note 32, § 3.6, at 52 (Supp. 1995).
296. Rubin, supra note 1, at 580. Others have attributed less noble motives to the congressional use of broad
statutory language. See William H. Rodgers, Jr., The Lesson of the Red Squirrel: Consensus and Betrayal in
the Environmental Statutes, 5 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & PoC'Y 161 (1989) (describing the process of law-mak-
ing in "game" terminology, with the main goal of the legislator being to "win" (be re-elected)); see also John P
Dwyer, The Pathology of Symbolic Legislation, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 233 (1990) (criticizing legislators who enact
"symbolic" legislation, reaping the popular benefits of public interest legislation while interfering with the reg-
ulatory process which implements it).
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3. Congress Could Change the Way It Makes Law297
Although the use of legislative history as an interpretive tool has been criti-
cized, its use continues to be a popular judicial choice.2 98 One alternative to con-
gressionally mandated interpretive doctrines would be to change Congress' leg-
islative procedures in order to more accurately reflect the committee members'
thoughts on pending bills and avoid items not relevant to the true intent of the
legislature.299 Although this solution would clarify the legislative history associ-
ated with any statute and improve the use of legislative history as a tool in con-
struing congressional intent, the process would still be subject to criticism since
the process of lawmaking does not consider the same concerns affecting the judi-
ciary during the judicial interpretation of a statutory mandate."' The polyglot
combinations of negotiation and jockeying for position that make up the current
system of lawmaking is a poor foundation for an important interpretive tool
wielded during the process of judicial interpretation. 1
It is unlikely that a legislator would find any of these solutions important to his
constituents or that such a topic would be a priority in his current legislative
agenda. However, in the absence of any congressional action, it is still possible
to look to other branches of the triadic governmental tree for possible solutions.
B. Judicial Action Could Decide the Issue
1. The Supreme Court Could Decide Whether a Senza Ripieni Use of a Solo
Doctrine Is Appropriate
As noted above, it does no good to look at current Chevron opinions, the rule
of lenity decisions, or their progeny for answers to the posed dilemma because
no real assistance is available there to resolve it. Although the Chevron opinion
297. See Ross, supra note 21, at 574-78 (discussing various suggestions which seek to modify congressional
practices by enacting statutory legislation in order to minimize situations where the breadth (or dearth) of statu-
tory language encourages the judiciary to invoke a descriptive canon).
298. The use of legislative history as an interpretive tool continues and is criticized by the current Court. Its
critics have called the interpretive use of legislative history, among other things, the "soft science of legislative
historicizing," Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 287 (1994) (Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas, JJ., con-
curring) and an "omnipresent makeweight for decisions arrived at on other grounds," Thunder Basin Coal Co.
v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 219 (1994) (Scalia and Thomas, JJ., concurring). Justice Scalia is an especially colorful
critic of the use of legislative history as an interpretive tool, calling it, among other monikers, the "last hope of
lost interpretive causes, that St. Jude of the hagiology of statutory construction . United States v.
Thompson/Center Arms Co, 504 U.S. 505, 521 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring).
Commentators have noted a diminished judicial reliance on the use of legislative history. See Merrill, supra
note 116, at 354 ("The use of legislative history... is dropping precipitously, while the use of dictionaries ... is
moving up".) However, use of legislative history as an interpretive tool remains, although it has been criticized,
see Landgraf 511 U.S. at 287 and Thunder Basin Coal Co., 511 U.S. at 219, as a blatant exercise ofjudicial pre-
determination of issues and comradery. See, e.g., Jack Schwartz and Amanda Stakem Conn, The Court of
Appeals at the Cocktail Party: The Use and Misuse of Legislative History, 54 MD. L. REv. 432 (1995) ("[Tjhe use
of legislative history [is] 'the equivalent of entering a crowded cocktail party and looking over the heads of the
guests for one's friends."' (quoting Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring)).
299. See Ross, supra note 21, at 574-78.
300. See supra note 296.
301. "[J]udges must 'exercise extreme caution before concluding that a statement made in floor debate, or at
a hearing, or printed in a committee document may be taken as statutory gospel', in light of the 'endemic inter-
play, in Congress, of political and legislative consideration[s]' likely unrelated to the interpretive tasks of a
court." Texas Mun. Power Agency v. EPA, 89 F.3d 858, 875 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (quoting Gersman v. Group Health
Ass'n, Inc., 975 F2d 886, 892 (D.C. Cir. 1992)).
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allows for the use of "traditional tools of statutory construction" as an aid in
determining congressional intent,0 2 there are no cases in which the Supreme
Court has provided direction or pointed to those circumstances in which Chevron
deference should be replaced with the rule of lenity or any rule of statutory con-
struction. In fact, in the cases in which canons of interpretation have been sub-
stituted for Chevron deference, there has been no discussion by the Court of any
priority of the two doctrines. Some commentators consider the two doctrines
equals, calling Chevron deference a canon of construction,"' an opinion which
has not yet been accepted by the Supreme Court.
2. Another Judicial Alternative-Ignore Both Doctrines
In some instances in which either Chevron deference or the rule of lenity
would be an appropriate interpretive tool wielded to ascertain congressional leg-
islative intent, some courts reviewing agency interpretations of statutes reach
beyond Chevron deference and the rule of lenity and use other judicial doctrines
to determine a result which purportedly meets the congressional purpose of the
statutes." 4 This judicial "gerrymandering""3 avoids the problems experienced
with the senza ripieni use of lenity or Chevron deference, but creates problems of
its own. This approach adds further confusion to the environmental enforcement
scheme and creates additional exceptions to those instances in which the use of
either Chevron deference or the rule of lenity is applicable. A possible (but
unvoiced) factor in the judiciary's failure to choose between the two doctrines
might be the similarities between the two,3"6 which creates possible judicial
uncertainty concerning a choice of one doctrine over the other, if both might
apply.
302. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984); accord
Michigan Citizens for an Indep. Press v. Thornburgh, 868 E2d 1285, 1292 (D.C. Cir. 1989) ("Chevron implicit-
ly precludes courts picking and choosing among various canons of statutory construction to reject reasonable
agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes .... [However], canons of construction are [not] completely irrel-
evant in the post-Chevron era."), affd mem., 493 U.S. 38 (1989) (equally divided court).
303. Sunstein, supra note 103, at 2108 ("Chevron itself creates an interpretive principle .... ); see also
White, supra note 105, at 733. Not all commentators agree. Professor Merrill sees Chevron deference as a
doctrine that "trumps" any canon of statutory construction. See Merrill, supra note 43, at 988 ("[Ihf a court
[can] interpret a statute only by invoking a canon, it would be forced to acknowledge that the issue is one to
which Congress has not clearly spoken and that, under Chevron, it must therefore defer... "').
304. Two examples of judicial use of other doctrines are: (1) Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a
Great Oregon v. Babbitt, 17 E3d 1463, 1465-66 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (using noscitur a sociis to limit overly broad
regulations interpreting the ESA), rev'd, 515 U.S. 687 (1995); and (2) United States v. Weitzenhoff 35 E 3d
1275, 1284-86 (9th Cir. 1994) (using the "public welfare doctrine").
305. "Gerrymandering" is the process of dividing a state or other territory into authorized civil or political
divisions, but with such geographical arrangement to accomplish an ulterior or unlawful purpose. BLACKs LAw
DICTIONARY 618 (5th ed. 1979). The term was coined in the early 1800s to describe a Massachusetts district
drawn to the advantage of Governor Elbridge Gerry's political party which vaguely resembled a salamander.
See N. Jay Shepherd, Note, "'Abridge" Too Far: Racial Gerrymandering, the Fifteenth Amendment, and Shaw v.
Reno, 14 B.C. THIRD WORLuD L.J. 337, 367 n.34 (1994).
306. See supra Part IVA.
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This Author rejects either a legislatively or judicially mandated choice of one
of these doctrines over the other because such a choice is unlikely, and that usage
fails to meet two important policy goals inherent in the "modem" agency struc-
ture: (1) the need for Chevron deference to an agency's expert interpretation of
broad statutory language that the legislature requires the agency to administer;
and (2) the need for "fair notice" and "certainty" of punitive regulations and/or
agency interpretations of regulations designed to promote compliance to those
persons who may suffer substantial penalties for violations of those statutes and
any agency promulgated interpretive regulatory provisions.
VI. THE CHEVRON WALTZ
307
This Author's proposed answer which meets these criteria is a combination of
the two doctrines discussed above, the Chevron waltz. The Chevron waltz is a
three-part approach to this problem of statutory construction which is analogous
to the dance of the same name. In the music of the waltz, the strong accent of
the dance is always on the first beat. Beats two and three are ancillary, coming
only after the first strong beat has occurred . 8
A. Step One-What is the Intent of Congress?
In the Chevron waltz, the first step is the most important, for that step deter-
mines whether the dance continues. The first step of the Chevron waltz takes
place as the court ascertains Congress' intent behind the legislation which is the
topic of the court's interest. This approach is consistent with the first step of the
two-part inquiry inherent in the Chevron deference doctrine and the rule of leni-
ty.319 In both Chevron and the rule of lenity, the primary question to be answered
is "what is the intent of Congress?" Any responsibility of the court to defer to an
agency's action or to apply lenity will be guided by the answer to that question.3 10
After the first accented step of the Chevron waltz has been taken (and congres-
sional intent is determined), only then can the next two steps occur. If congres-
sional intent is apparent, then the dance is over; the orchestra (the court) can go
home because there is nothing for the court to construe or interpret. But, if the
congressional intent is ambiguous, or silent on the matter at hand, then the
Chevron waltz must continue to steps two and three.
307. A waltz is a dance in three steps. WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1318 (1976).
308. Id.
309. See supra Parts II.B. 1. and III.C.
310. Metropolitan Stevedore Co. v. Rambo, 515 U.S. 291, 295 (1995) ("[W]hen a statute speaks with clarity
to an issue, judicial inquiry into the statutory meaning . . . is finished."); see also Passamaquoddy Tribe v.
Maine, 75 F.3d 784, 793 (1st Cir. 1996) ("'When ... Congress has unambiguously expressed its intent ...
courts must read the relevant laws according to their unvarnished meaning .... [If] there is no statutory ambi-
guity, the principle[s] of [interpretation are] not triggered.").
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B. Step Two--Was the Agency Interpretation a Reasonable One?
Step two inquires as to "whether the agency's interpretation of the statute was a
reasonable one." While this inquiry returns the court to the Ptolemiac cycles of
statutory interpretation,311 guidance can be found in opinions which define the
parameters of "reasonable" agency action,312 thus providing guidance for both the
court and for the practitioner who must advise clients navigating these regulated
agency waters. The finding that an agency action or regulation is "reasonable" at
step two is crucial because only regulations which are reasonable will survive the
scrutiny of a reviewing court. Once the court has determined that the agency's
interpretation/decision was reasonable (or was unreasonable)," 3 then the dance
continues to step three.
C. Step Three-Was Fair Notice of the Regulation Provided?
Step three inquires as to "whether the violator was given fair notice of the
statutory prohibition and/or the regulation at issue." This last step of the Chevron
waltz ensures lenity's purpose of "fair notice" of prohibited activities and the
requirement that lenity be used at the "end of the [interpretive] process."3 15 Dur-
ing this inquiry, it is appropriate for a court to inquire into the avenues used by
the agency to publicize the regulation's prohibitions and/or strictures, as well as
the probability of the regulated entity receiving notice of the regulation.
Although some methods of agency interpretive activities clearly constitute fair
notice, such as a formal "notice and comment" rule, 1 6 if the agency interpreta-
tion is informal, the potential violator may not have notice of its prohibitions.
317
311. 2 WILLAM H. RODGERS JR., supra note 7.
312. See United Mine Workers v. Federal Mine Safety and Health Admin., 920 F.2d 960, 963 (D.C. Cir.
1990) (The court need not consider other valid readings of the statute; it must only decide "whether [the
agency's] interpretation ... is reasonable.") The agency interpretation will be found reasonable if it is not
"inconsistent with the statutory mandate or [would not] frustrate the policy that Congress sought to imple-
ment," Kerr-McGee Chem. Corp. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm 'n, 903 F.2d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (quoting
Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors, 468 U.S. 137, 143 (1984)), and as long as the agency's interpre-
tation is not "arbitrary, capricious or manifestly contrary to the statute." Katsis v. INS, 997 F.2d 1067, 1070 (3d
Cir. 1993) (quoting Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense, 467 U.S. 844). However, the agency must
articulate the reasons for its interpretation because "'[i]n the absence of any explanation justifying [the agency's
position] ... [the court is] unable to sustain [it] as reasonabl[e]."' Oil, Chem. and Atomic Workers Int'l Union
v. NLRB, 46 E3d 82, 90 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (quoting Leeco, Inc. v. Hayes, 965 F.2d 1081, 1085 (D.C. Cir. 1992)).
313. See supra notes 55 and 56.
314. "Fair notice," as used in this analysis, encompasses both the need for notice of prohibited activities to
potential defendants and for legislative certainty, which legality requires. See supra note 173 and accompany-
ing text.
315. Gozlon-Peretz v. United States, 498 U.S. 395, 410 (1991) ("The rule [of lenity] comes into operation at
the end of the process of construing what Congress has expressed, not at the beginning as an overriding consid-
eration of being lenient to wrongdoers.") (quoting Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 596 (1961)).
316. See supra notes 51-52, 54; included in this category would also be publications of the regulation in its
proposed form in the Federal Register. See infra note 334.
317. See supra note 53 and text accompanying note 57.
[VOL. 19:115
1998] HAS THE CHEVRON DOCTRINE RUN OUT OF GAS?
Again, there is a reasonably large body of precedent to guide the court and the
cautious practitioner in determining whether the notice provided to the regulated
community would constitute "fair notice."31
D. The Chevron Waltz Demonstrated
1. General Electric Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency
319
The Chevron waltz approach was successfully used by the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals in a case which involved an informal interpretation (an agency
interpretive rule) of a formal interpretation (a formal "notice and comment" reg-
ulation). 2 In the General Electric case, General Electric was prosecuted for
violating the EPA's polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB) regulations and fined
$25,000.00.321 Although the "Chevron waltz" nomenclature was not used by the
District of Columbia Circuit, that court used this Author's proposed approach to
overturn the EPA'S assessed fine by approaching the problem in a tripartite man-
ner. In its analysis, the court first found that the EPA's interpretation of the PCB
regulations was within the intent of Congress and, therefore, permissible.322 In
addition, since the interpretation at issue was of the agency's own regulations, it
was entitled to a high level of deference. 23
Next, the court evaluated the regulations which were the subject of the enforce-
ment action and found them reasonable (Chevron waltz step two).324 After mak-
ing that determination, the court proceeded to step three of the Chevron waltz by
examining the facts of the case to ascertain whether General Electric had
received fair notice of the EPA prohibitions contained in the EPA'S interpretive
rule. 325
318. If a regulation fails to give "adequate notice" of the conduct required or prohibited, it cannot be upheld
as constitutional. Komjathy v. NTSB, 832 E2d 1294 (D.C. Cir. 1987). "Adequate notice" exists if there are
opportunities for the regulated party to determine what obligations the regulation imposes. See City of
Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 E3d 415, 429 (10th Cir. 1996) (finding that "[t]here is a strong presumption that
regulations [meet the requirements of notice] if the regulated party has the means of obtaining clarification
either by making inquiry or through an administrative process"). Notice is critical to meet the requirements of
due process because, in its absence, "an agency may not deprive a party of property by imposing civil or crimi-
nal liability." General Elec. v. EPA, 53 E3d 1324, 1328-29 (D.C. Cir. 1995).




323. Id. at 1327 (quoting General Carbon Co. v. OSHRC, 860 E2d 479, 483 (D.C. Cir. 1988)). See also
Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994) ("[Courts] defer to [an agency's] interpretation
unless an 'alternative reading is compelled by the regulation's plain language or by other indications of the
Secretary's intent at the time of the regulation's promulgation"') (quoting Gardebring v. Jenkins, 485 U.S. 415,
430 (1988)). The General Electric court did not discuss whether the EPA's PCB regulations or its interpretive
rule complied with the Congressional intent of the statute. However, that conclusion is implied (and step one of
the Chevron waltz met) because the court discussed the importance of deference to the agency's interpretation,
recognizing that the PCB regulations were a part of a "technically complex statutory scheme ... backed by an
even more complex and comprehensive set of regulations .... [Deference allows the agency to] retain control
over permissible readings of the regulations they will enforce ... [since the agencies] have the technical exper-
tise and political authority to carry out statutory mandates." General Elec., 53 E3d at 1327 (citations omitted).
324. Id.
325. Id. at 1327-28.
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Using the Chevron waltz step three analysis, the court found that the EPA inter-
pretation did not provide "fair notice" because it did not clearly prohibit the
General Electric activities at issue. An additional factor lending support for the
court's finding of "no fair notice" was the lack of consensus among the different
divisions of the EPA about which General Electric activities were prohibited by
the interpretive rule. 32 The court found that General Electric had not been given
"fair warning" of the prohibitions in the agency's interpretation. 27 As a result,
due process had not been met and General Electric could not be penalized for
these violations:
328
Due process requires that parties receive fair notice before being deprived of
property. The due process clause thus prevents ... deference from validating
the application of a regulation that fails to give fair warning of the conduct it
prohibits or requires. In the absence of notice ... an agency may not deprive a
party of property by imposing civil or criminal liability.
3 29
The court went on to require that "fair notice" be given to regulated entities not
only in criminal cases, but also in any civil administrative context which involves
penalties, stating that "[t]his requirement [is] thoroughly 'incorporated into
administrative law.""'33 The court was generous with its definitions and exam-
ples of the required "fair notice." One example of "adequate notice" was infor-
mal notice to a regulated entity that a permit was needed prior to that entity com-
mencing a prohibited activity.331 This limited notice is sufficient if the agency's
interpretation is reasonable.33 2 The court also allowed agency citations or other
punishment meted out to constitute fair notice if the regulations (and/or other
informal interpretations of those regulations) are clearly written.33 In this situa-
tion, the court will ask:
[W]hether the regulated party received, or should have received, notice of the
agency's interpretation in the most obvious way of all: by reading the regula-
tions. If, by reviewing the regulations and other public statements issued by the
agency, a regulated party... [could] identify, with 'ascertainable certainty', the
standards with which the agency expects parties to conform, then the agency
[has provided fair notice].""
326. During the enforcement proceedings, the EPA changed the basis for General Electric's liability under
the PCB regulations several times. Id. at 1332-33.
327. Id.
328. "Had EPA merely required General Electric to comply with its interpretation, this case would be over."
Id. at 1328. But, even though the agency's interpretation was reasonable, it could not sustain a violation and
fine because General Electric was never on notice of the agency interpretation. Id.
329. Id. at 1328-29 (citations omitted).
330. Id. at 1329 (quoting Satellite Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 824 E2d 1, 3 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).
331. General Elec., 53 F.3d at 1329.
332. Id. Of course, the agency interpretation is reasonable only if it is consistent with congressional intent
and with the agency's regulation. See supra notes 310-12 and accompanying text.
333. General Elec., 53 F3d at 1329.
334. Id. Under this standard, it can be argued that even proposed agency rules would constitute fair notice to
a regulated entity if such rules meet the "logical outgrowth" standards which govern adequate notice for pro-
posed rules. See Shell Oil v. EPA, 950 F.2d 741, 751 (D.C. Cir. 1991) ("Final rules need only be a 'logical out-
growth' of proposed regulations.").
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Despite its liberal definition of "fair notice," the General Electric court con-
cluded that no fair notice was afforded to General Electric in this instance:
Where... the regulations and other policy statements are unclear, where the
petitioner's interpretation is reasonable, and where the agency itself struggles to
provide a definitive reading of the regulatory requirements, a regulated party is
not "on notice" of the agency's ultimate interpretation of the regulations, and
may not be punished ... either financially or in future enforcement proceed-
ings-for the actions charged in this case.335
The Chevron waltz approach used by the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals meets the policies and concerns of both Chevron deference and the rule
of lenity. In applying Chevron deference to an agency's interpretation of the
statute, the court first ascertains whether congressional intent has been met
through the agency's interpretive actions; if it has, the court defers, allowing the
responsible agency to fulfill its function by engaging in reasonable policy mak-
ing decisions needed under a technically complex scheme. But, in determining
whether the regulated party had notice of the agency's actions before any punish-
ment was assessed, the court addresses the need for fair notice, which exists
when an agency action involves the deprivation of a liberty or property inter-
est."3
An approach similar to that of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in
General Electric has been taken in other cases with some success. 37 The benefit
of the Chevron waltz approach is that it works well in cases in which the agency
interpretation involved is either formal or informal. It is in the informal interpre-
tation area that the amount of notice provided may create a broad area for coun-
sel to mount challenges to the agency's interpretive actions.
2. Chevron Waltz Under the Clean Water Act-Formal Agency Interpretations
A good example of how the Chevron waltz operates in the context of a formal
interpretation under the CWA can be found in City ofAlbuquerque v. Browner."
Under the CWA, Indian tribes are granted the same authority as a state govern-
ment and are treated by the EPA in the same manner as states, in some circum-
stances. 39 Included within that congressional grant of authority is an Indian
335. General Elec., 53 E3d at 1333-34 (emphasis added).
336. Id. at 1328 ("Due process requires that parties receive fair notice before being deprived of property.");
see, e.g., Caust-Ellenbogen, supra note 35, at 799.
337. See Blount v. Securities and Exchange Comm'n, 61 F.3d 938, 948-49 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding that
notice given in the form of informal advance rulings from SEC staff was sufficient notice, but allowing the
affected party to challenge the application of these rules as not reasonably foreseeable or violative of the due
process requirement of fair notice if an enforcement action is brought); Beazer East, Inc. v. EPA, 963 F.2d 603,
609-10 (3d Cir. 1992) (rejecting defendant's argument that there was no fair notice when the agency chose to
proceed by adjudication); Martin v. Occupation Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 941 F.2d 1051, 1058 (10th
Cir. 1991) (finding the agency interpretation reasonable, although "perhaps not apparent," and finding that the
defendant had fair notice of the agency's interpretation because the defendant had been informed of the agency
requirements prior to citations being issued) (emphasis added).
338. 97 F3d 415 (10th Cir. 1996).
339. Id. at 418 n.1.
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tribe's ability to have regulatory jurisdiction over the tribe's water sources in the
same manner as the states under the framework of the CWA 40 After providing
an opportunity for public notice and comment, the Isleta Pueblo tribe adopted
water quality standards for the portion of the Rio Grande River (hereinafter "Rio
Grande") which flows through the Isleta Pueblo reservation. 41 The water quality
standards adopted by the Isleta Pueblo were more stringent than the standards
adopted either by the State of New Mexico or the applicable federal standards;
however, the Isleta Pueblo's standards were subsequently approved by the EPA. 42
The city of Albuquerque filed suit, challenging the EPA's consent to the stan-
dards on several grounds. The city's principle complaint was that the approval of
the Isleta Pueblo's standards adversely affected the pending re-issuance of the
city's National Pollutant Discharge Elimination Systems (NPDES) permit for its
city waste treatment facility which also discharged into the Rio Grande."' On
appeal, the city challenged the tribe's ability to adopt the more stringent water
quality standards.
Although the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals did not adopt this Author's
nomenclature for its approach, the court used the Chevron waltz analysis to reject
the city's claims. In the first step of its analysis (Chevron waltz step one), the
court attempted to ascertain congressional intent on the issue of whether the
Isleta Pueblo could adopt more stringent water quality standards than either the
state of New Mexico or the federal government. The court found that the CWA
was ambiguous on this issue. "' Once congressional intent was found to be
unclear, the court proceeded to Chevron waltz step two in order to determine
whether the EPA's actions in interpreting the statute were reasonable.
The court found that, under the CWA, Congress had granted "substantial statu-
tory discretion" to the EPA to administer the provisions of the CWA345 and that the
EPA's treatment of the tribe as a state was appropriate under the statute (and con-
sistent with the idea of Indian tribal sovereignty). 3" As a result, the court found
that the EPA's approval of the Isleta Pueblo's water quality standards was a reason-
able exercise of the discretion granted by Congress under the CWA 47 This find-
ing successfully completed step two of the court's Chevron waltz analysis.
Although this part of the court's analysis resolved the bulk of the city's claim,
the city also alleged that the EPA had acted improperly by failing to comply with
340. Id. at 418.
341. Id. at 419.
342. Id.
343. Prior to this appeal, the city settled many of its disputes with the EPA and the Isleta Pueblo by adopting
the heightened water quality standards as part of its new NPDES permit. Id. at 420. Although the city filed a
motion to dismiss the appeal, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals refused to grant it because dismissing the
city's action would permit the city to avoid the stare decisis effect of the lower court's decision rejecting the
city's claims and allow the city another opportunity to litigate the question. The Tenth Circuit concluded that
this result would be unfair both to the EPA and to the Isleta Pueblo. Id. at 421.
344. Id. at 422.
345. Id.
346. Id.
347. "We conclude that the EPA's construction of the ... CWA [which allows] tribes [to] establish water
quality standards that are more stringent than those imposed by the federal government-is permissible...
Id. at 423.
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procedural requirements of the APA in the process of approving the Isleta
Pueblo's water quality standards." ' The city argued that, as a result of that fail-
ure, it was not given proper notice because the EPA "fail[ed] to include a state-
ment of basis and purpose for its action[s] ... [and failed] to provide [opportuni-
ty] for public notice and comment."3 '9 The city also claimed that, by approving
the Isleta Pueblo standards, the EPA engaged in informal rulemaking and that
additional notice of its activity should have been provided to the city."'
The court disagreed, proceeding to step three of the Chevron waltz analysis.
Although the court conceded that, under the CWA, Congress intended for states
and/or tribes to provide "fair notice" of proposed water quality standards to
affected parties, it held that this goal was accomplished by allowing public par-
ticipation in the adoption of the Isleta Pueblo's water quality standards."' The
court determined that the EPA's role in reviewing the proposed water quality
standards was a limited, non rule-making role. 2 Any notice required under the
CWA for proposed water quality standards was to be given by the states and/or
the tribes which established these standards, not the EPA. 53 The court found that
the Isleta Pueblo had provided adequate notice by publishing the proposed stan-
dards in the local newspaper, by having a public hearing, and by mailing notice
of the hearing directly to the city.35 4 Noting that an additional, independent
opportunity for notice of the standards was provided by the EPA in connection
with the re-issuance of the city's NPDES permit (which contained the Isleta
Pueblo's increased water quality standards), the court found that the city had "a
full and fair opportunity for public notice, comment, and hearing" and rejected
the city's claims.
3 5
The formal rule scenario plays well to demonstrate the strengths of the
Chevron waltz because use of the technique allows deference to an agency's
expertise in interpreting a complex regulatory statute and inquires whether "fair
notice" of the requirements of that interpretation have been adequately commu-
nicated to the regulated party. However, the Chevron waltz can also be used
when the agency interpretations at issue are informal agency interpretations of
the CWA.
348. Id. at 424.
349. Id.
350. Id.
351. Clean Water Act § 303, 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(1) (1994); see City ofAlbuquerque, 97 E3d at 424.
352. Id. at 424-25.
353. Id. at 425.
354. Id. at 425-26.
355. Id. at 426. The city also raised a vagueness challenge to the Isleta Pueblo's water quality standards,
claiming that they were so vague as to deny the city its right to due process. The court rejected this argument
for three reasons: (1) the EPA's regulations allowed the narrative descriptions contained in the Isleta Pueblo's
water quality standards that the city called "vague"; (2) the proposed standards did not require any particular
conduct of the city; they merely put the city on notice of possible standards which must be satisfied; and (3) the
city had an administrative process available which would allow translation of the narrative standards into spe-
cific enforceable limits. Id. at 429. Other courts have allowed the enforcement of CWA water quality standards
by citizens' suits. See supra note 67; see also PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County v. Washington Dep't of Ecology,
511 U.S. 700 (1994); Northwest Envtl. Advocates v. City of Portland, 56 E3d 979 (9th Cir. 1995).
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3. Chevron Waltz Under the Clean Water Act-Informal Agency Interpretations
In Appalachian Energy Group v. Environmental Protection Agency,"' oil and gas
industry trade associations challenged an internal memorandum, from the EPA's
NPDES Program Branch Chief to a regional EPA storm water coordinator, inter-
preting the CWA. The memorandum stated that an NPDES permit would be
required for "'storm water discharges from construction activities involving oil and
gas facilities (e.g., access roads, drilling pads, pipelines, etc.).""'3 7 Once this mem-
orandum became public knowledge, the oil and gas industry challenged the memo-
randum's substance because the memo's interpretation was contrary to the CWA's
explicit terms which exempt from any permit requirement uncontaminated "dis-
charges of stormwater runoff from mining operations or oil and gas exploration,
production, processing, or treatment operations or transmission facilities."3
Subsequently, trade associations representing the oil and gas industry filed
suit, challenging the Branch Chief's opinion on two grounds.3"9 First, they
claimed that the interpretation contained in the memo was inconsistent with the
CWA.3 s Second, they argued that the memorandum amounted to a new rule,
adopted without proper notice under the APA.3 1 These claims were rejected by
the court, which resolved the case by focusing on the nature of the memorandum
at issue. 2 Since no judicial review was available for an informal opinion," 3 and
because the memorandum had not been adopted by the EPA and/or used to issue
or deny any NPDES permits, the court denied the relief sought by the trade asso-
ciations.3"4 But, what if the memo had affected a pending permit application?
This factual situation (and the court's analysis) can be used to illustrate the oper-
ation of the Chevron waltz analysis in an informal rule situation.
First of all, the court looked at the language of the CWA to determine the
intent of Congress (Chevron waltz step one). The court found that Congress
intended to allow the judicial review of agency actions in "issuing or denying any
permit."3 The Appalachian Energy Group admitted that the memo did not
356. 33 E3d 319 (4th Cir. 1994).
357. Id. at 320. "The heart of the Clean Water Act is [its] requirement for nationally uniform, technology-
based limits on point source discharges administered through a national permit program [NPDES permit]
required by section 402." Percival, supra note 10, at 879.
358. Clean Water Act § 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342(l)(2) (1994); Appalachian Energy Group, 33 E3d at 320 n.2
(emphasis added).
359. Appalachian Energy Group, 33 E3d at 320-21.
360. Id.
361. Id.
362. The court found that the memo was sent from one EPA official to the other as an inquiry. No permit was
issued or denied as a result of the memo, nor did it involve or relate to a pending permit application. The EPA
also represented to the court that the memo had not affected the issuance or denial of a permit and that it was not
a new rule, but merely the writer's interpretation of "two regulations apparently in tension." Id. at 322-23.
363. The trade group attempted to invoke the jurisdiction of the court of appeals under 33 U.S.C. §
1369(b)(1)(F), arguing that this provision "confer[s] jurisdiction on the courts of appeals to review the EPA
Administrator's action 'in issuing or denying any permit ... "' and by citing legal precedent finding "appellate
court jurisdiction to review EPA 'rules that regulate underlying permit procedures."' Appalachian Energy
Group, 33 E3d at 321 (citing Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 966 F.2d 1292 (1992)).
364. Appalachian Energy Group, 33 E3d at 321.
365. Id.
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involve the issuance or denial of a particular permit, but argued that it "constitut-
ed a rule 'underlying a potential permit application"' and, as such, review was
within the jurisdiction of the court.3 6' The court disagreed, finding that, because
the memo did not affect any issuance or denial of any permit, it had no subject
matter jurisdiction to review the memo.367
Second, although the court did not specifically address whether the agency
opinion expressed in the memo was a reasonable interpretation of the CWA
(Chevron waltz step two), that issue was tangentially addressed. The Appala-
chian Energy Group argued that the EPA memo opinion was inconsistent with
the CWA and with current EPA regulations"3 '8 -i.e., the memo's interpretation of
the CWA was unreasonable. The EPA responded by claiming that the memo was
an interpretive rule that "reasonably and correctly interprets the Clean Water
Act. ' 369 However, the court expressed some skepticism about the reasonableness
of the EPA's interpretation.370 If the memo was not a reasonable interpretation,
then the agency action would not have survived the scrutiny of the reviewing
court37 1 and the effect of this memo on any pending NPDES application for a
permit would have been null. However, for the sake of this hypothesis, we will
assume that the agency interpretation was a reasonable one. Having cleared that
hurdle, the final question would be that of "fair notice."
Because the memo did not affect the issuance or denial of any CWA permit,
the court did not analyze whether the oil and gas industry received fair notice of
the memo (Chevron waltz step three). However, if the memo's informal interpre-
tation had affected the issuance or denial of a permit (or if the text of the memo
had been interpreted as requiring additional restrictions under the NPDES per-
mit), the court could have proceeded with the third step of the Chevron waltz
analysis. One step of this analysis would have been to investigate the avenues of
publicity through which the memorandum had passed and determine whether the
oil and gas industry had received notice of its provisions. In this instance, it is
doubtful that the court would have found that the Appalachian Energy Group had
"fair notice" of the memo's effect.
The memo was an internal EPA memo. The Appalachian Energy Group was
not apprised of the memo or of its effect on its members prior to the time it was
requested by counsel. If the memo had required the members to obtain a permit
for discharges exempt under EPA regulations (i.e. affected the issuance or denial
of any permit), the Appalachian Energy Group would not have had notice of its
366. Id. (citing Natural Resources Defense Council, 966 E2d at 1297).
367. Appalachian Energy Group, 33 F.3d at 322-23.
368. Id. at 320 n.2. The group based its argument on three separate EPA statutory interpretations: (1) 40
C.F.R. § 122.26(c)(1)(iii) (mandating permits for oil and gas operations only when contaminants are being dis-
charged and not for uncontaminated storm water runoff); (2) 55 Fed. Reg. 48031 (Nov. 16, 1990) (adopting
Standard Industrial Classification 13 as the EPA definition of oil and gas activities and commenting that "oil
and gas [activities] ... must only obtain a storm water permit when a discharge to waters of the U.S.... is con-
taminated); and (3) 40 C.ER. § 122.26(b)(14)(i-x) (requiring storm water permits for only construction industry
activities, not for construction activities in other industries) (emphasis added).
369. Appalachian Energy Group, 33 E3d at 321 n.3.
370. "Although we recognize the problems that the EPA may encounter in maintaining this position, we do
not resolve the dispute at this time in light of our ruling that subject matter jurisdiction is lacking." Id. at n.3.
371. See supra notes 55, 56, and 311-12.
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terms or been given an opportunity to argue against its effect; thus, the court
could have found that the trade associations had no "fair notice."
Second, the memo was inconsistent with existing EPA regulations;372 therefore,
it would almost certainly have come as a surprise to any party who engaged in
regular day-to-day activities associated with the oil and gas industry and whose
activities complied with the current terms of the CWA and its regulations. In the
General Electric case,373 the court required notice to the regulated party prior to
an assessment of punishment. Although the court's requirement of "notice" was
liberal,374 the basic test was "whether the regulated party received ... notice of
the agency's interpretation in the most obvious way of all: by reading the regula-
tions. '375 In this instance, even if the oil and gas industry had read the EPA regu-
lations, there would have been no notice to the regulated entity of the require-
ments of the memo's contents which set out "what the law intend[ed] to do if a
certain line [was] passed.3 7  Accordingly, any penalties that might have been
assessed as a result of an unpermitted discharge, as defined by the memo's inter-
pretation, could not have been sustained.377
VII. THE FINALE-CHE VRON WALTZ AND ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT-
THE CLEAN WATER ACT
The Chevron waltz analysis works well for both the regulating agency and the
regulated community in situations involving both formal and informal regula-
tions under the environmental statutes. This is particularly true for enforcement
activities taken under the CWA, a strict liability statute379 which prohibits the dis-
charge of any pollutant without a permit and contains broad definitions of what
constitutes a "pollutant.""0 Fair notice of the types of activities prohibited under
the CWA is of particular concern, as the penalties allowed under the CWA are sub-
stantial and may have a significant effect on regulated entities and ordinary persons
alike; therefore, due process demands that potential offenders be aware of the
"clear lines" surrounding prohibited activities that, once crossed, result in puni-
tive sanctions.- '
The Chevron waltz analysis, which uses the two-step Chevron deference analy-
sis and then evaluates the type of notice provided to the violator before penalties
372. Appalachian Energy Group, 33 E3d at 320 n.2.
373. General Elec. Co. v. EPA, 53 E3d 1324 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
374. Id. at 1329.
375. Id.
376. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971).
377. See supra note 314.
378. The last movement of a sonata or any of the related forms, i.e., symphony, quartet, etc. HARVARD
DIcTioNARY OF Music 315 (2d ed. 1969).
379. See supra note 79.
380. Clean Water Act § 502, 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12) (1994), defines "discharge of a pollutant" as "any addi-
tion of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source." The CWA defines "pollutant" broadly, includ-
ing items such as rock, sand, and dirt. 33 U.S.C. § 1362 (6).
381. McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931) (holding that a fair warning has been given if the
statutory language is clear enough that it forms clearly ascertained limits to prohibited activities).
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can attach, meets the policies of both Chevron deference and the rule of lenity
because it encourages judicial deference to the agencies that have the expertise to
administer a broadly defined legislative scheme and the congressional mandate
(explicit or implied) to reconcile conflicting policy decisions. 82 The analysis
also encourages an approach to penalties assessed under broadly-worded "mod-
em" statutes which will also allow penalties or punishment to be fairly assessed
only when the violators are on notice of the consequences of their actions. The
operation of the Chevron waltz in this manner avoids the due process concerns
implicated in the strict liability impact of statutes like the CWA.
An added incentive for judicial use of the Chevron waltz is that it will assist in
the amelioration of the enforcement scheme under the CWA by encouraging uni-
formity among judicial decisions reviewing agency interpretations. Use of the
Chevron waltz analysis may encourage the judiciary to avoid senza ripieni choic-
es of other judicial doctrines (such as canons of construction like ejusdem gener-
is, noscitur a sociis, or the "public welfare doctrine") which further muddy the
already murky waters of judicial construction of broadly-worded statutes.
Finally, the requirement of an inquiry into how much "fair notice" is received by
the regulated party prior to any punishment being assessed softens judicial objec-
tions to Chevron deference to non-legislative rules3 because, absent notice, no
penalty may be assessed.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The rule of lenity, a "venerable doctrine, ' 384 protects interests vital to those
charged with penalties under our law. On the other hand, the Chevron deference
doctrine is crucial for the efficient working of the administrative enforcement of
broadly-worded "modem" statutes. While the interests served by the rule of
lenity do not disappear in the context of a comprehensive regulatory scheme,
such as the CWA, they metamorphose when interacting with other interests that
must be met during judicial review of an agency's actions. During any enforce-
ment of regulatory schemes, the agency's interpretations of the statues should
prevail if those interpretations are within the intent of Congress and are reason-
able. However, any penalties assessed under a regulatory scheme should be
upheld only if the court can find that "fair notice" of the regulations and their
consequences was provided to the regulated party. Under the CWA, the EPA'S
interpretations of its own statutes should be given deference and any penalties
should be upheld if they meet the above criteria. This enables the EPA to admin-
ister the scheme uniformly, rather than allowing a case by case approach, and
accomplishes the intent of Congress to "protect the public at large from the
potentially dire consequences of water pollution."" s On the other hand, potential
382. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984).
383. Elizabeth Blackwell Health Ctr. for Women v. Knoll, 61 E3d 170, 190-97 (3d Cir. 1995).
384. See supra note 170.
385. United States v. Weitzenhoff, 35 F3d 1275, 1286 (9th Cir. 1994).
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violators and regulated parties will receive "fair notice" of what is prohibited
under broadly worded legislative mandates, such as the CWA, so that they may
confine their activities within the parameters of the law or mount challenges to
those restrictions in the appropriate forum. The use of the Chevron waltz accom-
plishes this by meeting two very important needs addressed by the regulatory
scheme: (1) the need for Chevron deference to an agency's expert interpretation
of broad statutory language which the legislature requires the agency to adminis-
ter; and (2) the need for "fair notice" and "certainty" of punitive regulations
and/or agency interpretations of regulations which are designed to promote com-
pliance among persons who may suffer substantial penalties for violations.
To return to the Author's waltz analogy, the waltz "has retained its popularity to
the present day, [and] has time and again inspired composers.""38 So, too, this
Author believes the Chevron waltz, a combination of the Chevron deference doc-
trine and the rule of lenity, will attain a popularity over the judicial senza ripieni
use of either Chevron deference or the rule of lenity and possibly inspire a judi-
ciary which must meet the competing needs created by broadly-worded "mod-
em" statutory schemes for some time to come.
386. See supra note 307.
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